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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Yugoslavia Revisited: An Examination of the Immediate Effects and Long-Term Implications of 
Western (Foreign) Policies During and After the Yugoslav Crisis 
 
By 
 
Jovan Milojevich 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Professor Caesar Sereseres, Chair 
 
 
 
This research project consists of four studies that examined the immediate effects and 
long-term implications of Western foreign policy strategies in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). The crisis in SFRY in the early 1990’s began with secessionist groups 
conducting small-scale attacks on military and civilian infrastructures, yet it was the coercive 
threats of the U.S. and other western powers that escalated the violence. Although there were 
numerous factors that led to civil war enveloping Yugoslavia, only one causal factor of the war 
was a necessary condition. Study 1 is a case study analyzing the processes and effects of U.S. (as 
well as E.C.) foreign policy during the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis; focusing on one causal 
factor – the West’s strategy of coercion from 1990-91. Counterfactual theory of causation, as 
well as counterfactual analysis, with an emphasis on historical and logical consistency, and 
necessary and sufficient conditions, were utilized to support the hypothesis that the coercive 
strategy implemented by Western powers in the Balkans from 1990-91 was the cause of the war. 
The methodology used in this study is frequently utilized in case studies analyzing causes of war 
(as well as peace), however it has not yet been utilized to analyze the cause of the Yugoslav civil 
xvi 	
 
 
war. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on counterfactual analysis, as well as on 
the Yugoslav conflicts and U.S. foreign policy more broadly.  
Study 2 examines possible bias by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Scholars have long debated the impartiality of this institute. Some argue that 
the Tribunal is biased while others argue that it fairly and impartially seeks justice for all the 
victims of the war. The present study offers a narrower approach to the question of possible bias 
by examining whether certain case variables were associated with case outcomes. The results 
show strong evidence of an association between the ethnicity of the accused (and of the victims) 
and the verdict and years sentenced, which calls into question the Tribunal’s impartiality. 
Nonetheless, the main goal of this study was not to question or dispute its decisions but to assess 
the validity of certain grievances against the Tribunal.  For instance, the Serbs feel the Tribunal 
has not delivered justice for their victims and –as a result– their ‘collective suffering’ has been 
disavowed by the other communities in the region as well as by the West. Western political elites 
have largely rejected the validity of the Serbs’ claim and have attributed their belief to a denial 
by the Serbs of their role in the war. Unfortunately, the contentious nature of this debate has 
contributed to the lack of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in the region.  
Study 3 extends on the issue of bias by examining the messages disseminated by the 
ICTY. Previous studies have demonstrated that Tribunal has made prosecutorial decisions and 
reached judgments based on ethnicity. Furthermore, some scholars argue that the workings of the 
Tribunal have aggravated tensions in the region and are the primary cause for the negative 
perceptions of the ICTY by many communities in the Balkans. In response, the Tribunal has 
largely blamed the regional media and ‘nationalist politicians’ for spreading ‘gross distortions 
and blatant falsehoods’ about its work. Subsequently, it created an outreach program to try to 
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change its image in the Balkans. Using thematic analysis, this study examined the way the 
Tribunal has framed the Yugoslav conflicts. The results show that the Tribunal’s frame of the 
conflicts mirrors that of the U.S. government and Western mainstream media, indicating ethnic 
bias by the Tribunal. Overall, this study supports findings of framing studies, as well as empirical 
and critical studies on the ICTY.  
Finally, Study 4 examines the effects of the ongoing media demonization/dehumanization 
on the target group that began at the onset of the crisis in Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. Recent 
empirical research has shown that dehumanization can have severely negative consequences. 
Few studies, however, have focused on the target group and those that have were experimental. 
To fill this void, this study focuses on the effects of dehumanization from the perspective of the 
target group through a real-world experience of dehumanization. Serbians and Serbian-
Americans were recruited to participate in a series of focus groups and one-on-one, semi-
structured interviews via Skype. The results show effects that include feelings of numbness, 
lethargy, a reduced tendency towards action, and lack of self-assertion; responses that are defense 
mechanisms against emotional distress. These results support previous studies on dehumanization. 
However, the most dominant themes were motivations to take action and ‘fight back,’ mainly 
through political engagement and mobilization. The results can essentially be boiled down to 
responses of ‘fight or flight,’ with the former as the most dominant. This study, therefore, adds a 
novel insight into the effects of dehumanization.  
1 	
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Until the outbreak of war in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the 
1990s, Europe had enjoyed an unparalleled era of peace since the end of  World War II. During 
this period, Yugoslavia managed to integrate its divergent ethnic groups and religions into a 
single national state. Nevertheless, tensions continued to exist between the various ethnic groups, 
as groups such as the Croatians, Kosovo Albanians, and Bosnian Muslims were allied with the 
Nazis during WWII and committed genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Roma. The majority of the 
killings were committed within the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi puppet 
state, where extermination camps, such as Jasenovac – one of the largest such camps in Europe – 
were established throughout the territory. The crimes of the Ustasha (Croatian fascist 
government) went largely unpunished and are not well-known outside of the region even today, 
which is mainly a result of their suppression by Yugoslavia’s (somewhat dictatorial) Communist 
leader Josip Broz Tito. Once tensions began to mount in the early 1990s, memories of these past 
atrocities played a major part in how the groups responded to one another. Some groups 
(legitimately) feared others, as right-wing politicians took control of various regions and used 
nationalist rhetoric to mobilize their people and to prepare to break the country apart. Many 
scholars blame nationalism for the outbreak of violence (Denitch, 1996; Glenny, 1992; 2012; 
Kaplan, 1993; Ramet, 1992; Silber & Little, 1996), yet nationalism is only a part of the story.  
From at least the beginning of the 1980s – around the time of Tito’s death – internal and 
external forces were moving the country in the direction of ethnic conflict. Although the 
underlying causes of the Yugoslav civil war have been shown to be multiple and complex, they 
were clearly precipitated by the ambitions of external forces, mainly by Germany and the United 
States. Many scholars (Ali, 2000; Beloff, 1997; Carpenter, 2000; Flounders, 1998; Gervasi, 
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1998; Gowan 1999; 2000; Hayden, 1993; Johnstone, 2002; Parenti, 2000; Roberts, 1996; 
Szamuely, 2013) have blamed the strategic geopolitics and neo-liberal agenda of these Western 
powers for Yugoslavia’s demise. Although scholars who blame external forces for the outbreak 
of war acknowledge that internal forces were contributing factors, and vice versa, the debate on 
who deserves the most blame for the outbreak of war continues. Furthermore, and in spite of all 
the evidence to the contrary, the conventional wisdom about the role of the United States is that 
it did not take sides (at least in the early stages) and that it wanted Yugoslavia to remain intact. 
This was most definitely not the case as the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, a 
public law the Bush administration pushed Congress into passing, essentially demanded the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and is evidence that the U.S. had always supported the secessionists. 
One of the goals of this dissertation was to contribute to this debate and to make the role 
of the United States (as well as the European Union and Germany) clearer. This was done by 
conducting a case study (Study 1) using necessary condition counterfactual analysis in order to 
paint a clearer picture of the impact Western policies, particularly American, had on the conflict. 
The hypothesis of this study is that the demands and ultimatums made by the West were 
ineffective in ameliorating the dispute and instead were major contributing factors, or necessary 
conditions, for escalating the crisis from mainly isolated pockets of violence into a full-blown 
war. To put it another way, the coercive strategy employed by the West from 1990-1991 was the 
main cause of the war. Therefore, if the coercive actions conducted by Western powers in the 
Balkans during this timeframe were taken out of the causal chain of events, it is highly likely that 
the violence that permeated the region could have been averted and a peaceful solution to the 
crisis could have been found. To frame it as a necessary condition counterfactual, without 
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Western coercion (independent variable X), a full-blown war (dependent variable Y) would not 
have occurred. 
From this point, the goal was to build off the initial study to examine, arguably, the other 
main contentious issue of the Yugoslav case, which is the debate about whether the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was a fair and impartial court that sought 
justice for all of the victims of the conflicts, or whether it was a political tool used by Western 
powers to justify their intervention by making Serbs the guilty party and minimizing the role of 
the secessionist groups. Regardless of where one stands on this debate, it is generally 
acknowledged that the Tribunal has been shrouded in controversy since its inception – although 
those who support the Tribunal tend to overlook or justify the issues that have been raised 
against it. Some of the disconcerting actions of the Tribunal that have been exposed include 
indicting individuals without evidence, redacting testimony, censoring defendants, violating 
defendants’ due process, trying defendants in absentia, allowing hearsay evidence, allowing and 
admitting evidence obtained through torture, accepting testimony from perjured witnesses, not 
allowing defendants to confront their accusers, not allowing defendants to access and analyze 
evidence being used against them, violating defendants’ right to a public hearing, and giving 
accused war criminals impunity for their testimony (Black, 2000; Brock, 1996; Hayden, 1999; 
Laughland, 2007; Mandel, 2004; Thomas, 2003; Zoglin, 2005). These are serious accusations 
that should not be taken lightly. Nonetheless, the focus of this dissertation is the accusation of 
bias. 
Two separate studies (Study 2 and Study 3) were conducted to examine a possible anti-
Serb bias by the Tribunal. Study 2 is a quantitative analysis of case outcomes at the ICTY, and 
Study 3 is a content analysis of the messages disseminated by the Tribunal (mainly to 
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communities in the Balkan region but also to the international community). Study 2 and Study 3 
are inextricably linked to Study 1. For instance, if the foreign policy strategies of Western 
powers were mostly to blame for the outbreak of war, then it could be expected that the ICTY 
would be biased against Serbs, especially considering that Western powers created it, as well as 
funded and staffed it throughout its operations. Based on previous research on the ICTY two 
hypotheses were formulated for Study 2; it was predicted (H1) that those who committed crimes 
against non-Serbs would be more likely to be convicted as well as sentenced to longer prison 
terms than those who committed crimes against Serbs and (H2) that defendants of Serbian 
ethnicity would be more likely to get convicted as well as sentenced to longer prison terms than 
those who are not of Serbian ethnicity. Building off of Study 2, Study 3 offered a qualitative, and 
therefore more exploratory, examination into the issue of bias.  
Finally, a fourth study (Study 4) was conducted to examine the psychological effects of 
the demonization of Serbia (and Serbians) by the mainstream media (both during and after the 
conflicts) on Serbians and Serbian-Americans. In order to gain support for the breakaway 
republics and ultimately to sway public opinion in favor of U.S. foreign policy, the mainstream 
media and government officials conducted a large-scale propaganda campaign against the Serbs 
(Hammond, 2000a; Hammond & Herman, 2000). As renowned scholar on the media (who also 
wrote prolifically on Yugoslavia), Edward Herman (2009) describes, “The successful 
demonization of the Serbs, making them largely responsible for the Yugoslav wars, and as 
unique and genocidal killers, was one of the great propaganda triumphs of our era. It was done so 
quickly, with such uniformity and uncritical zeal in the mainstream Western media, that 
disinformation had (and still has, after almost two decades) a field day.”  
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Ultimately, the main objective of demonizing a group, other than to gain public support for 
a particular foreign policy (usually a ‘humanitarian intervention’), is to dehumanize it, as it places 
the target group outside of the moral boundaries of society and makes crimes and atrocities 
committed against it seem acceptable, even just (Opotow, 1990). Dehumanization is a 
“psychological process of demonizing the enemy, making them seem less than human and hence 
not worthy of humane treatment” (Maiese, 2003). It is also an “extension of a less intense process 
of developing an ‘enemy image’ of the opponent…[which] is a negative stereotype through which 
the opposing group is viewed as evil, in contrast to one's own side, which is seen as good” 
(Maiese, 2003). Furthermore, the demonization of Serbs is also supported by studies on media 
framing, which have shown that the media tend to report and stay close to the government’s 
official version of events (Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Lawrence, 2010) while ignoring opinions 
on foreign policy that do not receive support among political elites (Powlick & Katz, 1998), and 
consistently favor one side over another (Entman, 2004, Entman & Rojecki, 2000) – especially 
when it comes to U.S. foreign policy (Entman, 2004; 2007). 
Research on the media demonization of Serbs has been quite prolific, and the same can 
be said about propaganda and media framing. However, one area where research has been 
limited is on the effects dehumanization can have on the target group, and more specifically 
dehumanization through demonization. Recent empirical research has shown that 
dehumanization can have severely negative consequences, however few studies have focused on 
the target group and those that have were experimental. To fill this void, this study focuses on 
the effects of dehumanization from the perspective of the target group through a real-world 
experience of dehumanization. Serbians and Serbian-Americans were recruited to participate in a 
series of focus groups and one-on-one, semi-structured interviews via Skype. By utilizing open-
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ended responses from a community-based sample, the data generated from this methodology are 
richer in detail than what can generally be obtained through experiments. Therefore, this 
approach allowed for a deeper exploration of the experiences and feelings of the respondents to 
the dehumanization process, as well as helped to better understand how certain effects of 
dehumanization can evolve or dissipate, and how coping and/or defense mechanisms, may 
change over time.  
Study 4 is a vital component of this dissertation, as it turns the focus on the human 
component of the conflicts and the effects that government policies can have on innocent lives, 
beyond the devastation of sanctions and bombing from the sky. The roles of the ICTY and 
Western mainstream media (particularly the American media) were vital to shaping public 
opinion on U.S. foreign policy, however the element that is almost never taken into consideration 
is what is at stake when it comes to reaching this goal. Some participants from Study 4 described 
it as ‘media bombing.’ They felt that it was even more deleterious on the overall well-being of 
Serbs around the world than actual NATO bombs. No one was trying to minimize the death and 
destruction within Serbia (and other Serbian populated areas NATO bombed), however they 
wanted to point out effects that are often overlooked. They stated that Serbia was always able to 
recover and rebuild relatively quickly after wars (such as WWI and WWII), but that the 
psychological impact the ‘media bombing’ has had on Serbs has made the recovery process 
much more difficult. Considering the statement by Herman above, they make a valid point. 
In conclusion, the overarching goal of this dissertation was to offer a unique perspective 
of the Yugoslav conflicts by analyzing various factors of the conflicts that have not been 
examined (or only minimally examined) before. The hope is that the studies conducted for this 
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dissertation will contribute to various literatures, such as those on Yugoslavia, peace and 
conflict, international criminal law, media and propaganda studies, and dehumanization. 
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CHAPTER 1: Coercive Diplomacy as a Cause of War 
 In late 1990 and early 1991 the United States employed two coercive measures against 
the federal government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which were 
necessary conditions that caused the ‘Wars of Secession’ in Yugoslavia. The first was the 1991 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which demanded that the SFRY follow certain 
provisions as established by the U.S. government, with noncompliance resulting in the U.S. 
blocking all financial assistance to the SFRY. The second coercive measure was U.S. 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman’s ultimatum to Belgrade, in which he declared 
that the United States would not accept the use of force by the SFRY’s armed forces – Yugoslav 
People’s Army (otherwise known as ‘JNA’, which stands for Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) –  
to preserve Yugoslavia and that failure to comply would result in severe economic and 
diplomatic sanctions, as well as possible military recourse. 
The situation in the SFRY was one in which multiple groups were fighting one another 
for virtually the same things: territory and the right to self-determination. However, the U.S. 
threatened only the Serbs with sanctions and, later, military force to try to persuade them to 
abandon their right to self-determination on the territories they had control over and where their 
population made up the majority. Meanwhile, the U.S. supported these same rights for the other 
groups that constituted Yugoslavia (Slovenians, Croatians, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo 
Albanians), which created a ‘powder-keg’ scenario. It was a contradictory policy that applied a 
double standard – one for the Serbs and one for everyone else. As General Charles G. Boyd, a 
four-star general who served as deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command 
during the Yugoslav crisis, noted in his article published in Foreign Affairs, “As one Serb officer 
confided to a member of my staff, he did not understand why his people had been “satanized” for 
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insisting on the same right of self-determination that had been accorded virtually all others in the 
former Yugoslavia” (Boyd, 1995; pp. 25-26). At the onset of the U.S. strategy, the separatist 
groups perceived U.S. threats against the Serbs as a ‘green-light’ to continue collecting arms and 
committing violent attacks against both government and civilian infrastructures. By not 
condemning these terrorist acts the U.S., in essence, tacitly approved of them. Furthermore, the 
U.S. began covertly and overtly supplying financial and other aid to the secessionists – a 
bewildering and antithetical policy for a state that publicly declared its support for a unified 
SFRY.   
 The United States and the European Communities (E.C.) – also referred to as the 
‘European Community’ and was the precursor to the European Union –  claimed they were 
against the break-up of Yugoslavia, yet, as General Boyd (1995; p. 23) pointed out, “U.S. actions 
in the Balkans have been at sharp variance with stated U.S. policy.” Before and throughout the 
war U.S. and E.C. foreign policies escalated the tension and violence in the region, and with each 
failed attempt at finding a peaceful resolution Serb resolve only hardened. For most of the war 
the Serbs resisted the demands of the West, acting under the assumption that any attempt by the 
West to garner the necessary U.N. approval to use military force against them would be met with 
disapproval.1 Furthermore, besides affecting the disposition of the Serbs the U.S./E.C. policy of 
                                                        
1 At the time, Yugoslavia was considered a part of Russia’s sphere of influence, regardless of 
Tito breaking ties with Stalin in 1948 (Beloff, 1985). The climate was not yet ready for the U.S. 
to act unilaterally, as it would have been difficult for the U.S. to use military force without 
United Nations (U.N.) approval. Nevertheless, the U.S. was able to test the waters and, more 
specifically, test Russia’s resolve in the region. Once Russia’s influence waned and the U.S. 
realized Russia and the U.N. were too weak to stand up to it, the U.S. made its move to establish 
control and dominance in the region. The move reinforced Europe’s reliance on U.S. military 
power and the U.S. was able to transform NATO’s mandate as a defensive alliance against 
possible Soviet aggression into an offensive one ready to ‘defend human rights’ and ‘spread 
democracy’ anywhere in the world and at any cost (Gervasi, 1998). 
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offering only sticks to the Serbs while carrots were offered to the secessionists had a negative 
impact on the secessionist groups. One of the main consequences of the West’s strategy was that 
it fostered an indefatigable stubbornness in the secessionists.  
 With Western powers squarely in their corner, the secessionists were much less willing to 
negotiate in good faith knowing they would not be punished for resisting. In fact, much of the 
time they were rewarded for doing so (Burg, 2003; Holbrooke, 2000; Johnstone, 2002; 
Laughland, 2007; MacKenzie, 1993). However, there were moments when the West genuinely 
wanted its newly minted clients in the Balkans to accept a deal it put forth, yet these groups 
frequently refused to do so. In his book, To End a War (2000), former U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations Richard Holbrooke acknowledges that the negotiations in Dayton almost broke 
down as a result of the stubbornness of Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, who was 
unwilling to compromise even on issues that hardly mattered to the Bosnian Muslims. 
Furthermore, Holbrooke (2000) details how the Albanians made life difficult for the Americans 
in Rambouillet even though the Americans were giving the Albanians everything they wanted 
(See also Ali, 2000; Corwin, 1999). At various times throughout the fighting that took place in 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (Kosovo) ceasefires and peace negotiations broke down – or were 
blatantly sabotaged – largely due to the actions of the secessionists, which were mainly 
orchestrated by the U.S. (Ali, 2000; Art & Cronin 2003; Holbrooke, 2000; MacKenzie, 1993; 
Owen, 1995; Rose, 1999; Schindler, 2007).  
 Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Walter R. Roberts (2014; p. 372) affirmed that 
“most of the local ceasefires that were arranged by the United Nations on the spot were broken 
by the Bosnians, and the ceasefire that had been holding in Croatia for over a year was shattered 
by the Croatians.” According to former British Foreign Secretary David Owen, who was an 
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active mediator in Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslims were not willing to sign a promising peace 
agreement, which offered quite favorable terms to their side, because they expected the 
Americans to join in the fight on their behalf at any moment. In an interview in early February 
1993 Owen stated, “We have more or less got a settlement. But we have a problem.  We can't get 
the Muslims on board.  And that's largely the fault of the Americans, because the Muslims won't 
budge while they think Washington may come into it on their side any day now…. It's the best 
settlement you can get, and it is a bitter irony to see the Clinton people block it” (Apple, 1993). 
The coercive measures were clear indicators that Washington had sided with the secessionists 
and had its own agenda for the region. Gervasi (1998; p. 26) reaffirms this notion as he states, 
“[The] two Western powers, the United States and Germany, deliberately contrived to destabilize 
and then dismantle the country” as they “carefully planned, prepared, and assisted the secessions 
which broke Yugoslavia apart.” Once their pretense of supporting the preservation of the SFRY 
was no longer necessary, the Western powers recognized the secessionist states as independent 
and sovereign, violating international law and norms in the process. It was the final act that 
ignited the powder keg and launched the SFRY into a civil war.  
 Some scholars (Burg, 2003; Art, 2003), however, have argued that U.S. coercive 
diplomacy succeeded in bringing about the Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian war. 
There were certainly many factors that led to the peace settlement, and perhaps the coercive 
diplomacy used in Dayton was one of them, yet, regardless of its (perceived) success during the 
negotiations in Dayton, it does not negate the effects of the coercive strategy that preceded it. 
Furthermore, with respect to the Kosovo case, coercive diplomacy employed by the U.S. at the 
“negotiations” in Rambouillet, France – where the U.S. presented the Serbs with an ultimatum 
that went far beyond what any legitimate sovereign state would accept – culminated with the 
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U.S., through the auspices of NATO, conducting an almost three-month illegal air war against 
the ‘rump Yugoslavia’ (Serbia and Montenegro).2 According to Art (2003), coercive diplomacy 
fails when the coercer cannot persuade the target to ‘reverse course’ and, therefore, must either 
back down – which could later weaken its negotiating power – or conduct a full-scale war. The 
latter is what occurred during the Kosovo crisis and, therefore, the coercive diplomacy employed 
by the U.S. can only be deemed a failure (Burg, 2003). Although U.S. coercive diplomacy may 
have failed to bring peace, it was successful in bringing war, which was seemingly the 
Americans' intended goal.  
To ensure of this outcome the Americans added a last minute addendum to the 
ultimatum, known as Appendix B,3 that would have given NATO the power to occupy all of 
Yugoslavia, intentionally setting the bar too high and anticipating that the Serbs would reject the 
“peace deal” (Booth, 2001; Gowan, 2000; Layne, 1999). U.S. policymakers made it clear from 
the outset that their terms were ‘nonnegotiable’ – (then) Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
further stressed this point at a White House press conference shortly after the bombing began4 – 
and knew all along that there was ‘zero chance’ that the Serbs would accept the proposal, 
therefore the U.S. was able to create a pretext for war by framing the situation as the Serbs being 
‘unwilling to negotiate’ and ‘rejecting peace’ (Burg, 2003; pp. 90-91). Burg (2003) argues that 
the U.S. devised and executed a plan to ensure the failure of the peace talks in order to punish 
                                                        
2 When NATO began its bombing campaign on March 24, 1999 it did so without permission 
from the United Nations – there was no resolution and no U.N. Security Council approval before 
taking this action. 
3 The addendum was shrouded in secrecy and kept from the general public for most of the 
bombing campaign, which was a clear indication of malintent.  
4 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Press Conference on “Kosovo,” Washington, D.C., 
March 25, 1999, released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, 
secretary.state.gov/www/statements (taken from Burg, 2003; p. 99). 
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Serbia for Bosnia and Kosovo, while others (Gowan, 1999; 2000; Johnstone, 2002; Parenti, 
2000) argue that it was done to destroy the last remaining bastion of social and economic 
independence in the region – essentially for geopolitical reasons. Either way it is perceived, the 
addendum is indispensable evidence that supports the claim that the U.S. purposely escalated the 
crisis in order to create a pretext, as well as to justify, an air war against Yugoslavia. 
Objective and Method of Study 
 As discussed, coercive measures were used at various stages of the conflict, however this 
case study focuses solely on the U.S strategy that was utilized during the early period of the 
conflict, from 1990-1991. Furthermore, the main focus of this study is to examine one causal 
factor. In many case studies, as Goertz and Levy (2007; p. 15) emphasize, “the goal is to focus 
on one important causal factor. The aim is not a “complete” explanation of the event but rather a 
more modest one of exploring the consequences of a key independent variable.” Tetlock and 
Belkin (1996; p. 19) further emphasize that “thought experiments should manipulate one cause at 
a time, thereby isolating pathways of influence.” Therefore, counterfactual theory of causation is 
utilized for this study, with the goal of analyzing one causal factor to test whether or not it was a 
necessary condition for the cause of the war. This is done, in part, by examining whether the 
outcome would have been the same without the effects of the causal factor. As described by 
Lewis (1987; p. 161), “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the 
difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it. Had it been 
absent, its effects — some of them, at least, and usually all — would have been absent as well.” 
Goertz and Levy (2007; p. 14) explain that “X is necessary for Y means simultaneously the 
counterfactual that without X, Y would not have occurred.”  
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 In order to reach the stated aim of this study, counterfactual analysis with an emphasis on 
historical and logical consistency (Tetlock & Belkin, 1996) and necessary and sufficient 
conditions (Goertz & Levy, 2007) are utilized for analysis. The hypothesis of this study is that 
the demands and ultimatums made by the West were ineffective in ameliorating the dispute and 
instead were major contributing factors, or necessary conditions, for escalating the crisis from 
mainly isolated pockets of violence into a full-blown war. To put it another way, the coercive 
strategy employed by the West during this time frame was the main cause of the war. Therefore, 
if the coercive actions conducted by Western powers in the Balkans from 1990-1991 were taken 
out of the causal chain of events, it is highly likely that the violence that permeated the region 
could have been averted and a peaceful solution to the crisis could have been found. To frame it 
as a necessary condition counterfactual, without Western coercion (independent variable X), a 
full-blown war (dependent variable Y) would not have occurred. 
Right to Self-determination? 
 It is important to first begin with the question of self-determination; did the secessionist 
groups in Yugoslavia have the right to declare the ‘right to self-determination’ and force the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, and, therefore, was the United States justified in its support of these 
groups? According to international law, the answer to this question is no, as secessionism is 
illegal and supporting secessionist movements is generally not favorably looked upon by both 
Western as well as non-Western states – many U.N. member states, including several Western 
ones, have had to deal (or are currently dealing) with their own secessionist issues. In order to 
support this premise about secessionism a brief historical background on the “right to self-
determination” – as was claimed by the secessionists – is provided below, as well as a 
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comparative analysis of the Yugoslav case to similar cases, which will demonstrate that the 
secessionist movements in the SFRY were clearly illegal.   
 The “right to self-determination” as a theory or ideology has pre-20th century roots, 
however, the most important historical starting point for the emergence of the right to self-
determination in the 20th century came in 1918, just before the end of World War I. The leader of 
this ideology was then U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. His Fourteen Points speech had a major 
influence on establishing new nation-states in Europe. Ironically, one of the states he listed in his 
Fourteen Points speech was Serbia. The eleventh point was as follows:  
Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; 
Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan 
states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines 
of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.5 
 
One month later he gave his famous self-determination speech, and in it declared the following: 
“National aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by 
their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of 
action” (Congressional speech given on Feb.11, 1918). However, his argument for defending 
peoples’ right to self-determination, as described in his Fourteen Points, is based on the premise 
that this right belongs to peoples who had their territories occupied or colonized by a foreign 
power – i.e., the Ottoman Empire, the Empire of Austria Hungary, or the British Commonwealth.  
 Since Yugoslavia was created with the consent of all of its constituent peoples (or 
‘nations’ – ‘narodi’ in Serbian) it does not meet Wilson’s self-determination criteria. In fact, the 
movement to create a nation of “South Slavs” originated in Croatia in the 19th century; it was 
called the “Illyrian Movement” (Trifkovic, 2010). Therefore, based on Wilson’s principles, the 
                                                        
5  Taken from Williams, Goldstein, and Shafritz (2006). 
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secessionists in SFRY should not have been allowed to unilaterally declare independence based 
on the “right to self-determination”. Furthermore, there is nothing mentioned in the United 
Nations Charter that grants self-determination to peoples within existing sovereign independent 
states, nor are there any Western nations that allow secession within their borders (Thomas; 
2003). Therefore, no group in the SFRY had the right to secede in such a manner. However, 
there were certain measures that would have allowed nations within the SFRY to legally 
breakaway and create their own states. Based on the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution nations (not 
territories) can be granted sovereignty as part of a confederation with the SFRY or they can 
become completely independent sovereign states (Johnstone, 2002; Laughland, 2007; Parenti, 
2000; Szamuely, 2013). Hayden (1993; p. 1) offers a succinct summary of the way the 1974 
Yugoslav Constitution addressed the right to self-determination including the possibility of 
secession: 
The famed concept of self-determination had different meanings in Yugoslav politics and 
popular thought than the refined, "limited" right that the EC and US claimed to recognize. 
The reference in the first line of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution to "the right of every 
nation to self-determination, including the right to secession" referred to the nations 
(narodi) of Yugoslavia, ethnically defined, not to the populations or citizens of republics. 
While these "nations" were recognized as having their several republics, it was the 
"nations,” not the republics, that were described as having united to form the Yugoslav 
state. This constitutional situation may be contrasted with that of the Soviet constitution 
of 1977, which defined the Soviet Union as a state formed by "the voluntary association 
of equal Soviet Socialist Republics,” each of which retained "the right freely to secede 
from the USSR." Such a right was not granted to the Yugoslav republics, but only to the 
"nations" of Yugoslavia. 
 
 Nevertheless, gaining independence from the SFRY would have been an arduous process 
and many concessions would have been necessary on the part of the secessionists, such as 
affording other nations within a specific territory – such as the Serbs in Croatia for example – the 
option of remaining within the SFRY. Therefore, all of the secessionist groups in the SFRY 
would have had to give up parts of the territories they claimed belonged exclusively to them, 
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which was perhaps the primary reason the secessionists avoided this route.6 The only other 
option available to them, however, was illegal: collecting arms and using violent measures to 
break away. This is the option the secessionist groups in the SFRY chose. It is a means that can 
cause unrest in a state, including destabilizing a legitimate government (especially when foreign 
governments interfere), and is, therefore, one of the main reasons states do not support 
secessionism. 
 There are many Western states that have dealt with or are currently dealing with 
secessionist problems similar to the one that occurred in Yugoslavia – Canada (Quebec), Spain 
(Basque region and Catalonia), Great Britain (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland), and Belgium 
(Flanders and Wallonia) are just a few examples and none of them have allowed secessionists to 
unilaterally declare independence. To elaborate further with respect to Quebec, in August 1998 
the Canadian Supreme Court, having acknowledged that Canada is not indivisible, declared that 
Quebec could not secede through a simple majority vote among its residents, and, more 
importantly, declared that under international law, there is no right of unilateral secession except 
territories that are judged to be colonies and specially oppressed peoples (Thomas 2003; p. 21). 
Based on this ruling, which happened to include three judges from Quebec, the secessionists in 
the SFRY should have clearly been ruled out as possible claimants of the right to self-
determination.  
                                                        
6 When the SFRY was founded Tito’s regime established the boundaries in a way that was not 
necessarily fair to all groups. The theory, “A weak Serbia for a strong Yugoslavia” had guided 
the domestic policy of Tito’s regime since the establishment of the SFRY (Beloff, 1985; 1997; 
Meier, 2005; Walter, 2014) and the boundaries were drawn in a way that reflected this policy. 
Instead of living in the same republic, as was afforded to the other peoples or nations of 
Yugoslavia, large segments of the Serbian population were forced to live outside of Serbia. 
Furthermore, they were not given autonomy within these regions even though non-Serb 
communities were given autonomy inside of Serbia. 
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 Furthermore, Thomas (2003; p. 18) offers another prime example of a unilateral 
declaration of independence (UDI) – mirroring those that occurred in SFRY – that was judged to 
be illegal: 
When the right of self-determination is invoked by secessionist ethnic groups, the state 
almost always invokes the principles of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
state and the inviolability of its borders. This invariably leads to civil war. A “Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence” (UDI) against the objections of the federal authorities and 
the wishes of the majority population who are engaged in resisting the secessionists is 
considered a violation of international law. In 1965, for instance, Britain refused to 
recognize the UDI by Prime Minister Ian Smith’s White minority government in 
Rhodesia declaring the act as illegal under international law. Supporting the British 
position, the United Nations then proceeded to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia 
as punishment for its illegal UDI. 
  
On November 12, 1965, the day after Rhodesia’s UDI, the UN adopted United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 216, which condemned the UDI “made by a racist minority" in Southern 
Rhodesia7. According to the Yugoslav census of 1991, even if all of the Croats, Bosnian 
Muslims, Slovenians, and Albanians had amalgamated for the sole purpose of breaking up 
Yugoslavia, they still would have only constituted roughly 44% of Yugoslavia’s total population, 
which is a long way from being a full majority (Johnstone, 2002; Parenti, 2000).  Therefore, if 
Rhodesia’s UDI was considered illegal – due mainly to the fact it was made by a minority – as 
well as meriting severe punishment by the United Nations, then, based on the same principle, the 
UDIs made by the secessionists in the SFRY should have also been deemed illegal. However, 
this did not occur. The United Nations did not even offer an opinion on the legality (or illegality) 
of the UDIs made by the secessionists in the SFRY, nor did it in any way try to defend the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SFRY. These very principles form the 
foundation of international law and the United Nations was created mainly for the purpose of 
                                                        
7 Resolution 216 can be viewed at: http://undocs.org/S/RES/216(1965) 
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defending state sovereignty in order to help maintain international peace and security (Dinstein, 
2011; Goodrich & Simons, 1955; Laughland, 2007; Luard & Heater, 1994; Schachter, 1991). 
Vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, the United Nations failed to uphold these principles and allowed 
international law to be violated. 
The Coercive Strategy 
Defining Coercion  
 The strategies employed by the United States apropos of the crises in former Yugoslavia 
were a combination of deterrence, coercive attempts, and coercive diplomacy, and were aimed 
primarily at the Serbs. Deterrence was utilized mainly before the fighting broke out in the SFRY. 
Coercive attempts were employed as a strategy immediately prior to as well as during the war, 
and coercive diplomacy was used at the end of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Kosovo crises. The 
present case study focuses the West’s strategy, which utilized both deterrence and coercive 
attempts (a form of compellence), during the time period immediately before and after the 
outbreak of violence. The theories of deterrence and compellence can vary and at times may 
seem rather nebulous and confusing. For instance, Byman, Waxman, and Larson (1999) state 
that compellence and deterrence are both forms of coercion, and Art (2013) states that coercion 
and coercive diplomacy are both forms of compellence. Scholars, such as Schelling (1966), 
George (1991), Morgan (2003), and Art (2003), separate compellence from deterrence because 
compellence essentially is utilized as a strategy to persuade a target to “stop what he is doing…. 
(or) to undue what he has already done” (George, 1991; p. 6) and deterrence is utilized as a 
strategy in order to prevent a target from taking a certain action – such as invading another state 
or developing nuclear weapons – (Morgan, 2003; Schelling, 1966). As Schelling (1966; pp. 71-
72) notes:  
20 	
 
 
Deterrence and compellence differ in a number of respects…. Deterrence involves setting 
the stage – by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation – and 
waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent. The stage-setting can often be nonintrusive, 
nonhostile, nonprovocative. The act that is intrusive, hostile, or provocative is usually the 
one to be deterred; the deterrent threat only changes the consequences if the act in 
question – the one to be deterred – is then taken. Compellence, in contrast, usually 
involves initiating an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or 
become harmless, only if the opponent responds. The overt act, the first step, is up to the 
side that makes the compellent threat. To deter, one digs in, or lays a minefield, and waits 
– in the interest of inaction. To compel, one gets up enough momentum (figuratively, but 
sometimes literally) to make the other act to avoid collision.  
 
 Byman et al. (1999; p. 11) agree with Schelling here, yet they argue that compellence and 
deterrence “tend to blur”, because they both (can) use coercive measures. Furthermore, they 
argue (11) that the target of deterrence can, subsequently, threaten its opponent – with violent or 
nonviolent actions – in order to force it to reverse course (revoke its deterrent threat) or to stop 
the coercer from trying to coerce it, which, either way you look at it, are seemingly forms of 
compellence. Morgan (2003; p. 3) provides a good example of how compellence and deterrence 
can blur by drawing on the case of North Korea and its development of nuclear weapons: “When 
the US threatens military action to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program is this 
deterrence of a provocative step (a kind of "attack" by the North), or compellance of the North to 
get it to stop what it is doing”? This example highlights how difficult it can be at times to 
distinguish between compellence and deterrence. However, based on the descriptions provided 
by these scholars, it would be a safe assumption to make that coercive attempts and coercive 
diplomacy (both forms of compellence) fall under the ‘coercion’ category, and that, at times, 
deterrence can as well.  
Art (2003; pp. 6-7) distinguishes between coercive attempts and coercive diplomacy as 
he defines coercive diplomacy as the threat of military force or the actual use of limited force in 
order to get the target to “change its objectionable behavior”. He believes coercive attempts 
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involve only “the use of economic sanctions, only the withholding of benefits to a target, only 
the cessation of benefits that a target currently enjoys, or more generally any coercive attempt 
that does not entail some employment of military force” (pp. 6-7). When it comes to coercive 
diplomacy, however, George (1991; p. 5) argues that it is a “strategy that seeks to persuade an 
opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping”, and he stresses that if 
any force is to be used it must be conducted in a very limited and cautious manner. Contrary to 
Art, George does not view coercive diplomacy as needing to use the threat of military force and 
states that it “does indeed offer an alternative to reliance on military action” (5). Therefore, 
George classifies compellence with or without the threat of military force as ‘coercive 
diplomacy’, while Art separates compellence with the threat of military force (coercive 
diplomacy) from compellence without the threat of military force (coercive attempts). Art’s 
‘coercive attempts’ constitutes coercion by threat and/or implementation of sanctions and/or 
embargos, which I generally use in reference to one of the two threats issued by the Americans in 
the Balkans during the time period between 1990-1991. The other measure taken as part of their 
coercive strategy consisted of a deterrence threat, and it included both sanctions and the use of 
military force as punishment for noncompliance. Since the overall strategy contained threats of 
sanctions and the use of military force as punishment for noncompliance it is classified as 
‘coercive diplomacy’. 
The Strategy  
The United States employed two coercive measures against the federal government of the 
SFRY that were necessary conditions for the outbreak of war. The first was the 1991 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act, which demanded that the SFRY follow certain provisions as 
established by the U.S. government, with noncompliance resulting in the U.S. blocking all 
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financial assistance to the SFRY.8 The second coercive measure was U.S. Ambassador to SFR 
Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman’s ultimatum to Belgrade, in which he declared that the United 
States would not accept the use of force by the SFRY’s armed forces (the JNA) to preserve 
Yugoslavia and that failure to comply would result in severe economic and diplomatic sanctions, 
as well as possible military recourse. As will be later discussed, the U.S. implemented the 
sanctions, as well as eventually using military force against the SFRY, even though Belgrade 
fully complied with the ultimatum. 
 The secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia were in the works long before war 
engulfed Yugoslavia in the 1990’s (Woodward, 1995). However, it was not until the Berlin wall 
came down that these movements began to really gain momentum. The Croatian diaspora, 
particularly the ones in Canada and the United States, had been working diligently over the years 
to raise funds for purchasing arms, and with the reunification of Germany and its position near 
the top of the ‘new world order’, Croatia and Slovenia were primed to begin their quest to break 
away from Yugoslavia. Germany was a key player from the beginning, arming the Croats with 
stockpiles of weapons that had belonged to former East Germany as well as providing vital 
intelligence information to the top Croatian brass (Clark, 1998; Johnstone, 2002; Parenti, 2000). 
The United States also got involved early on in the process as its President, George H.W. Bush, 
signed into law the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in November of 1990, which 
demanded that all U.S. financial assistance to the SFRY be blocked – including having U.S. 
representatives at IMF, the World Bank, and even the E.C. bar all loans and other financial 
assistance to the SFRY – if the U.S. deemed that, after six months, the SFRY had not complied 
                                                        
8 See APPENDIX A to view in full Section 599A of the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations 
Act (PUBLIC LAW 101-513). 
23 	
 
 
with the Act and held fair and free elections in each of the Republics as well as demonstrated  
that it was not engaging in systematic abuse of human rights. The ‘human rights’ aspect was 
added by Senator Donald Nickles from Oklahoma and it became known as the Nickles 
Amendment.  
 The Nickles Amendment was a cunning addition as it gave the U.S. some 
maneuverability in case the elections were successfully carried out. As the Act stated, “That 
notwithstanding the failure of the individual Republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to have held free and fair multiparty elections within six months of the enactment of 
this Act, this section shall not apply if the Secretary of State certifies that the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia is making significant strides toward complying with the obligations of 
the Helsinki Accords.”9 The onus was on the Secretary of State – not the SFRY officials or even 
the United Nations – to certify that the SFRY was complying with the Helsinki Accords, yet the 
method to be used to confirm compliance was nowhere to be found. There was no transparency 
about the protocols that needed to be undertaken on the ends of both the SFRY government and 
the State Department. Nor was there transparency about who would be in charge of monitoring 
the situation on the ground – such as monitors appointed by the United Nations or even by 
Washington. At the very least the Secretary of State should have been required to provide 
evidence to support any claims that the SFRY was in violation of the Helsinki Accords, 
especially before implementing such harsh punishments. Furthermore, the SFRY was not 
allowed to demonstrate that it was in full compliance with the Act and, therefore, it had no 
means of defending itself against false accusations. In theory, the U.S. government, through the 
Act, had designated itself as de facto prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. All it took for the 
                                                        
9 Emphasis added by this author. 
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section of the Act (on Yugoslavia) to automatically and immediately go into effect was for the 
Secretary of State to simply refrain from taking any course of action to certify that the SFRY was 
making ‘significant strides toward complying with the obligations of the Helsinki Accords’. 
Unfortunately for Yugoslavia, this is exactly what occurred. Even though Washington never 
provided evidence to back up any of its claims, economic sanctions immediately went into effect.  
 Furthermore, there is a section in the Act that contradicts Washington’s claim that it 
supported the preservation of Yugoslavia. It reads as follows, “[T]his section shall not apply to 
assistance intended to support democratic parties or movements, emergency or humanitarian 
assistance, or the furtherance of human rights.” Therefore, even though SFRY could be (and 
was) barred from receiving all types of financial assistance imaginable, certain political parties 
and movements (including secessionist movements) continued to be eligible to receive aid. While 
Slobodan Milošević and the Serbs were singled out for condemnation and economic sanctions 
were implemented against SFRY and the Republic of Serbia, the United States began giving aid 
directly to the secessionists. In February of 1991, the “U.S. Congress continued its support for 
Slovenia and Croatia, with an amendment to the Direct Aid to Democracies Act (the Dole Bell) 
offered by Representative Dana Rohrbacher (Republican from California) that sought to separate 
Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia so that penalties for the human rights violations in 
Kosovo did not apply to these republics and they could be sent aid, bypassing the federal 
government” (Woodward, 1995; 161). Through the Direct Aid for Democracy Act significant 
funds were given to “small, right-wing, nationalist parties in a financially strangled region 
suddenly thrown into crisis by the overall funding cut-off. The impact was, as expected, 
devastating” (Flounders, 1998; p. 49). By providing the secessionists with financial aid through 
the Direct Aid for Democracy Act and implementing sanctions against Yugoslavia, even though 
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it complied with the demands of the Americans, Washington sent a clear message of support to 
the secessionists and exposed its intention to help ‘resolve the crisis’ in the SFRY as merely a 
façade. 
 By definition (the demands of) the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act was a coercive 
attempt, however U.S. officials deliberately devised it so that the SFRY government would 
imminently fail, whether or not it successfully addressed the demands of the Act. For one, the 
Serbs could not stop doing something that they were not actually doing to begin with. There is no 
evidence to support the claim that the Serbs had, at any point, forcefully barred any of the 
Republics from holding elections. Nor did the U.S., or anyone else, ever provide evidence to 
support the accusation that the SFRY was violating the Helsinki Accords. Although the purpose 
of a coercive attempt is to force an adversary to stop doing something (in this case the stated aim 
was to ‘stop the Serbs from repressing minority groups and abusing human rights’) the U.S. did 
not seem interested in stopping anything. The Act was used as a means to begin the destruction 
of the Yugoslav economy, create disorder throughout the country, weaken the federal 
government – while strengthening the secessionists by directly giving them aid – and, lastly, to 
provide a signal to the secessionists that the U.S. was supporting them in their goal to break apart 
Yugoslavia. In essence, it was a policy that fomented war. To further bolster this objective, the 
U.S. included a deterrent threat as part of its strategy. 
The Belgrade Ultimatum  
 The Croatians had been arming themselves throughout the autumn of 1990 as 
“Tudjman’s government was secretly pursuing a huge illegal arms smuggling operation to 
transform the new police force, called the Croatian National Guard, into the army of the future 
independent Croatian state. The operation was run by a former senior officer of the Yugoslav 
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People’s Army (JNA), Martin Špegelj, who wanted to use the Croatian armed force to lay siege 
to JNA barracks and force the officers and men to transfer their loyalty to Croatia” (Johnstone, 
2002; p. 23). The Croatian countryside “was brisling with weapons that had been secreted or 
stolen from JNA warehouses or smuggled across the Croatian-Hungarian border” (Silber & 
Little, 1996; p. 112)10, and, needless to say, violence increased in the region at a rapid pace.  
 The SFRY government became aware of the situation and was planning to send in the 
JNA to disarm the illegal paramilitaries. Clearly, the SFRY had every right to act, as any 
government in any state in the world would consider what the Croats were doing an act of 
treason and take the necessary measures to combat terrorist activities within its borders. 
However, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman entered the fray to make sure the 
Yugoslav government could not stop the secessionists. During a meeting (January 1991) between 
Warren Zimmerman and the SFRY’s President Borisav Jović, Zimmerman told Jović that the 
U.S. would not accept any use of force by the Yugoslav Army (JNA) to bring the terrorist attacks 
by the secessionists’ paramilitary units to a halt (Cheng, 2006; Johnstone, 2002; Szamuely, 
2013). What this meant for Yugoslavia was that it “could not prevent the Federation from being 
dismembered by force” (Johnstone, 2002; p. 24). As noted by distinguished scholar of Yugoslav 
history Nora Beloff (1997; p. 28), “No multi-ethnic country, not even France, would have been 
able to avert terror and violence if its army had been paralyzed.” Zimmerman’s threat deterred 
the Serbs from acting, which is the objective of deterrence. However, the intent behind his threat 
was not to ‘help quell the violence’ but rather to provoke the opposite response, to increase the 
violence.  
                                                        
10 Cited by Johnstone (2002; p. 24). 
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 By not giving the Croatians the same ultimatum to refrain from violence that was issued 
to the Serbs the U.S. sent a tacit message to the Croatian leadership to unabatedly continue 
committing violent attacks, and the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, obliged. The United 
States put the government of the SFRY in a major bind. If it did not use the JNA to preserve its 
state, then the secessionists could break away by using force. If SFRY decided to use military 
force to preserve the country, then the U.S. and E.C. would intervene by increasing the already 
severe economic and diplomatic sanctions and possibly using military force. The government of 
the SFRY was put in a lose/lose situation in what essentially amounted to a zero sum game that 
was rigged against it. Regardless of what the SFRY did it was going to come out on the losing 
end. George Szamuely (2013; p. 104) best summarizes the situation as it was:  
Justifying secession on the ground that secessionists had made the work of government 
impossible is bad law and even worse morality. By Badinter’s11 logic, secessionists need 
only to disrupt the work of government and engage in violence to merit international 
recognition. It was also the height of impudence for the Western powers – which had 
threatened the Yugoslav federal government with punishment if it were to resort to force, 
first to disarm the paramilitaries and second, to end the secessions – now to turn around 
and cite the inability of the government to exert itself as evidence of its unworthiness to 
be considered a proper government. 
 
 If the U.S. genuinely wanted to help implement a peaceful settlement in Yugoslavia it 
would have used deterrence to force all the sides to refrain from using violence, not just one. As 
Lebow and Stein (1987; p. 8) point out, “The goal of deterrence is to dissuade another actor from 
carrying out a proscribed behavior. In the context of international relations, the most important 
objective of deterrence is prevention of a use of force. To do this, the theory stipulates that the 
deterrer must carefully define the unacceptable behavior, communicate a commitment to punish 
transgressors (or deny them their objectives), possess the means to do so, and demonstrate the 
                                                        
11 Robert Badinter was the President of the five-member Arbitration Commission of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia (footnote added by this author). 
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resolve to carry through its threat.” If the U.S. was genuinely seeking a peaceful resolution, then 
why only dissuade one of the actors from using force? To analogize this to perhaps a slightly 
over-simplified scenario, if two individuals were about to engage in a fistfight with one another 
dissuading only one of the individuals from fighting but allowing the other to punch and kick at 
will in order to ‘prevent violence’ from occurring would be completely absurd. By using basic 
inductive reasoning it would be reasonable to apply this argument to the group level. Therefore, 
by not attempting to dissuade the other actor (the Croats) from using force suggests that the U.S. 
wanted the violence to escalate and that it was not at all searching for a peaceful resolution.  
 Furthermore, as Lebow and Stein (1987; p. 6) describe, “Deterrence is unabashedly a 
theory of ‘opportunity.’ It asserts that adversaries seek opportunities to make gains, and that 
when they find these opportunities they pounce.” It has already been extensively argued that the 
West saw opportunities for gain in the Balkans and was trying to exploit them,12 which 
reinforces the main point of Lebow and Stein that when an actor uses deterrence against an 
adversary it is highly likely that the actor is trying to take advantage of a possible opportunity for 
its own, personal gain, making the United States’ self-imposed role as an unbiased peace-
mediator ostensibly disingenuous.   
Implementation and Effects 
 Although the United Nations did not voice its opinions concerning the crisis in 
Yugoslavia, the European Community decided that it would. It set up a commission, the 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as Badinter 
Arbitration Committee), on August 27, 1991 – just over two months after the illegal UDIs were 
                                                        
12 See Ali (2000), Beloff (1997), Carpenter (2000), Gibbs (2009), Gowan (1999; 2000), 
Johnstone (2002), Laughland (2007), Mandel (2004), Parenti (2000), Szamuely (2013), and 
Thomas (2003). 
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made by Croatia and Slovenia – in order to offer its opinions on the matter of ‘self-
determination’ from a supposedly legal perspective, and with the stated purpose to engage in 
genuine arbitration between the disputing parties in Yugoslavia. There are a few things, 
however, to consider about the E.C.’s explanation for the necessity to create such a commission, 
as well as its stated goals.  
 One of the main concerns regarding the commission was that its founding was in 
violation of international law. More specifically, the commission (including the way it was 
founded) violated many of the principles and procedures set forth by the 1907 Hague Convention 
on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and “didn’t remotely follow the arbitration 
procedures set down in the Convention” (Szamuely, 2013; p. 99). Due to the very nature of the 
commission’s founding its legitimacy, as well as its ability to be objective, should have been put 
into question (by the United Nations). To look at it from a hypothetical perspective, if a 
commission such as this one was established legally, and therefore deemed a legitimate 
creation,13 then it naturally would be viewed as an impartial arbiter – at least until proven 
otherwise. Nevertheless, its actions and findings would still be scrutinized to the minutest of 
details, which would include a rigorous review of each of its findings by an outside governing 
body. Therefore, if a legally established commission is held to such rigorous standards then, at 
the very least, the same should be expected of one that is created in violation of international 
law. Unfortunately, this did not occur with regard to the Arbitration Commission of the 
                                                        
13 Although the Badinter Commission was recognized by Western powers as a legitimate 
creation, it does not make it so. All of the conflicting parties needed to be obliged some level of 
involvement, particularly with regard to approving the Commission’s creation and its jurisdiction 
to arbitrate, which did not occur (Szamuely, 2013).  
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Conference on Yugoslavia as none of its actions or findings were ever rigorously reviewed by 
any governing body.  
Nevertheless, the very act of creating a commission in violation of precedent and 
international law makes the Commission’s intended purpose (to act as a fair mediator) a highly 
dubious one. Therefore, the more likely scenario, as argued by legal scholar Peter Radan (1997), 
is that the Badinter Commission was created with a political purpose in mind – otherwise why 
not simply follow the legally mandated procedures? As Radan (1997; p. 537) notes, “the actual 
role of the Arbitration Commission, as distinct from its officially stated role, was to provide a 
legal justification for the political decision of the E.C. to recognize the former Yugoslav 
republics as international states.” This extends to the United States as well. Further evidence that 
supports this deductive analysis that exposes the Commission’s true agenda were the actions of 
its members, who “were involved behind the scenes at every stage of the crisis” (Gervasi, 1997; 
p. 27). 
 The Western powers had to figure out a way around international law since the 
secessionists’ goal of breaking apart Yugoslavia through violence and UDIs was not legal. Their 
best, and perhaps only, option to reach their objective was to try to at least create the perception 
of legality and legitimacy. That the perception was duplicitous did not matter, no one would or 
could question the Commission’s motives or the premise behind its creation – and no one did, 
except for the Serbs, but their voice had long been marginalized (Parenti, 2000). To set the stage 
for the Commission to come up with findings that favored Western policy objectives, the U.S. 
policy-makers devised a plan to force the SFRY government into losing control over its territory 
– or at least make it seem as if it had lost control over Yugoslavia – in order to frame the conflict 
as a “dissolution” rather than as the more familiar and accurate “secessionist” frame. To carry 
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out this objective the West chose a coercive measure (deterrence) to use against the Serbs, which 
entailed having the U.S. government publicly threaten the SFRY that it would not allow the 
Yugoslav government to use force to quell any attacks by rebel secessionists. 
 Viewing the threat as a ‘green-light’ to unabatedly continue terrorizing civilians, police, 
and government officials, the secessionists increased their attacks in number, scope, and potency, 
knowing that the Yugoslav authorities would not act – or at least only in a limited manner so as 
not to provoke a response by the U.S.14 Although there were certain areas where the secessionists 
had created some devastation and chaos, to describe the situation as one where the SFRY 
government had completely lost control over its entire territory and that the country was in a 
state of dissolution was nothing more than hyperbole. In reality, the situation was nowhere near 
that dire. To put it into perspective, the situation in Yugoslavia at that particular time was 
nowhere near as bad as the situation in Syria at the end of 2016, and neither the U.S., the E.U., 
nor the U.N. has claimed that Syria was in a state of ‘dissolution’.15 Even at the worst point of 
the civil war in Yugoslavia, in terms of violence and destruction, it was not comparable to the 
situation in Syria at the end of 2016. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks by the secessionists had 
                                                        
14 The manner in which the secessionists carried out their attacks as well as the targets of the 
attacks is best described as a form of terrorism. Therefore, to demonstrate just how nonsensical 
the U.S. threat against Yugoslavia was one only need to look at how the U.S. government 
responds to terrorist attacks against it – or, for that matter, how it responds to anything that may 
threaten its national security. In the recent past, street protests in the U.S. led to excessive 
measures being taken by the police and even the military to subdue the demonstrators. Los 
Angeles, Ferguson, and Baltimore are some examples. The best comparison, however, may be 
the example of the IRA in the United Kingdom. To put the Yugoslav case into perspective, one 
need only to imagine how improbable it would have been for the U.S. to threaten the United 
Kingdom that it would not allow the U.K. to use force to quell the attacks conducted by the IRA.  
15 The whole of the territory of Syria that was populated (about 50 percent of the territory) was 
under siege whereas in Yugoslavia there was fighting only in a tiny portion within the territory of 
Croatia (the area inhabited by Serbs and Montenegrins). See maps of Syria and Yugoslavia in 
APPENDIX B and APPENDIX C for comparison. 
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the desired effect of making the state of affairs at least appear as though the SFRY government 
had lost control over its territory, especially when the American mass media could frame the 
situation in such a way without any resistance, which set the stage nicely for the Commission to 
present its findings.16  
 When it was time for the Commission to offer its opinions and recommendations 
regarding the Yugoslav crisis it avoided directly addressing the questions of secessionism as 
proposed by the SFRY government, which were presented as follows: (1) Who can be the subject 
of the right to self-determination from the standpoint of international public law, a nation or a 
federal unit? Is the right of self-determination a subjective collective right or the right of a 
territory? (2) Can secession be a legal act from the standpoint of the United Nations and other 
relevant legal rules? (3) Are the demarcation lines between constituent parts of a federal state 
(provinces, cantons, states, Lander, republics and the like) borders in the sense of international 
public law?17 The SFRY government proposed these questions to “call attention to the fact that 
international law does not, in fact, recognize the right of self-determination in the form of 
secession of an administrative unit within a federal state (such as California within the United 
States or North-Rhine Westphalia within the Federal Republic of Germany)” (Johnstone, 2002; 
p. 25).  
 The members of the Commission knew the answer to the question (of secessionism) the 
SFRY government directed at them and, therefore, could not answer it because Western powers 
                                                        
16 Without the counter-balance of ‘new’ (and social) media that we have today, contending 
voices in the media were either marginalized or silenced. There was essentially one frame 
repeated ad nauseam by the mainstream American media: “The Serbs were the aggressors who 
were conquering lands and oppressing democracy-seeking minority groups.” Without even the 
slightest inclination to do any ‘fact checking’ reporters accepted and printed embellishments and 
even outright lies as long as it went against the Serbs (Brock, 2006; Parenti, 2000). 
17 Taken from Johnstone (2002). 
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“couldn’t go on the record as sanctioning secession. Therefore, if the secession[s] of Croatia and 
Slovenia were to be recognized, as Germany was demanding, it would have to be called 
something else. [Lord Peter] Carrington replaced the term secession by the term disintegration” 
(Szamuely, 2013; p. 102). To put it another way, when Carrington presented the question to the 
Commission he had fundamentally altered it so as to obstruct the Serbs from obtaining the 
rightful and legal conclusion that the crisis deserved. The Badinter Commission went one step 
further by declaring that the state “was in the process of dissolution”18 (Pellet, 1992; p. 183) and 
“that successor states needed to be recognized” (Hayden, 1993; p. 7). As a result, it allowed 
Western powers to give the secessionists their unmitigated support without seemingly breaking 
international protocol. The opinions allowed Western powers to justify their support of 
secessionism (Radan, 1997). The West argued – based on the findings of the Commission – that 
since Yugoslavia was in a ‘state of dissolution’ the only course of action available to the 
Republics within SFRY was to create their own independent and sovereign states19. Shortly after 
the Commission promulgated its answers, Western powers began recognizing the UDIs of 
                                                        
18 Opinion No. 1 – Arbitration Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia. 
19 By declaring that Yugoslavia was in a state of dissolution the Commission then promulgated 
that what had remained of Yugoslavia could not continue to exist as Yugoslavia, which was a 
violation of international law. To offer a similar comparison, it would be similar to declaring that 
if Scotland broke away from the United Kingdom then the U.K. would cease to exist as a state, a 
nonsensical proposal to be sure that would completely contradict international norms. If 
Catalonia were to break away from Spain then what would remain of Spain would, as is its legal 
right, carry on as the same state. Spain would remain being Spain and the United Kingdom 
would still be the United Kingdom, just without Catalonia and Scotland, respectively. The SFRY 
should have been allowed to carry on as the SFRY if it so chose. However, it was not given the 
choice and the United Nations revoked its status as a member state. This result had significant 
consequences, one of which was losing all of the protections and privileges that come with being 
a recognized and sovereign U.N. member state. It was another telling decision of the 
Commission’s pro-secessionist bias. 
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Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, which led to a full-blown war in large sections of Croatia (Krajina 
and Slavonia regions) and throughout Bosnia. 
 Without a doubt, it “was the leading NATO powers that had triggered instability in the 
Balkans through premature recognitions, a fact repeatedly pointed out by such Establishment 
figures as Owen and Carrington. Had the West avoided issuing its precipitate recognitions, the 
Serbs would not have panicked and taken matters into their own hands. There might then have 
been time to seek negotiated outcomes in Yugoslavia” (Szamuely, 2013; p. 128). However, it 
was the coercive strategy of the U.S. that set it all in motion; it was a necessary condition for the 
cause of the war. Without it – removed from the causal chain of events – the war most likely 
would have been averted. The reason the coercive strategy was a necessary condition is because 
without the Act and the Belgrade ultimatum there would have been nothing to prevent the SFRY 
from using force to stop the secessionists. The coercive measures, however, were not sufficient 
conditions because they were not enough on their own to start a full-blown war. Nevertheless, 
they were a part of a sequence of events (all of which were necessary conditions) that, when 
taken together, become a ‘sufficient set’ (Goertz & Levy, 2007). To look at it another way, when 
all of the antecedent events are summed up they can be viewed as a single ‘sufficient’ condition 
for the cause of the war.  
 The coercive measures were a means to help fund the secessionist movements as well as 
to keep SFRY from crushing them, and they sent an important message to the secessionists to 
increase the violence and escalate the crisis, which, in turn, was later used by the West to claim 
that Yugoslavia was in a state of dissolution. These effects also helped the secessionist groups 
establish a foothold of power and control in their specific regions and mobilize their 
communities, without which they would have been unable to unilaterally declare independence. 
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The UDIs opened the door for Western powers to join the fray as ‘mediators’ and create a 
commission to offer ‘legal opinions’ to ‘help resolve’ the crisis. These opinions led to the 
recognition of the new states, which, in turn, led to the outbreak of a full-blown war. Although 
all of the events that followed the coercive measures are important for explaining the cause of the 
war, they were not the only contributing variables. For instance, nationalism was certainly a 
contributing factor in the Yugoslav crisis (Denitch, 1994) as it was used for mobilization and to 
spread hatred and distrust amongst the groups, however it was not a necessary or sufficient 
condition. As Goertz and Levy (2007; p. 10) state, “A contributing factor X is part of the set of 
conditions which are sufficient for Y but which is not necessary or sufficient by itself for Y”.  
To further elaborate on this point, if X represents nationalism (independent variable) and 
Y represents the war (dependent variable), then the statement ‘because of X then Y’ would not 
hold true in this case as there are a plethora of multicultural countries where nationalism is 
present and war has not broken out (Thomas, 1996). As Thomas (2003; p. 8) notes, “Such 
competing nationalisms between Serbs and Croats were not sufficient to destroy Yugoslavia, a 
problem that occurs in other multiethnic states”. Furthermore, the various ethnic groups in the 
SFRY had intermingled and lived together peacefully for nearly five decades before the crisis 
evolved. It was, therefore, not a necessary condition because there are other means for 
mobilization and spreading hatred and distrust within a group, and it certainly was not a 
sufficient condition because nationalism cannot start a war without other contributing factors or 
conditions. 
 Following Goertz and Levy’s (2007; p. 15) description that “necessary condition 
counterfactual methodology is a univariate one”, this study focused on the coercive strategy 
utilized by the U.S. in the early 1990’s, demonstrating that it was a necessary condition that 
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caused the war. Goertz and Levy (2007, p. 15) emphasize that “in many case studies the goal is 
to focus on one important causal factor. The aim is not a “complete” explanation of the event but 
rather a more modest one of exploring the consequences of a key independent variable. The 
necessary condition counterfactual methodology is thus a natural tool. Certainly if a good case 
can be made for the necessity of X then X can be said to be an important cause of Y”. It can be 
further broken down as follows: if X then Y or “that X is necessary for Y means simultaneously 
the counterfactual that without X, Y would not have occurred” (p. 14). As demonstrated by this 
counterfactual analysis of the Yugoslav crisis, without the coercive measures of the U.S., a full-
blown war could have been averted. 
Conclusion 
 The strategy of coercive measures (compellence and deterrence) utilized by the U.S. from 
the end of 1990 to the end of 1991 caused the civil war in Yugoslavia. The Nickles Amendment 
and the Direct Aid for Democracy Act were signals to the secessionists that they had the support 
of the West. By punishing Yugoslavia and rewarding the Republics that wanted to secede it 
became clear to the secessionists that they had a ‘green-light’ to pursue a violent break-up of 
Yugoslavia. Warren Zimmerman’s Belgrade ultimatum put the SFRY into a bind from which it 
could not escape. Not allowing the JNA to take control of the crisis allowed the secessionists to 
escalate the violence without getting punished. Moreover, they were rewarded for doing so 
because, as the violence increased, the West used it as evidence that the SFRY was not able to 
quell the violence and exert control over its territory, and should, therefore, cease as a state. This 
is more or less the way in which Badinter described the crisis at the Conference on Yugoslavia, 
which led to the recognitions and the outbreak of war. Without the Nickles Amendment and the 
Direct Aid for Democracy Act the secessionists would not have had the necessary resources to so 
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actively arm themselves and conduct large scale attacks against the federal government and 
Zimmerman’s Belgrade ultimatum allowed them to further escalate the violence.  
 It is important to look back at these policy decisions to make sure the mistakes are not 
repeated. Supporting secessionism in Yugoslavia was clearly a bad idea as, besides creating 
undue suffering and destruction, it set new precedents, which other leaders, American and 
foreign, have been able to exploit – such as the Bush administration with the invasion of Iraq, or 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intervention in Georgia. Furthermore, the outcome of what 
took place in Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the importance and necessity of having 
(legitimately established) neutral mediators to help find solutions to such crises. In his book, 
Dubious Mandate (1999), former U.N. chief political officer in Sarajevo Phillip Corwin 
describes how important it is for mediators to stay neutral in these types of crises, because if they 
do not then one side will expect everything from them and will stubbornly refuse to negotiate, 
while the other side will not trust them and will also be less inclined to negotiate. As Corwin 
discusses in his book, he clearly saw this happening throughout his tenure working for the United 
Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 Further research on this topic can be done to examine how U.S. and E.C. policies vis-à-
vis Yugoslavia have affected the way sovereignty is viewed today by the international 
community, and how these possible effects have led to NATO and, more specifically, the U.S. 
instigating and conducting wars across the globe, including currently being on the brink of war 
with Russia over Syria, as well as Ukraine. Furthermore, with regards to Russia, research can be 
done to examine the effects of the West’s actions in Yugoslavia on U.S. relations with Russia, as 
well as how they may have contributed to Russia developing (back) into a military super power. 
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CHAPTER 2: Justified Grievances? A Quantitative Examination of Case Outcomes at the 
Yugoslav Tribunal 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was founded in 
1993 to try those who had committed war crimes during the Yugoslav Wars of Secession of the 
1990s, as well as to deter further crimes from being committed – the fighting continued in the 
region until 1999 (six years after the founding of the ICTY). Until the outbreak of the Yugoslav 
civil war, Europe had enjoyed an unparalleled era of peace since the close of the Second World 
War. During this period, Yugoslavia had served as a model for the relatively smooth integration 
of divergent ethnic groups and religions into the fabric of a single national state. While tensions 
clearly existed within the Yugoslav Federation, particularly since the death of its charismatic, yet 
somewhat dictatorial, leader Josip Broz Tito, few observers believed they were the harbinger of 
the country's demise. Nevertheless, from at least the beginning of the 1980s, internal and external 
forces were moving the country in the direction of ethnic conflict. The underlying causes of the 
Yugoslav civil war have been shown to be multiple and complex, and were clearly precipitated 
by the ambitions of external forces (Szamuely, 2013). Many scholars (Denitch, 1996; Glenny, 
1992; 2012; Kaplan, 1993; Ramet, 1992; Silber & Little, 1996) cite nationalism for the outbreak 
of violence, while others (Ali, 2000; Beloff, 1997; Carpenter, 2000; Flounders, 1998; Gervasi, 
1998; Gowan, 1999; 2000; Hayden, 1993; Johnstone, 2002; Parenti, 2000; Roberts, 1996) fault 
the strategic geopolitics and neo-liberal agenda of Western powers, yet, while it was not my 
intent to ignore any of these causal factors, it would fall outside the scope of this study to include 
analyses of them.  
 What was relevant for this paper was to work from the premise that the war in 
Yugoslavia initially began as an internal issue, with secessionist groups clamoring for 
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independence, and was followed by an outbreak of violent clashes. Before too long the clashes 
escalated into a full-blown war with conflicts occurring in various areas of the region. As with 
most, if not all, territorial wars the violence was difficult to contain and, as a result, there were 
victims – and perpetrators – on all sides. According to the Tribunal’s founding 1993 UNSC 
Resolution, two of the Tribunal’s fundamental goals were to bring peace and justice to all the 
peoples of Yugoslavia (Akrivoulis, 2017; p. 372). The goals, as declared by the international 
powers that created the Tribunal, were: 1) to bring justice to the victims – with the intention of 
being impartial and fair toward all the peoples of Yugoslavia – and 2) to deter further violence 
and war crimes from occurring. Unfortunately, the impetuous manner in which the Tribunal was 
established led to serious consequences that adversely affected these objectives. 
As far back as 1995, when the ICTY was in its infancy, Susan Woodward offered an 
insightful and prescient analysis of the Tribunal that is just as informative today as it was then. In 
her seminal book on Yugoslavia, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War 
(1995), she described how the threat of prosecution coming from the court further backed the 
fighters into a corner and increased the incentives of finding sanctuary within their own 
sovereign states, making it unlikely to stop the fighting – considering that perhaps the worst 
atrocities came after 1993 she made a compelling case. As she stated, “By ignoring this 
counterproductive result – encouraging the conditions that led to violations – supporters of the 
War Crimes Tribunal appeared to give priority to defending the norms rather than to preventing 
conditions that would result in more victims” (p. 324). Furthermore, she pointed out that because 
“the procedure was pushed largely by the United States, the accusations became a servant of 
American policy toward the conflict itself, which required a conspiracy of silence about the 
atrocities committed by parties who were not considered aggressors” (p. 324) – or, rather, 
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atrocities committed by non-Serbs20. According to Woodward’s analysis, this policy most 
certainly would have adversely affected the Tribunal’s aim to bring justice to all of the victims.  
Nonetheless, the Tribunal has stressed that it has promoted peacebuilding and 
reconciliation in the region, specifically that it has “contributed to an indisputable historical 
record, combating denial and helping communities come to terms with their recent history. 
Crimes across the region can no longer be denied” (ICTY n.d.). Establishing a ‘collective 
memory’ of what happened in Yugoslavia could have a positive impact on the reconciliation 
process, especially considering “law and collective memory are reciprocally associated” 
(Savelsberg & King, 2007; p. 189). However, if there is evidence that the Tribunal may be 
discriminating against certain groups then the Tribunal’s outcomes will inevitably be disputed, 
which could cause adverse effects on combating denial and helping communities come to terms 
with their history. Furthermore, many of the outcomes of the Tribunal have already been 
disputed – not least by some of the governments of states that had previously made up 
Yugoslavia, such as Serbia and Croatia – thus already putting the Tribunal’s historical record in 
dispute. As Akrivoulis (2017; p. 372) notes, “Given the public mistrust to the Tribunal in the 
region, its workings seem to aggravate the already existing tensions between the conflicting 
communities, rather than facilitate their reconciliation.” 
 To further elaborate on this point, Serbs generally feel that the Tribunal has not delivered 
justice for their victims and that this has resulted in their suffering being largely disavowed by 
the other communities in the region – as well as by the West. In response to this claim, many in 
the West have dismissed these grievances as the Serbs simply being in denial of their role in the 
                                                        
20 In this paper the terms ‘Serb’ and ‘Serbian’ refer only to ethnicity (not nationality), such as 
‘Serb defendants’ or ‘victims of Serbian ethnicity’.  
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war (Gordy, 2013; Obradovic & Wochnik, 2013; Orentlicher, 2008; Ramet, 2007).  Reducing 
this complex issue to such a stark position is profoundly unfair to a subset of the victims of the 
Yugoslav wars and could increase the animosity between the various communities in the region. 
Furthermore, it is a non sequitur; a group not completely accepting its role in a conflict would 
not negate the legitimacy of said group’s concerns that its victims have been disavowed. 
Therefore, a group being ‘in denial of its role in the war’ and having a valid contention that ‘its 
victims have been disavowed’ are not mutually exclusive, as some have mistaken them to be. 
What would be mutually exclusive would be for a group to disavow its adversary’s victims while 
concomitantly claiming that it has fully accepted its role in the war. To put it another way, a 
group cannot genuinely accept its role in a war if it denies the war crimes committed by its side, 
thereby disavowing its adversary’s victims. In any case, it is not a matter of Serbs disputing the 
outcomes of the ICTY, it is a matter of them wanting justice for their victims too.  
The main concern of this study, therefore, was to examine case outcomes at the ICTY to 
try to gain new insights on this issue and to ascertain whether or not the Serbs’ grievances are 
valid. This study was not meant as an indictment against the Tribunal or those who are, or ever 
have been, affiliated with it, nor was its goal to try to dispute the outcomes of the cases at the 
Tribunal. To put it in clear and simple terms, the principle aim of this study was to answer the 
following question: Does ethnicity (defendant and/or victim ethnicity) predict trial outcome and 
length of sentencing in ICTY cases?  
‘Individualizing’ Guilt 
 Yugoslavia was a sovereign state that disintegrated as a result of various secessionist 
conflicts. It was not a war of aggression such as what occurred in WWII, which is why no state 
or head of state has been indicted by the ICTY for starting a war of aggression. Neither has the 
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International Court of Justice concluded that any of the successor states (former republics) of 
SFRY committed a war of aggression (or genocide) against another successor state. Every side in 
Yugoslavia fought for self-determination over the lands they inhabited and there were 
perpetrators and victims on all sides. Therefore, the primary concern of the ICTY has been jus in 
bello21 (the right conduct within a war) and not jus ad bellum (the right to go to war), which the 
Tribunal has confirmed. It states that “it has now shown that those suspected of bearing the 
greatest responsibility for atrocities committed can be called to account, as well as that guilt 
should be individualised, protecting entire communities from being labelled as ‘collectively 
responsible’” (ICTY, n.d.). Nevertheless, there seems to be a prevailing misconception that the 
intention of the Tribunal was to indict and prosecute only Serbs.22 
 Scholar Eric Gordy (2013) is perhaps one of the main contributors of the development of 
this misconception, as he links the Serbs to the ICTY as seamlessly as he links the Nazis to 
Nuremberg (the International Military Tribunal), finding it perfectly permissible to label an 
entire community “collectively responsible” for crimes committed by individuals. His stance is 
that the Tribunal was intended for Serbs just as Nuremberg was established for prosecuting 
Nazis. He states that for “all the magnification of the Nuremberg legacy, it has become a 
historical commonplace that public discussion of the kind that was hoped for in Serbia23 did not 
begin in Germany until two decades after the Tribunal” (Gordy 2013; p. x). Besides linking the 
                                                        
21 The ‘just war’ concept is used here as it falls in line with the Tribunal’s founding principles. 
As John Laughland  (2007; pp. 64-65) notes, “Instead of applying existing international law, the 
ICTY has effectively overturned it. Its founding philosophy is much closer to the ‘just war’ 
concept....”. 
22 For instance, at a recent conference where this paper was presented, some of the attendees (in 
the panel as well as in the audience) inquired about this specific point. They believed that the 
court was established to try mainly one group, just as Nuremberg had been. 
23 Emphasis added by this author. 
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Serbs to the ICTY (just as the Nazis are linked to Nuremberg), he also draws direct parallels here 
between the Serbs and the Nazis and between the ICTY and Nuremberg. The Tribunal, however, 
has adamantly defended its (self-declared) status as a neutral and fair arbiter that does not take 
sides.  
 The Tribunal stresses that it assigns blame to all sides, and, perhaps most tellingly, 
prosecutes individuals – not groups. The Tribunal states, “While the most significant number of 
cases heard at the Tribunal have dealt with alleged crimes committed by Serbs and Bosnian 
Serbs, the Tribunal has investigated and brought charges against persons from every ethnic 
background. Convictions have been secured against Croats, as well as both Bosnian Muslims and 
Kosovo Albanians for crimes committed against Serbs and others. While its judgements [sic] 
demonstrate that all parties in the conflicts committed crimes, the Tribunal regards its fairness 
and impartiality to be of paramount importance. It takes no side in the conflict and does not 
attempt to create any artificial balance between different groups” (ICTY, n.d.) This statement 
unequivocally refutes any presumption that the Tribunal was intended to indict and prosecute 
only Serbs.  
Critics Versus Defenders of the ICTY 
 Scholars have been debating the question of the Tribunal’s impartiality since its inception 
and have seemingly split into two camps. The critics argue that the Tribunal is biased against the 
Serbs and is a political tool used by Western powers to justify their military interventions in the 
region. The defenders, on the other hand, support the Tribunal’s rules and procedures and argue 
that it fairly and impartially seeks justice for all the victims of the war. Michael Scharf and 
William Schabas are two leading proponents of the ICTY. As they state in their book, Slobodan 
Milosevic on Trial: A Companion (2002; p. 3), they “have been deeply involved in international 
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justice issues since the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was 
established and even before, participating in its creation, then observing and commenting upon 
its evolution.” In this work they defend the ICTY’s refusal to indict and prosecute NATO 
leaders. They state that the “failure of the ICTY to proceed against NATO leaders for waging 
war against Yugoslavia strikes many as a case of unfairness and of selective prosecution. But the 
ICTY is powerless to deal with cases of illegal war. It can prosecute only crimes committed 
during war, not the crime of waging illegal war” (p. 143). Although this may be the case, they 
avoid the key issue apropos the Tribunal’s lack of willingness to prosecute NATO leaders. 
Scholars of international justice and/or the Balkans are well aware that the ICTY cannot 
prosecute the crime of waging illegal war, therefore it is not an issue with which scholars are 
unduly concerned. However, a key issue that has been raised and is a primary concern to many 
scholars and legal experts (Black, 2000; Dickson & Jokic, 2006; Hayden, 2000; Laughland, 
2007; Thomas, 2003) is the failure of the Tribunal to prosecute NATO leaders for war crimes. 
Critics of the ICTY argue that this policy is the result of the connection between Western 
governments, primarily the U.S., and the Tribunal. 
For instance, Thomas (2003; p. 171) states that the “selective manipulation of the 
international justice system and process has become one of the means of conducting U.S. foreign 
policy. The U.S. -sponsored and -supported creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an illustration of such a system of biased justice where the 
main goal is to indict Serbs while preventing any indictment of NATO leaders and minimizing 
those against Croats and Muslims.” Criminal defense lawyer Christopher Black (2000; pp. 29-
30) argues that “it was necessary to discredit the existing leadership” of Yugoslavia in order to 
break it up “into quasi-independent colonies, principally of Germany and the United States,” and 
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that an “effective propaganda weapon in such an exercise is, of course, a tribunal with an 
international character, which the public will accept as a neutral instrument of justice but which 
is controlled for political ends” (2000; pp. 29-30). Dickson and Jokic (2006; p. 355) affirm that 
the Tribunal has violated defendants’ procedural rights by ‘gagging’ them or even removing 
them from the courtroom altogether in order not to ‘see and hear the evil’ that NATO leaders 
perpetrated against Serbs. 
 Hayden (2000; pp. 551-552) echoes their sentiment as he finds the ICTY delivers a 
“biased justice”, with prosecutorial decisions based on the national characteristics – or rather the 
ethnicity – of the accused rather than on solid and compelling evidence. He points out that the 
evidence of this bias is found in the failure of the Tribunal to prosecute NATO leaders for prima 
facie war crimes and for crimes that are comparable to those of the accused who have been 
indicted. Hayden (2000; pp. 551-552) further argues that “this pattern of politically driven 
prosecution is accompanied by the use of the Tribunal as a political tool for those western 
countries that support it, and especially the United States: put bluntly, the Tribunal prosecutes 
only those whom the Americans want prosecuted, and the United States government threatens 
prosecution by the supposedly independent ICTY in order to obtain compliance from political 
actors in the Balkans.” The critics provide ample evidence to substantiate their claims, including 
official statements by NATO leaders and leading members of the ICTY (judges and lead 
prosecutors), such as Jamie Shea, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Louise Arbour, and Carla Del 
Ponte. Black concludes that instead of resolving conflicts and creating peace the Tribunal has 
been used to justify the unsanctioned military intervention in SFRY by the leading Western 
powers and is, therefore, an ‘instrument of war’ (2000; p. 40). 
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 Scharf (2002; p. 394), on the other hand, attempts to discredit the idea of a connection 
between the ICTY and the U.S. (and NATO), arguing that – in contrast to Nuremberg – the 
Tribunal was created by the United Nations, which represented the will of the international 
community, and not by the victors or those who were involved in the conflict. Nonetheless, 
Laughland (2007) points out that the ICTY was established illegally as the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) created the Tribunal even though the U.N. Charter does not grant it the 
power to do so, nor does it have the legal jurisdiction to try anyone for war crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia – according to the U.N. Charter, only sovereign states are allowed to do so. As 
Johnstone (2000; p. 164) notes, “The Security Council’s ICTY went over the heads of the states 
concerned and simply imposed its authority on them, without their consent.”  
 According to Laughland (2007), there are only two possible ways to legally create an 
international criminal court: 1) by amending the U.N. Charter, or 2) through a multinational 
treaty, neither of which occurred in the process of creating the ICTY. Furthermore, Laughland 
(2007) provides a vast amount of empirical evidence to demonstrate that even after its founding 
the Tribunal continued to violate international law – as well as customary criminal law – by 
continually violating the U.N. Charter, trying defendants in absentia, allowing hearsay evidence, 
allowing and admitting evidence obtained through torture, accepting testimony from perjured 
witnesses, not allowing defendants to confront their accusers, censoring defendants, censoring 
large portions of testimony, violating the defendant’s right to a public hearing, giving accused 
war criminals impunity for their testimony, and imposing defense counsel on a defendant who 
invokes the right to defend himself (as established by the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the ICTY 
Charter itself). Further adding to their critique of the Tribunal, Black (2000), Brock (1996), 
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Laughland (2007), and Thomas (2000) outline how the ICTY has violated its own mandate by 
creating laws and the rules of evidence instead of following precedent as was mandated. 
Nevertheless, there are many scholars who take the opposing viewpoint and argue in defense of 
the Tribunal’s rules, procedures, and impartiality. 
 Many of these scholars and legal experts – the defenders of the Tribunal – offer some 
insightful and useful analyses of the ICTY (See Bass ,2014; Boas, 2007; Gow, Kerr, & Pajic, 
2013; Hagan, 2010; Scharf, 2002; Scharf & Schabas, 2002; Smith, 2012). However, they largely 
fail to address the issues that have been raised by the critics of the Tribunal. Generally, they tend 
to justify the ICTY’s breaches of its own mandate and its violations of international law, and 
they unwaveringly defend against accusations that the Tribunal might be biased. Scharf (2002; p. 
394) provides a prime example as he claims, “The message of the International Tribunal's 
indictments, prosecutions, and convictions to date of Muslims and Croats, as well as Serbs, has 
been that a war crime is a war crime, whoever it is committed by. The Tribunal has taken no 
sides.” Unfortunately, this statement is a non sequitur, as a few convictions of non-Serbs do not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion ‘the Tribunal has taken no sides’, which could either be true or 
false.  
Smith (2012; p. 166) makes a similar error24 when he asserts that the “effective 
prosecution of those accused of war crimes regardless of the side of the conflict the defendant 
                                                        
24 It should also be pointed out that Smith (2012; p. 165) inaccurately describes that the Tribunal 
“became active in 1999” even though it became active as early as October 1994 – From the 
Duško Tadić summary, page 3, section (I.) (B) (7): “Proceedings at the International Tribunal 
involving Duško Tadić, all of which have been held at the seat of the International Tribunal in 
The Hague, Netherlands, commenced on 12 October 1994 when the Prosecutor of the 
International Tribunal, at that time Richard J. Goldstone, filed an application under Rule 9 of the 
Rules, seeking a formal request to the Federal Republic of Germany, pursuant to Rule 10, for 
deferral by the German courts to the competence of the International Tribunal” 
(http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf). 
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was on is a critical progression here that cannot be understated.” Smith’s claim is essentially the 
same as that of Scharf, except expressed in a more circuitous way as he only implies that the 
Tribunal takes no sides – his description of the Tribunal’s (perceived) fairness as a ‘critical 
progression’ also seems rather peculiar. Nevertheless, his statement is equally invalid. In 
addition, Smith claims that the “ICTY proceedings at the Hague seem to deliver justice to the 
accused because both the procedural due process and substantive due process dimensions of the 
institutional arrangement are soundly constructed. Specifically, there can be no serious argument 
that the accused are not entitled to a full and fair defense” (pp. 163-164). The main problem with 
Smith’s account here is that he fails to substantiate it or to juxtapose it with a contradicting 
claim. For example, the ICTY forcibly appointed defense council on a defendant against his will 
(Dickson & Jokic, 2006; Laughland, 2007), an act that constitutes a due process violation and is 
evidence that contradicts Smith’s claim that due process at the ICTY is soundly constructed. As 
Dickson and Jokic (2006) have observed, however, there are many who are critical of the right to 
self-representation. 
 Dickson and Jokic (2006; p. 357) point out that the “critics [of the right to self-
representation] were increasingly pleading that for justice to proceed in an orderly manner, 
Slobodan Milošević had to be represented by counsel, whether he wanted one or not. This aspect 
of Slobodan Milošević’s defense case – and the unusually passionate advocacy carried out in the 
Hague and beyond to deprive a defendant (not just any defendant) of a clear right to represent 
himself, explicitly set out at article 14 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights – provide a glimpse of the nature and essential features of ad hoc UN Security Council 
institutions called Tribunals.” Furthermore, Dickson and Jokic (2006; p. 357 note 5) note that 
Michael Scharf has been one of the most ardent critics of the right to self-representation at the 
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ICTY and beyond. Although the issue of bias is perhaps the main issue that divides the defenders 
and the critics of the ICTY, it is certainly not the only one. Unfortunately, the gap between their 
respective positions is quite large and with the conclusion of each case it seemingly widens. 
Hopefully this study will help lessen that divide. 
 Two hypotheses were formulated for this study based on previous research on the ICTY 
as well as on the crises in the Balkans more broadly – and emphasizing those works that utilized 
empirical evidence and rigorous research methodologies for analyses. It was predicted (H1) that 
those who committed crimes against non‐Serbs would be more likely to be convicted as well as 
sentenced to longer prison terms than those who committed crimes against Serbs and (H2) that 
defendants of Serbian ethnicity would be more likely to get convicted as well as sentenced to 
longer prison terms than those who are not of Serbian ethnicity.  
 These hypotheses contradict those of the only other quantitative study (Meernik, 2003) 
conducted on this issue to date, which found that defendant ethnicity was not associated with 
case outcomes. However, there are two issues of concern regarding the previous study. The first 
issue is that the 2003 study was conducted thirteen or so years ago and had a limited amount of 
cases to draw from for its analyses, thirty-two to be exact (n = 32). The population size of this 
study (N = 100) is 213% larger than what was used in the 2003 study. The Meernik study, 
therefore, was more or less a preliminary study of the case outcomes of the ICTY, which 
Meernik seemingly confirms (Meernik 2003; p. 142). Furthermore, there is one more issue of 
concern regarding the 2003 study that could have had a significant impact on its results.25 Three 
                                                        
25 Using the present study’s data set, two analyses were run examining defendant ethnicity on 
case outcomes utilizing the exact same sample (n = 32) that was used in the Meernik study – due 
to the small sample size Fisher’s exact tests were conducted. In the first analysis the three 
defendants were classified as ‘convicted’ (just as was done in the 2003 study) and the results 
were insignificant, (p = .212, Fisher's exact test); indicating that defendant ethnicity was not 
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of the defendants were classified as ‘convicted’ for the analyses that were run, even though, as 
the researcher of the study acknowledged (pp. 153-154), the three defendants had in fact been 
acquitted of all charges after going through the appeals process. In light of these decisions by the 
ICTY, the three defendants should have been classified as ‘acquitted’ because the results would 
have then more accurately illustrated what had taken place at the Tribunal up to that point in 
time, regardless of the outcomes of the other cases under appeal.26 Once a verdict is given 
(through the appeals process) it is the final verdict and the one that goes down in the historical 
record of the court. Taking these issues into account, the results of the 2003 study do not 
accurately represent what has been occurring at the Tribunal. 
Method 
Sample 
 Through quantitative analyses the present study examined whether or not there was an 
association between defendant ethnicity and case outcomes, as well as one between victim 
ethnicity and case outcomes, therefore the individuals who went through the Tribunal’s entire 
process – from indictment to verdict – were used for this study. The ICTY states that it has 
indicted one hundred and sixty-one individuals (ICTY, n.d.), however only those whose cases 
have been completed were included in this study. Therefore, those who had their indictments 
withdrawn (N = 21), who died either before or during their trial (N = 17), and who were 
transferred to a national jurisdiction (N = 13) were excluded from this study. Furthermore, 
                                                        
associated with case outcomes – just as the 2003 study had shown. However, in the second 
analysis the three were classified as ‘acquitted’ and this time the results were significant, (p = 
.015, Fisher's exact test), showing that defendant ethnicity was associated with case outcomes 
and demonstrating that the two ways of classifying these three defendants could lead to 
significantly different results (especially in light of the small sample size). 
26 It should be noted that none were acquitted after appeal (of the defendants whose cases were 
going through the appeals process at that point in time). 
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defendants whose cases are currently under trial (N = 1) as well as those whose cases are under 
appeal by the Tribunal (N = 6) were excluded. Lastly, those whose cases are also under appeal 
but will be retried by the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals 
(MICT)27, were also excluded from this study (N = 4). Although these latter cases will be tried 
by the MICT they are cases that went through the entire procedural process of the ICTY, 
including going through the appeals process of the Tribunal, and therefore are considered cases 
‘under appeal’ of the ICTY. The data were collected via the Tribunal’s website, under the ‘cases’ 
section.28 The current population size is one hundred cases (N = 100) – just to note, once all of 
the cases conclude (and the ICTY operationally shuts down) the final count of completed cases 
conducted by the Tribunal will be 111, therefore this study included 90% of what will be the 
final count. The list of cases that were included in this study can be viewed in APPENDIX D.  
Coding 
 The data set was put together through a review of the court records on the ICTY website 
to determine the exact number of convictions, acquittals, and sentences of all of the accused. 
Other important data were also collected through these records, such as the ethnicity of each 
defendant, the ethnicity/ethnicities of their (alleged) victims, the age of each defendant at the 
start of their trial, which of the three groups – Military, Political, or Paramilitary – each 
defendant belonged to when the alleged crimes occurred, and the type of charges being pressed 
(which take into account the amount of victims, the type of involvement in the crimes, and the 
                                                        
27 The MICT “was established by the United Nations Security Council on 22 December 2010 to 
carry out a number of essential functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), after the 
completion of their respective mandates”. See United Nations Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals, (n.d.) About the MICT, Retrieved on June 20, 2016, from 
http://www.unmict.org/en/about 
28 http://www.icty.org/en/action/cases/4 
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overall scope of the crimes). The ethnicities of the defendants include Serbian, Croatian, 
(Bosnian) Muslim, (Kosovo) Albanian, and Macedonian and the ethnicities of the victims 
include Serbian, Croatian, (Bosnian) Muslim, (Kosovo) Albanian, and Roma.29 Also obtained 
was which of the three conflicts – Croatian, Bosnian, and/or Serbian (Kosovo) – the defendants 
were involved in. To note, only two Macedonians were indicted and tried by the ICTY; one was 
convicted and the other was acquitted. They were the only accused whose alleged crimes 
occurred outside of the three conflict zones (in Macedonia) as well as outside of the timeframe 
(late summer 2001) of the main conflicts of the Yugoslav civil war, which all took place in the 
1990’s. 
 Dichotomous variables were created for ethnicity of victims and ethnicity of defendants – 
Serbs were coded as “1” and non-Serbs were coded as “0”.30 A dichotomous variable was also 
created for verdict – “1” for convicted and “0” for acquitted. ‘Years sentenced’ was coded as a 
scale variable from 1-50 years. Those who were given life sentences received a score of 50 years, 
as the most number of years sentenced by the ICTY (after a life sentence) was 46 years. 
 In addition, two categorical variables were created for the type of charges being pressed 
(which take into account the amount of victims, the type of involvement in the crimes, and the 
overall scope of the crimes). It was not possible to create a continuous variable for the number of 
victims because roughly half of the defendants were charged for ‘indirect’ involvement of crimes 
that were committed as part of a ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)’ – a type of legal procedure the 
ICTY uses. The ICTY uses JCE mainly for cases involving mass crimes (such as the ‘ethnic 
                                                        
29 Regardless of the region of origin or birth, individuals (or groups, such as ‘victims’) were 
identified by ethnicity and not by nationality. For example, the ‘Serbian’ ethnicity is made up of 
Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, and Serbia.  
30 For the final analysis (a binary logistic regression) the ‘ethnicity of victims’ variable was re-
coded; Serbs were coded as “0” and non-Serbs were coded as “1”. 
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cleansing’ of villages), and it can essentially be understood as a concept of ‘collective liability’. 
Therefore, it was not possible to determine the number of victims for roughly half of the cases. 
Furthermore, creating a variable for ‘type of crime or crimes committed’ was also not possible. 
The ICTY is a war crimes tribunal that deals with a very limited amount of cases and very 
specific defendants, and, therefore, cannot be compared to even individual state court systems in 
the U.S. – such as, for example, in California, where hundreds of thousands of criminal cases are 
filed every year for various types of crimes. Obviously, the same type of data cannot be produced 
for cases of the ICTY as it can for criminal cases in states such as California.  
A preliminary review of each ICTY case report showed that every single defendant was 
tried for multiple counts of ‘crimes against humanity’ and/or ‘violations of the laws or customs 
of war’. Furthermore, the ICTY does not take on cases of ‘small time’ or ‘petty’ offenders; as an 
international war crimes tribunal it deals only with the most high-profile cases (essentially it 
prosecutes the worst -alleged- offenders). The Tribunal prosecutes mainly high-level military or 
political leaders who are accused of ‘command responsibility’ for their role in war crimes (OR) 
low-level mainly military but some political figures who were alleged to have actively 
participated in the worst atrocities. Therefore, two categorical variables were created to address 
the issues of number of victims and type of crimes/charges.  
 The first categorical variable was composed of high-level military and political elites who 
were tried for their inactive/indirect role in the (alleged) war crime(s) – they were placed in the 
‘indirect involvement’ category and coded as “1” –  and low (to mid)-level military and political 
figures who were tried for actively participating in the war crimes – they were placed in the 
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‘direct involvement’ category and coded as “0”.31 The second categorical variable was composed 
of those who were tried as part of a Joint Criminal Enterprise – they were placed in the ‘JCE’ or 
‘collective responsibility’ category and coded as “1” – and those who were tried individually – 
they were placed in the ‘non-JCE’ or ‘individual responsibility’ category and coded as “0”. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Preliminary analyses were conducted examining potential confounding variables and 
covariates, including age and gender of the defendants, group membership of the defendants 
(military, political, or paramilitary), which theatre/s of the civil war the defendants were involved 
in, and the type of charges being pressed (which take into account the amount of victims, the 
type of involvement in the crimes, and the overall scope of the crimes). Results indicated that age 
differed significantly between Serbian and non-Serbian defendants, t(98) = -4.449; p < .001. 
Specifically, non-Serbs (M = 42.306; SD = 9.0074) were significantly younger than Serbs (M = 
51.516; SD = 10.4167). Significant effects also emerged for group membership, c2(2) = 7.432,  p 
= .024, as 44 (68.8 %) of the Serb defendants were members of the military, 14 (21.9%) were 
members of the political establishment and 6 (9.4%) were members of the paramilitary. In 
comparison, non-Serb defendants had a higher percentage (within ethnicity) in the military 33 
(91.7 %), while 3 (8.3%) were members of the political establishment and none (0.0%) were 
members of a paramilitary unit. Neither gender nor location of conflict differed by defendant 
                                                        
31 There were some mid-level military figures, such as commanders, who were tried for 
command responsibility and/or active participation. Those who were tried for command 
responsibility were included in the ‘indirect involvement’ category and those who were tried for 
active participation were included in the ‘direct involvement’ category. Those who were tried for 
both (n = 8) were not included in this variable. 
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ethnicity (gender: c2(1) = .568, n.s.; location of conflict: c2(2) = .912, n.s.), therefore neither 
variable is considered further.  
 Lastly, two Chi-squares were run examining the association between the type of charges 
being pressed (which take into account the amount of victims, the type of involvement in the 
crimes, and the overall scope of the crimes) and verdicts. In the first analysis (n = 92), the 
variable used for the former placed the defendants into either of two categories: 1) indirect 
involvement (high-level officials/mass war crimes), or 2) direct involvement (low-level 
officials/actively took part in the atrocities). Eight cases (n = 8) were excluded from the analysis 
as these individuals were tried for both direct and indirect involvement. Most of these accused 
were commanders who were neither high-level nor low-level military figures but somewhere in 
between the two, and they were accused of actively taking part in war crimes as well as ‘creating 
an environment that encouraged and permitted war crimes to be committed’ – mainly against 
prisoners of various camps. The result of the Chi-square showed there was not a significant 
difference in verdict based on indirect or direct involvement; c2(1) = 1.624, p = .203.  
 In order to test this association using the entire population size (N = 100) a variable was 
created placing defendants into two categories, those who were tried under a Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (‘JCE’) and those who were not (‘non-JCE’). This was done with the anticipation that 
there would be no variance between the two variables – the ‘JCE’ category would be associated 
with the ‘indirect involvement’ (high-level officials/mass war crimes) category and the ‘non-
JCE’ category would be associated with the ‘direct involvement’ (low-level officials/actively 
took part in the atrocities) category. The former can also be classified as ‘collective 
responsibility’ and the latter as ‘individual responsibility’. As expected, the association between 
the two variables was significant; c2(1) = 31.950, p < .001. Therefore, a second Chi-square was 
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run examining the association between the type of charges being pressed and verdicts, however 
with the ‘JCE/non-JCE’ variable in place of the ‘indirect/direct involvement’ variable. The result 
showed that there was not a significant difference in verdict based on those who were tried as 
part of a JCE and those who were not; c2(1) = .299, p = .585. Overall, the two Chi-squares 
indicate that there is not an association between the type of charges being pressed (which take 
into account the amount of victims, the type of involvement in the crimes, and the overall scope 
of the crimes) and verdicts. Therefore, neither variable is considered further. 
Sample Characterization 
Descriptive statistics were conducted to characterize the length of sentencing based on 
(victim and defendant) ethnicity. Overall, when examining the ethnicity of victims, 58 out of the 
1,440 total years of sentencing handed out by the ICTY were for crimes committed against 
Serbs, while 1,382 years were given for crimes against non-Serbs (Figure 1). In other words, 4% 
of the total number of years sentenced were given for crimes committed against Serbs while 96% 
of the years sentenced were handed down for crimes committed against non-Serbs. These 
statistics are alarming considering the number of Serb victims that resulted from the fighting in 
Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. 
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 Next, when examining defendant ethnicity, out of 1,440 total years of sentencing, 1,202.5 
years were handed out to Serbs (83.5%), leaving only 237.5 years (16.5%) for all of the other 
ethnic groups combined (Figure 2). However, only 58 years of sentencing was handed out for 
crimes committed against Serbs, leaving the remaining 179.5 years for crimes committed by 
non-Serbs on non-Serbs (just over 200% more years than for crimes committed by non-Serbs on 
Serbs), which is also alarming considering fighting between non-Serb groups made up only a 
tiny fraction of the civil war. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sentencing at the ICTY based on the ethnicity of the victims. This figure illustrates the lack of 
representation of Serb victims compared to non-Serb victims in the sentencing of those convicted for war crimes 
by the Yugoslav Tribunal. 
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Ethnicity of Victims  
 One of the primary goals of the present study was to examine whether victim ethnicity 
predicted case outcomes (verdict and years sentenced).  It was expected that that those who 
committed crimes against non‐Serbs would be more likely to be convicted as well as sentenced 
to longer prison terms than those who committed crimes against Serbs. First, a Chi-square was 
run examining the association between conviction rates and the ethnicity of the victims.  
 
Figure 2. Sentencing at the ICTY based on the ethnicity of the convicted. This figure illustrates the disparity between the 
total numbers of years of sentencing for each ethnic group. 
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 A significant difference in verdict emerged based on victim ethnicity; c2(1) = 26.053, p < 
.001. As can been seen in Table 1, 9 out of 85 of the defendants whose purported victims were 
non-Serbs were acquitted by the ICTY, which is a rate of 10.6% and a conviction rate of 89.4%, 
while 10 out of 15 defendants whose purported victims were Serbs were acquitted, for a 66.7% 
acquittal rate and a 33.3% conviction rate. Furthermore, 5 out of the 81 total convictions (slightly 
over 6%) were for crimes committed against Serbs, leaving 76 out of 81 convictions (just under 
94%) for crimes committed against non-Serbs.  
Additionally, since there have been three times (200%) more convictions for crimes 
committed by non-Serbs on non-Serbs than by non-Serbs on Serbs, a Chi-square was run 
examining the association between conviction and acquittal rates of non-Serbs (N = 36) and the 
ethnicity of their victims.  
Table 1. Verdict Totals Based on the Ethnicity of the Victims 
Verdict Acquitted Convicted TOTAL 
Victim Ethnicity        
Non-Serbian 9 10.6% 76 89.4% 85 100% 
 47.4%  93.8%  85.0%  
Serbian 10 66.7% 5 33.3% 15 100% 
 52.6%  6.2%  15.0%  
Total 19 19.0% 81 81.0% 100 100% 
 100%  100%  100%  
Note. χ2(1) = 26.053, p < .001 
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 Results from the Chi-square indicate a significant association between trial verdict and 
victim ethnicity for non-Serb defendants: c2(1) = 5.123, p = .023. As can been seen in Table 2, 5 
out of the 20 total convictions (25%) were for crimes committed against Serbs, compared to 15 
out of 20 convictions (75%) for crimes committed against non-Serbs. Furthermore, 6 out of 21 of 
the non-Serb defendants whose purported victims were non-Serbs were acquitted by the ICTY, 
which is an acquittal rate of 28.6% and a conviction rate of 71.4%. In comparison, 10 out of 15 
non-Serb defendants whose purported victims were Serbs were acquitted, for a 66.7% acquittal 
rate and a 33.3% conviction rate (Conviction Rates: 71.4% - 33.3%; Acquittal Rates: 28.6% - 
66.7%).  
Finally, it was not possible to reliably test the hypothesis that the ethnicity of the 
victims32 (Serb versus non-Serb) has had an effect on sentencing at the ICTY. Only 5 defendants 
(6%) were convicted for committing crimes against Serbs – population size of convicted: (N = 
81) –while 94% of the convicted committed crimes against non-Serbs. Therefore, there were not 
                                                        
32 Serb victims are associated with the numerically smallest amount of time sentenced (58 total 
years) and non-Serb victims are associated with the numerically highest amount of time 
sentenced (1,382 total years). 
Table 2. Verdict Totals of Non-Serbs Based on the Ethnicity of the Victims 
Verdict Acquitted Convicted TOTAL 
Victim Ethnicity        
Non-Serbian 6 28.6% 15 71.4% 21 100% 
 37.5%  75.0%  58.3%  
Serbian 10 66.7% 5 33.3% 15 100% 
 62.5%  25.0%  41.7%  
Total 16 45.4% 20 55.6% 36 100% 
 100%  100%  100%  
Note. χ2(1) = 5.123, p < .05 
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enough convictions of defendants whose victims were Serb to reliably test this hypothesis. Only 
descriptive statistics can be reported: convicted defendants whose victims were non-Serbs were 
given, on average, longer prison sentences, (M = 18.19, SD = 12.09), than those whose victims 
were Serbs (M = 11.60, SD = 5.81). 
Ethnicity of Defendants 
 A second primary goal of the present study was to examine whether defendant ethnicity 
predicted case outcomes (verdict and years sentenced). It was expected that defendants of 
Serbian ethnicity would be more likely to get convicted than those who are not of Serbian 
ethnicity. First, a Chi-square was run examining the association between conviction rates and the 
ethnicity of the defendants. Overall, the association between verdict and defendant ethnicity was 
significant; c2(1) = 23.663, p < .001. 
 
 
 As can be seen in Table 3, only 3 out of 64 Serbs have been acquitted by the ICTY, 
which is an acquittal rate of 4.7% and a conviction rate of 95.3%, while 16 out of 36 non-Serbs 
have been acquitted, for a 44.4% acquittal rate and a 55.6% conviction rate. To test the 
Table 3. Verdict Totals Based on the Ethnicity of the Defendants 
Verdict Acquitted Convicted TOTAL 
Defendant Ethnicity        
Non-Serbian 16 44.4% 20 55.6% 36 100% 
 84.2%  24.7%  36.0%  
Serbian 3 4.7% 61 95.3% 64 100% 
 15.8%  75.3%  64.0%  
Total 19 19.0% 81 81.0% 100 100% 
 100%  100%  100%  
Note. χ2(1) = 23.663, p < .001  
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hypothesis that the ethnicity of the defendant (Serb vs. non-Serb) has had an effect on sentencing 
at the ICTY, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. Population size of 
convicted defendants: (N = 81). The analysis was significant, F(1, 79) = 7.041, p = .010, η2  = 
.082. As expected, convicted defendants of Serbian ethnicity were more likely to be given longer 
sentences (M = 19.71, SD = 12.64) than the convicted of non-Serbian ethnicity (M = 11.88, SD = 
6.49). 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
Next, to further test the hypotheses, a binary logistic regression was conducted to 
ascertain the effects of ethnicity of defendants, ethnicity of victims, age of defendants, and 
membership group of defendants (military position served as the reference group), on the 
verdicts of the ICTY.  
 
Overall, the model was statistically significant, c2(4) = 30.750, p < .001. The model 
explained 42.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in conviction rate and correctly classified 
Table 4. Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
Verdict 
 B SE B !" 
Defendant Ethnicity 2.677 .916 14.545** 
Victim Ethnicity 1.634 .758 5.126* 
Age -.044 .035 .957 
Membership Group -.541 .929 .582 
Constant 1.219 #$ 30.750** 
df 4 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
Note. (n = 183); Verdict: Acquitted = 0, Convicted = 1; Defendant Ethnicity: Non-Serbian = 0, Serbian = 1;  
Victim Ethnicity: Serbian = 0, Non-Serbian = 1; Membership Group: Non-Political = 0, Political = 1. 
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87.0% of cases. Defendants of Serbian ethnicity are significantly more likely to be convicted 
than non-Serbs (OR = 14.55), after controlling for age, membership group, and ethnicity of 
victims. In addition, defendants accused of crimes against non-Serbs are significantly more likely 
to be convicted than those accused of crimes against Serbs (OR = 5.13), after controlling for age, 
membership group, and ethnicity of defendants. To put it another way, a defendant of Serbian 
ethnicity is almost 15 times more likely to be convicted than a defendant of non-Serbian 
ethnicity, and a defendant (regardless of his ethnicity) whose (alleged) victims were non-Serb is 
5 times more likely to be convicted than a defendant whose (alleged) victims were Serb. 
Discussion 
 The main concern of this study was to examine case outcomes in order to obtain new 
insights on the issue of bias as well as to gain a better understanding of some of the grievances 
against the Tribunal. To achieve this aim, this study examined whether defendant and/or victim 
ethnicity were associated with case outcomes (verdict and sentencing). The results of this study 
are quite compelling and strongly suggest that defendant ethnicity and victim ethnicity shaped 
case outcomes (verdict and sentencing) at the ICTY. Furthermore, this study shows that the 
grievances expressed by certain groups, mainly the Serbs, are certainly valid and should not be 
disavowed. 
Ethnicity Versus Other Factors 
 Although the results of this study reveal that ethnicity influences case outcomes, other 
important factors were also taken into account, such as type of charges being pressed, crimes 
committed and overall scope of the crimes, involvement in the crimes (direct or indirect), amount 
of victims, gender of defendant, age of defendant, locations of crimes/conflict accused was 
involved in, group membership (political, military, or paramilitary), and the position of power 
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within the group. Overall, none of these factors were associated with verdict or sentencing. In 
fact, the only factors that did significantly predict verdict and sentencing were the ethnicity of the 
defendant and the ethnicity of the victims.  
For instance, when comparing convictions at the ICTY by ethnicity, the results show that 
defendants of Serbian ethnicity are almost 15 times more likely to be convicted than defendants 
of non-Serbian ethnicity. Furthermore, defendants (regardless of their ethnicity) whose (alleged) 
victims were of non-Serbian ethnicity are more than 5 times more likely to be convicted than 
defendants whose (alleged) victims were of Serbian ethnicity. A comparison of the racial 
disparity in incarceration rates in the United States should help put this into context. A recent 
study shows that African-Americans are incarcerated at 5.1 times the rate of whites in state 
prisons.33 In addition, a recent report found that African-American males received sentences (on 
average) 19.1 percent longer than white males for similar offences.34 In comparison, Serbs 
received sentences (on average) 66 percent longer than non-Serbs for similar offences. 
As disconcerting as these statistics are some may not be convinced that this evidence 
points to ethnic bias, yet it would be rather disingenuous to try to interpret the results any other 
way. For instance, given the fact that only 58 out of the 1,440 total years of sentencing at the 
ICTY (4%) were given for crimes committed against Serbs, it would be insincere and 
disrespectful to Serb victims to try to conjure an alternative explanation for this result. To further 
emphasize the ethnic disparity in incarceration rates at the ICTY, 95.3 percent of Serbs were 
convicted compared to 55.6 percent of non-Serbs, and only 33.3 percent of non-Serbs were 
                                                        
33 http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-
and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf 
34 https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf 
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convicted when their victims were Serbs, compared to 71.4 percent when their victims were non-
Serb. Furthermore, when looking only at the non-Serb defendants who were convicted, 25 
percent were convicted for crimes committed against Serbs while 75 percent were convicted for 
crimes committed against non-Serbs, even though, in comparison to conflicts involving Serbs 
and non-Serbs, conflicts between non-Serb groups were very limited. Regardless of the latter 
fact, there were 200 percent more convictions of non-Serbs for crimes committed against non-
Serbs (fifteen convictions) than for crimes committed against Serbs (five convictions). One can 
only conclude that, at most, the results of this study support the claim of bias, and, at the very 
least, they expose the discrepancies of case outcomes at the ICTY.  
The critics have made a strong case against the ICTY and the results of this study lend 
themselves in support of their position. As previously described, the critics have argued that the 
Tribunal is biased against Serbs and has abused its power by censoring defendants and witnesses 
from providing evidence of war crimes that were committed against Serbs by non-Serbs and 
NATO leaders. If certain information not of the Tribunal’s (or the U.S. government’s) approval 
did manage to get through, the Tribunal simply redacted the testimony, sometimes blacking out 
entire witness testimonies (Laughland, 2007). 
For example, when Slobodan Milošević cross-examined the Supreme Commander of 
NATO, General Wesley Clark, the presiding judge in the case, Judge Richard May, scolded 
Milošević on many occasions and forbade him from asking questions about NATO bombing. 
After constantly being berated by Judge May, Milošević finally asked him, ‘Mr. May, just in 
order to clarify the basic attitude toward me in relation to this witness, is it in dispute that 
General Clark was in command of NATO during the war against Yugoslavia? And is it disputed 
that that was his most important role in everything that related to Yugoslavia? And is it in 
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dispute that you’re not allowing me to ask him anything at all about that?’ The judge replied, 
‘That’s right.’35 It was, as Laughland (2007; p. 158) describes, “A surreal situation.” In addition, 
before releasing the transcript to the public the Tribunal gave the United States government 
permission to censor the entire transcript of General Clark’s testimony as it saw fit (Dickson & 
Jokic, 2006; Laughland, 2007). 
 Censoring defendants as well as witnesses in order to suppress evidence of war crimes 
that were committed against Serbs – so that the evidence would not later be used against those 
who committed the crimes (OR) to spark an investigation into the matter (OR) to help with an 
ongoing investigation – was an obstruction of justice. Furthermore, we can never know how 
much of an impact this censorship has had on case outcomes because no one has access to any of 
the censored evidence. Essentially, this evidence will never see the light of day and will never be 
rigorously examined. In addition to censoring and redacting evidence, the ICTY has also been 
criticized for destroying physical evidence of crimes committed against Serbs; not least by one of 
its former lead prosecutors, Carla Del Ponte (Del Ponte, Sudetic, & Amato, 2008).36 
 The present study offers a vital contribution to the literature on the ICTY because it takes 
many factors into consideration for its analyses, and not just the factors to which the critics refer. 
This study takes into consideration factors that both the critics and the defenders of the ICTY use 
in their analyses and the results strongly support the argument made by the critics. Furthermore, 
this study utilized the entire population size of the cases that have gone through the entire 
                                                        
35 Slobodan Milošević trial transcript (15 December 2003), p. 30,418. Taken from Laughland 
(2007; p. 158). 
36 See also Strange Border Kidnappings in Kosovo: Correspondent Confidential. Documentary. 
Directed by Carrie Ching. Los Angeles: VICE Media LLC, 2014.  
67 	
 
 
process (from indictment to verdict) at the ICTY, which will make up 90% of the total cases that 
have gone through the entire process once the ICTY operationally shuts down.  
The only other quantitative study on the ICTY to date (Meernik, 2003), which examined 
defendant ethnicity and other factors on case outcomes, was performed (and published) almost a 
decade and a half ago. It was a preliminary study with a very small sample size (n = 32). The 
results of the 2003 study found that defendant ethnicity was not associated with case outcomes, 
yet there was a discrepancy with the coding as three defendants were coded as ‘convicted’, when 
in fact all three had been acquitted and set free. As was demonstrated, this coding mishap could 
have significantly altered the results of that study. Furthermore, and regardless of the coding 
issue, the data available at that time were very limited and they did not accurately reflect the data 
available today. For instance, none of the cases (out of the thirty-two) were for non-Serb on Serb 
crimes, which brings up another glaring omission by the 2003 study – it did not examine victim 
ethnicity. In addition, the ethnicities of the defendants of the ongoing cases at the ICTY are 
roughly split between Serbs (n = 5) and non-Serbs (n = 6), yet none of the victims in these cases 
were Serbs. Therefore, regardless of the outcomes of these cases, they will not significantly 
affect the results of this study. Essentially, all of the remaining cases needed to be for non-Serb 
on Serb crimes and all would have needed to end in convictions if there were to be any 
significant changes in the results of this study (a scenario that is obviously not possible). 
Therefore, this study will not be plagued with the same issues in the future as occurred with the 
2003 study. 
Serbs as Victims  
 Victim ethnicity was a key factor of examination in this study and, as was previously 
emphasized, all of the sides in the civil war were victims of war crimes/crimes against humanity. 
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Nonetheless, some may argue that Serbs simply did not have as many victims as other groups 
and perhaps this may be the reason why the Tribunal has not prosecuted more non-Serbs. Since it 
was previously addressed in a limited manner, it is pertinent to include more information in order 
to dispel any notion that Serbs did not have (many) victims.  
 The crime of ‘ethnic cleansing’ became synonymous with the Yugoslav civil war, yet it 
was the Serbs who were deemed by Western governments and media as the main perpetrators of 
this crime. Nonetheless, there are many scholars who do not agree with this assessment. For 
instance, Parenti notes that, “What is still not widely understood in the West is that most of the 
ethnic cleansing throughout the former Yugoslavia was perpetrated not by the Serbs but against 
them. More than one million Serbs were driven from their ancestral homes in the breakaway 
republics. As of the year 2000, the rump nation of Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro] hosted 
more displaced persons per capita than just about any other nation” (Parenti 2000; p. 156). 
Furthermore, Herman and Peterson (2010; p. 82) argue that the Serbs were the main victims of 
ethnic cleansing during the bloody civil war by pointing out that “Operation Storm drove some 
250,000 ethnic Serbs out of the Krajina…. killing several thousand, including several hundred 
women and children” and that this “ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs was the single largest 
event of its kind in the Balkan wars.” To date, no one of Croatian ethnicity has been convicted by 
the ICTY for the crimes committed against Serbs during the brutal expulsion of Serbs from 
Croatia.  
 It was not my intent to disavow any of the victims or minimize their suffering in any way 
by discussing the victims of the civil war in such a manner, however it was necessary to include 
the information that Serbs, too, were victims of war crimes on a large scale, considering one of 
the aims of this study was to examine whether or not victim ethnicity was associated with case 
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outcomes. The ICTY claims that the conviction of Croatians (as well as others) for war crimes 
proves it is fair and impartial, however the victims of only one convicted Croatian were of 
Serbian ethnicity, even though Serbs were one of the main victims of war crimes perpetrated by 
Croats. Since hardly any of the victims of convicted Croats were of Serbian ethnicity, their 
convictions cannot ‘prove that the ICTY is fair and impartial’. Nevertheless, it was irrelevant for 
this study to demonstrate who had ‘the most victims’. What was relevant was to test whether or 
not victim ethnicity was associated with case outcomes, and to carry out this objective it was 
necessary to determine the ethnicities of the victims of the war. Furthermore, the indictments and 
prosecutions of non-Serbs for crimes against Serbs by the ICTY demonstrate that even the 
Tribunal recognizes there were Serb victims. 
Implications 
 The implications of there being an association between defendant ethnicity and case 
outcomes and one between victim ethnicity and case outcomes at the ICTY could be quite 
serious. First, the historical record of the war, which is essentially derived by the 
proceedings/outcomes of the Tribunal, could be put in disrepute, which would most certainly 
hinder reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts in the region. It has been decades since the 
hostilities have ceased and it would not be difficult for anyone visiting the Balkans today to 
notice the lack of reconciliation and peacebuilding in the region. The various lawsuits filed at the 
ICJ in the recent past by former Yugoslav republics (now states) against one another testify to 
the lack of reconciliation in the region. After all the time that has passed “the bitter resentment, 
grief, hatred and distrust – emotions that block reconciliation” (Johnstone 2015; p. 86) – have 
improved little, if at all. 
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 A prime example of the animosity that still exists in the region occurred during a recent 
FIFA World Cup qualifying match between Kosovo and Croatia (6 October 2016). Fans from 
both teams chanted in unison against Serbs, as “media footage of the match showed the Kosovo 
and Croatian fans outside and inside the stadium chanting: ‘Kill the Serbs’”, and other fascist 
slogans (Mejdini & Milekic, 2016). It would not be fair (nor accurate) to ascribe this behavior 
and general sentiment toward these groups as a whole, however it is telling that neither of the 
groups’ main political leaders (nor any European Union leaders) publicly denounced the actions 
(there was essentially a media blackout of the incident by the Western mainstream media as 
well). During Tito’s reign, the Yugoslav government suppressed the history of the fascist and 
genocidal policies of the Ustasha (who ruled over Croatia and Bosnia) and Kosovo Albanian 
regimes during WWII (Beloff, 1985) – both of which were allies of Nazi Germany. Croatians, 
Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo Albanians were, therefore, not allowed to come to terms with 
their historical legacy (of the WWII period) and many scholars, such as Johnstone (2002), 
Parenti (2000) and Szamuely (2013), believe it was a contributing factor that led to the conflicts 
in the 1990’s. These conflicts, in turn, only further exacerbated the growing influence of fascist 
and nationalist ideologies on these societies – fortunately they remain on the peripheries. Further 
distortion of the historical record of this region (specifically in reference to the Yugoslav civil 
war) and/or disavowal of any of the victims could increase this problem and severely hinder 
efforts at reconciliation.  
 Second, the implications of a possibly biased international institution could undermine 
the founding principles of the United Nations as well as, more broadly, international law. In fact, 
the growing list of cases of violations of state sovereignty, which is afforded to all United 
Nations member states, demonstrates that it has already begun. The proceedings at the ICTY 
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have established many new precedents, some of which have helped shape new and emerging 
international norms, such as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine, which allows 
powerful nations to violate state sovereignty without gaining the necessary approval of the 
United Nations Security Council before interfering in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. 
Minor infractions and even false accusations of human rights violations have been used as 
pretexts by certain powerful states to use military force against states accused of such violations 
– otherwise known as ‘humanitarian interventions’. Powerful countries have been abusing this 
precedent that was set by NATO’s attacks against Yugoslavia (first in Bosnia then in Kosovo). 
The denigration of international law has not made for a safer world; on the contrary, it seems to 
have provoked the opposite response (Ali, 2000; Gibbs, 2009; Kuperman, 2013). The ongoing 
crises in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, Yemen, and, perhaps most tellingly, Syria support 
this view. It is not too late, however, for the critics and defenders of the Tribunal to try to bridge 
the gap that exists between the two groups and to continue conducting rigorous research that may 
help find solutions to the issues concerning the Yugoslav Tribunal, reconciliation and 
peacebuilding in the Balkans, and international justice, law, and relations more broadly. 
Limitations, Future Directions, and Conclusions 
 There were some limitations to conducting analyses using quantitative methods on such a 
topic, mainly due to the complexities and uniqueness of the institution. Unlike most court 
systems in the West, the Tribunal does not offer a trial by jury (judgment by peers) nor does it 
enforce speedy trials, which could affect proceedings and outcomes at the Tribunal. Future 
research needs to be conducted on these factors. Furthermore, the Tribunal allows hearsay 
evidence, which has allowed the prosecution to inundate trial proceedings with hundreds upon 
hundreds of ‘witnesses’ (many of whom never directly witnessed anything), immensely slowing 
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down proceedings and dragging cases on for years. A prime example is the case of Slobodan 
Milošević; the proceedings of which lasted over four years with hundreds of thousands of pages 
of evidence, which, as some scholars, experts, and journalists have pointed out, did little if 
nothing at all to strengthen the prosecution’s case against him as not a single witness testified 
that Milošević ordered war crimes (Laughland, 2007). Further qualitative research could be 
conducted to examine the effects of hearsay evidence on trial proceedings and outcomes. 
 In addition, the Prosecution at the ICTY “made widespread use of the ICTY’s Rule 92bis, 
which allows witnesses to submit written statements, and for these statements to be presented as 
evidence to the court. The consequence is that statements can be admitted as evidence without 
the witness appearing for cross-examination” (Laughland, 2007; p. 153). Again, a strange 
protocol for a criminal court, however, and as it applies to this study, it would not have been 
feasible to go through hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence (for each case) to identify and 
code each written statement that was submitted as evidence in order to conduct quantitative 
analyses. Lastly, there is also the issue of the Tribunal censoring defendants and witnesses from 
providing evidence of war crimes committed against Serbs by either NATO or non-Serbs. These 
are important factors to examine, however they were not possible to include as variables for 
quantitative analyses in this study. Perhaps, however, scholars with the available resources will 
be willing to take on such endeavors in the future.  
 Although the results of this study revealed important insights, what was not possible to 
extrapolate from this study were the means by which this possible bias could have occurred. For 
instance, this study did not answer the question of whether the Tribunal, when pursuing 
indictments against non-Serbs, chose those whom it did not have strong evidence against, 
perhaps knowing that a conviction would be difficult to achieve? Or whether the Tribunal did not 
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utilize the resources necessary to collect evidence against non-Serbs, perhaps instead focusing 
most of its energy and resources on collecting evidence against Serbs? Although this study does 
not provide answers to these questions, it was never intended to do so. There has already been 
enough research conducted examining these questions, largely by the critics of the ICTY, 
showing discrepancies in every aspect of the Tribunal’s proceedings and rules of engagement 
(from the indictment to the verdict and beyond – such as early release). Nonetheless, there is a 
lack of general consensus on the issue of bias and it continues to be fervently debated.  
Although this study was designed to test for possible bias by examining various factors 
associated with case outcomes, and the results support the conclusions expressed by the critics of 
the ICTY, it was not intended to be an indictment of the court. The main concern of this study 
was to reveal whether or not the grievance against the court for ignoring Serb victims was valid. 
The results certainly show that the Serbs are not simply ‘in denial’, but that their concerns are 
justified. Ignoring Serb victims has led to the disavowal of their suffering as whole, which has 
put the Serbs on the defensive and those who support the ICTY on the offensive. The disavowal 
of any group’s suffering and/or grievances does not lend itself to support peacebuilding and 
reconciliation, which is something the peoples of the Balkans, unfortunately, know all too well. 
Hopefully, this study can help move this discourse in a more productive direction, where groups 
can express their concerns without being disavowed and reconciliation efforts can move forward. 
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CHAPTER 3: Political Communication at The Hague Tribunal (ICTY): A Content 
Analytical Study 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was founded in 
1993 to try those who had allegedly committed war crimes during the conflicts in (former)  
Yugoslavia. According to the Tribunal’s founding 1993 UNSC Resolution, its fundamental goals 
were to help bring peace and justice to all the peoples of Yugoslavia (Akrivoulis, 2017, p. 372). 
Situated in The Hague, Netherlands, the ICTY indicted a total of 161 individuals, representing 
all of the ethnic groups involved in the various conflicts. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has been 
shrouded in controversy since its inception as some scholars have accused the court of bias and 
have exposed some disconcerting actions of the Tribunal; such as indicting individuals without 
evidence, redacting testimony, censoring defendants, violating defendants’ due process, trying 
defendants in absentia, allowing hearsay evidence, allowing and admitting evidence obtained 
through torture, accepting testimony from perjured witnesses, not allowing defendants to 
confront their accusers, not allowing defendants to access and analyze evidence being used 
against them, violating defendants’ right to a public hearing, and giving accused war criminals 
impunity for their testimony (Black, 2000; Brock, 1996: Hayden, 1999; Laughland, 2007; 
Mandel, 2004; Thomas, 2003; Zoglin, 2005). Some of the communities in the region – 
particularly Serb and Croat communities – have negative perceptions of the court, largely as a 
result of these controversies and allegations (Clark, 2011; Saxon, 2005). 
In addition, some scholars attribute the manner in which the ICTY was created, as well as 
its location, to the negative perceptions of the Tribunal in the region.37 To further elaborate on 
                                                        
37 See, for example, Burke-White (2003) and Higonnet (2005), for analyses on how the location 
of the international tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) and the manner in which they were created have 
impacted the way they are perceived by the communities they serve. 
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this point, the establishment of the ICTY “was a decision made by the international community 
and not requested at the national level by the countries of the former Yugoslavia” (Potts & Kjær, 
2016, p. 526). Although the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) created the Tribunal, the 
U.N. Charter does not grant it the power to do so, nor does it have the legal jurisdiction to try 
anyone for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia (Laughland, 2007). As Johnstone (2000, p. 164) 
notes, “The Security Council’s ICTY went over the heads of the states concerned and simply 
imposed its authority on them, without their consent.”  
Finally, some scholars blame the negative perceptions of the Tribunal on the lack of 
outreach in the region prior to 1999, which allowed the “local media and nationalist politicians in 
the former Yugoslavia [to have] free rein to feed their populations with the message that the 
ICTY is a biased institution administering “justice” that is fundamentally unjust” (Clark, 2009). 
Tolbert (2002, p. 11) states that “prior to the creation of the Outreach Program, the tribunal’s 
work was subject to gross distortions and disinformation in many areas in the former 
Yugoslavia.”38 Similarly, the ICTY claims that the regional media and governments had 
“deliberately advanced hostile misinformation about the Tribunal” (ICTYb, n.d.) and it 
responded by creating an outreach program to try to change its image in the Balkans (and 
beyond).  
The ICTY’s Outreach program was “created in 1998-1999 under the leadership of then 
President of the Tribunal, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald” and the central office was located in 
The Hague, with local branches in Sarajevo, Belgrade, Pristina and Zagreb (ICTYb, n.d.). As 
stated by the ICTY, “Outreach has planned and organised many conferences, seminars and other 
events and visits for audiences from the former Yugoslavia. Thousands of people - victims and 
                                                        
38 Taken from Clark (2009, pp. 104-105) 
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members of their families, legal professionals, government representatives, students, journalists 
and others – have had a chance to communicate directly with Tribunal representatives. Access to 
accurate information has served to dispel myths and prejudices about the Court” (ICTYb, n.d.). 
The “myths and prejudices” to which the court refers are mainly those that it has been 
repudiating since its inception – that it was biased and a tool used by Western powers (mainly 
the United States) to further their political interests in the region and beyond. 
For instance, Thomas (2003, p. 171) claims that the  
selective manipulation of the international justice system and process has become 
one of the means of conducting U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. -sponsored and -
supported creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an illustration of such a system of biased justice where the 
main goal is to indict Serbs while preventing any indictment of NATO leaders and 
minimizing those against Croats and Muslims. 
 
Furthermore, Black (2000, pp. 29-30) states that “it was necessary to discredit the existing 
leadership” of Yugoslavia in order to break it up “into quasi-independent colonies, principally of 
Germany and the United States,” and that an “effective propaganda weapon in such an exercise 
is, of course, a tribunal with an international character, which the public will accept as a neutral 
instrument of justice but which is controlled for political ends.” Correspondingly, Bardos (2013, 
p. 15) argues that (former justice at the ICTY) Frederik Harhoff’s allegation that the American 
presiding judge at the Tribunal pressured his colleagues to overturn decisions related to cases 
involving war crimes in Croatia and Serbia, as well as the subsequent accusations of political 
interference triggered by Harhoff’s allegation, have reinforced the view that “the tribunal's work 
[was] determined not by impartial standards of justice, but by the great powers' political 
interests.”  
In addition, Hayden (1999) argues that the ICTY delivered a “biased justice”, with 
prosecutorial decisions based on the national characteristics (ethnic background) of the accused 
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rather than on solid and compelling evidence. He claims that the Tribunal’s “pattern of 
politically driven prosecution [was] accompanied by the use of the Tribunal as a political tool for 
those western countries that support it, and especially the United States: put bluntly, the Tribunal 
prosecute[d] only those whom the Americans want[ed] prosecuted, and the United States 
government threaten[ed] prosecution by the supposedly independent ICTY in order to obtain 
compliance from political actors in the Balkans” (1999, pp. 551-552). Finally, a recent empirical 
study (Milojevich, 2018) found that the only two predictors of outcome (verdicts at the Tribunal) 
were ‘defendant ethnicity’ and ‘victim ethnicity,’ indicating an anti-Serb bias. 
The Tribunal, however, denies these allegations and argues that its “judgements 
demonstrate that all parties in the conflicts committed crimes,” and that it “regards its fairness 
and impartiality to be of paramount importance” (ICTYa, n.d.).  Furthermore, it stresses that it 
has “contributed to an indisputable historical record, combating denial and helping communities 
come to terms with their recent history. Crimes across the region can no longer be denied 
(ICTYa, n.d.). Some scholars have echoed the Tribunal’s claims of fairness and impartiality. For 
instance, Scharf (2002, p. 394) argues that the “message of the International Tribunal's 
indictments, prosecutions, and convictions to date of Muslims and Croats, as well as Serbs, has 
been that a war crime is a war crime, whoever it is committed by. The Tribunal has taken no 
sides.” Furthermore, Smith (2012, p. 166) asserts that the “effective prosecution of those accused 
of war crimes regardless of the side of the conflict the defendant was on is a critical progression 
here that cannot be understated.” Although it may appear to be valid, this argument is specious. 
To further elaborate, convictions of some non-Serbs do not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
‘the Tribunal has taken no sides’, which could either be true or false. Therefore, this argument is 
a logical fallacy (non sequitur). Nevertheless, and in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, the 
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view of the Tribunal being fair and impartial is the most prevailing and accepted within the 
general scholarship on the ICTY. 
The goal of the present study is to contribute to the literature on the ICTY by analyzing 
the messages the Tribunal has disseminated through its Outreach Program. If the messages are, 
more or less, neutral in tone and use the same or similar themes and patterns when discussing 
and describing the crimes that were committed (regardless of who committed them), as well as 
when describing the perpetrators and victims of the crimes (regardless of their ethnicity), then 
the result of the analysis will point towards fairness. On the other hand, if the themes and 
patterns used by Outreach differ significantly based on the ethnicity of the perpetrators and/or the 
victims of the crimes, then the result will point towards bias. 
To date, only one study (Potts & Kjær, 2016) has examined the discourse of the ICTY – 
or how it projects its image to society through its website. Using critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), the authors (2016, p. 549) analyzed the judgments from the Trials and Appeals 
Chambers as well as the Tribunal’s Annual Reports in order to 1) explore how the ICTY’s own 
stated ‘achievements’ are discursively manifested and constructed, and 2) demonstrate how 
corpus linguistics methods can contribute to analysis of the language of the law. They found that 
the Tribunal’s self-declared achievements were “stated rather than demonstrated” and, therefore, 
“dubiously portrayed” (p. 552). The authors also found that “the court was seen to deviate from 
phrases of accountability, resulting in confusion, appeal, and general erosion of the contribution 
to international law” (p. 552). Although the present study had similar goals, the principle aim 
was to examine the key ‘themes’ the ICTY has disseminated (through its Outreach Program) to 
the various communities in the Balkans, as well as to individuals and groups from all over the 
world. The overarching goal, though, was to ascertain whether or not the Tribunal’s frame of the 
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Yugoslav conflicts falls in line with the way Western governments (particularly the U.S.) and the 
mainstream media framed the conflicts.  
Media Frames and U.S. Foreign Policy in Former Yugoslavia 
In order to gain support for the breakaway republics and ultimately to sway public 
opinion in favor of U.S. foreign policy, the mainstream media and government officials targeted 
the Serbs for dehumanization (Hammond 2000a; Hammond & Herman, 2000). This was done by 
demonizing Serbs as well as disavowing Serbian victims. Crimes committed against Serbs were 
systematically ignored by the mainstream media, which predominately described the conflicts in 
Yugoslavia using the ‘good versus evil’ binary opposition that is frequently used in media frames 
(Boyd-Barrett, 2016; Hammond, 2000b). The dumbed-down and one-sided (pro-government 
stance) reporting supports the findings of studies on framing and the media that suggest the media 
1) tend to report and stay close to the government’s official version of events (Herman & 
Chomsky, 2002; Lawrence 2010) while ignoring opinions on foreign policy that do not receive 
support among political elites (Powlick & Katz, 1998), and 2) consistently favor one side over 
another (Entman, 2004; Entman & Rojecki, 2000) – especially when it comes to U.S. foreign 
policy (Entman, 2004; 2007). Frames have been shown to “activate and spread from the top level 
of a stratified system (the White House) to the network of nonadministration elites, and on to 
news organizations, their texts, and the public….[in turn, these] interpretations feed back from 
lower to higher levels” (Entman, 2003, p. 415).  
Consequently, few perspectives of the crises in Yugoslavia were presented to the general 
public by the mainstream media, and the dominant narrative that surfaced depicted the Serbs as the 
unequivocal ‘demons’ of the conflicts, while the secessionist groups were portrayed as their 
unwilling ‘victims.’ Phillip Corwin (1999), the United Nations chief political officer during the 
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Bosnian conflict, observed the demonization of Serbs firsthand while working for the U.N. in 
Sarajevo. He described Western journalists reporting in Sarajevo as “very, very biased in favor 
of the Bosnian government,” and that they deemed the Bosnian Serbs “the unofficially convicted 
demons in the Bosnian drama.”  
Generally, the demonization process consists of associating the enemy leader with a 
former, ruthless dictator (e.g., the “new Hitler”) and using highly emotive adjectives to describe 
him, such as “a mass murderer” or “genocidal” (Milojevich & Beattie, 2018). The demonization 
of the targeted leader “is in keeping with the narrative formula of casting the combatants in the 
roles of 'good' and 'evil'. The extension of the leader figure's persona as the personification of 
evil, or simply as 'the bad guy', is aided by the identification with established historical figures 
that are clearly recognizable as undesirable” (Willcox, 2005, pp. 102-106). The mainstream 
media referred to Serbs as the ‘new Nazis’ from the very beginning of the conflicts. As Hume 
(2000, p. 77) points out,  
From the summer of 1992, the media’s thoroughgoing demonization of the Serbs 
helped to set in motion a dynamic of increasing Western intervention in the civil 
wars in the former Yugoslavia. The Serbs = Nazis stories published and broadcast 
through the 1990’s were to play a significant part in paving the way for Nato’s ‘just 
war’ in the spring of 1999. 
 
Furthermore, crimes committed against Serbs were systematically ignored by the 
mainstream media. Through this omission the media avoided convoluting the official narrative 
with different perpetrators, victims, and perspectives, thus helping the in-groups maintain their 
status as the unequivocal ‘good guys’ and the official victims of the Yugoslav conflicts. As 
studies have shown, framing can manipulate public opinion by omission – failing to provide 
interpretations that citizens would find relevant – and it is through omission that media framing 
sets the ideological boundaries for public discourse on political issues (Entman, 2007). Omission 
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is conducted through the process of “indexing,” which presents only those frames of issues that 
match the views of political elites—leaving opinions that do not enjoy elite support at a 
considerable disadvantage (Bennett, 1990). The case of Operation Storm, where “some 250,000 
ethnic Serbs [were driven] out of the Krajina [Croatia]…. killing several thousand, including 
several hundred women and children” (Herman & Peterson, 2010, p. 82), offers a pertinent 
example of omission vis-à-vis media/government framing of the Yugoslav conflicts.  
The “ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs” has been described as “the single largest event 
of its kind in the Balkan wars” (Herman & Peterson, 2010, p. 82), yet U.S. officials and 
mainstream media have avoided depicting it this way. A study by Herman and Peterson (2010, p. 
83) shows that this ethnic cleansing was “minimally newsworthy and has been treated neither as 
a massacre nor as genocide.” They also note that Peter Galbraith, former (and first) United States 
Ambassador to Croatia, denied that what had occurred was ethnic cleansing and went as far as to 
claim that it was a practice committed only by Serbs. The authors (2010, p. 83) conclude that 
according to Galbraith’s logic it is only ethnic cleansing “if carried out by ethnic Serbs against 
Muslims and Croats, but not if carried out by their forces against ethnic Serbs” and that the U.S. 
media and humanitarian intervention intellectuals used and continue to use the phrase “ethnic 
cleansing” in lockstep with Galbraith’s view.  
In addition, Parenti (2000, p. 70) notes that “when thousands of Serb civilians in eastern 
Herzegovina were expelled from their homes in February 1993, the Western media carried not a 
word about it. Every Serbian home between Metkovic and Konjic in the Neretva valley was 
burned to the ground.” Furthermore, the massacre of 181 mainly Serbian civilians in the Bosnian 
town of Mrkonjić Grad (near the border with Croatia) in the autumn of 1995, “went almost 
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completely unreported” (p. 72).39 Ignoring atrocities committed against Serbs was, and continues 
to be, common practice by Western governments and the mainstream media.40 This omission has 
been carried out – in conjunction with portraying Serbs as evil aggressors – in order to dehumanize 
the out-group, which is a “psychological process of demonizing the enemy, making them seem less 
than human and hence not worthy of humane treatment” (Maiese, 2003).  
Dehumanization is also an “extension of a less intense process of developing an ‘enemy 
image’ of the opponent…[which] is a negative stereotype through which the opposing group is 
viewed as evil, in contrast to one's own side, which is seen as good” (Maiese, 2003). 
Dehumanization generally leads to a process known as ‘moral exclusion’, by which targeted 
groups are placed “outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of 
fairness apply…[they] are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving” (Opotow, 1990, 
p. 1). Consequently, and as Opotow (p. 1) describes, “harming or exploiting them appears to be 
appropriate, acceptable, or just.” As recent empirical research has shown, those who view the 
outgroup as ‘less than’ are less likely to feel guilty about wrongs perpetrated by their group against 
the targeted group (Vasiljevic & Viki, 2008) and are less likely to punish the perpetrators (Leidner, 
Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Vasiljevic & Viki, 2008). Both the former and the latter 
were evident during the Kosovo war. FAIR (2000), the national media watch group, protested the 
Committee to Protect Journalists’ (CPJ) exclusion of the 16 Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) 
employees killed by NATO from its annual list of journalists murdered because of their work, and 
condemned Western mainstream media outlets for engaging in “crude race-hatred and war-crime 
                                                        
39 See also ‘Serbs unearth 181 bodies in mass grave’ (1996). 
40 For more examples see Brock (2005), Hammond and Herman (2000), Johnstone (2002), 
Parenti (2000) and Szamuely (2013).  
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agitation”, singling out the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman and Fox’s Bill O’Reilly for 
particularly egregious offences. 
As discussed above, many research studies indicate that the U.S. government and 
mainstream media were congruent in creating and disseminating their frames of the Yugoslav 
conflicts – which is consistent with studies on media frames (as well as studies on 
dehumanization). Therefore, if the ICTY was biased against Serbs as well as heavily influenced by 
the United States, as some scholars suggest, then we could expect some overlap, or similarities, 
between the ICTY’s frames of the Yugoslav conflicts and the U.S. government/mainstream 
media’s frames of the conflicts.  The overarching question this study examined, therefore, was 
whether or not the Tribunal, through its Outreach Program, promulgated a frame of the Yugoslav 
conflicts similar to that of the U.S. government and mainstream media? As such, the present study 
sheds further light on whether there may be merit to the claims of bias and of the political nature of 
this institute. 
Method and Data 
The data utilized for this study were collected on the ICTY website in the section titled 
‘Outreach’. The following are the articles, summaries, and reports that were collected and 
included in the data set: 1) “Bridging the Gap Series” conference reports and the online 
summaries of each conference, 2) Outreach activities summaries from 1999-2017, and 3) 
Outreach articles. Thematic analysis (TA), a qualitative content analytical method, was used to 
examine the data.  
Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis allows the researcher to identify, analyze, and report patterns (or 
‘themes’) within data (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 79), much like that of qualitative content 
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analysis as developed by Mayring (2000). Both approaches allow for a qualitative analysis of 
data and share the same aim of analytically examining narrative materials (Vaismoradi, Turunen, 
& Bondas, 2013), however thematic analysis provides a purely qualitative, detailed, and nuanced 
account of data whereas content analysis uses a descriptive approach in both coding of the data 
and its interpretation of quantitative counts of the codes (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi, 
Turunen, & Bondas, 2013).  
In addition, there are two main types of thematic analyses, inductive or theoretical 
(deductive), which, depending on the one utilized, will dictate “how and why you code the data” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). Thus, the researcher “can either code for a quite specific research 
question (which maps onto the more theoretical approach) or the specific research question can 
evolve through the coding process (which maps onto the inductive approach)” (Braun & Clarke, 
2006, p. 84). Inductive thematic analysis is rather comparable to framing analysis – which is 
mainly used in communications research – as both use the inductive approach and are strictly 
qualitative. Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006), nonetheless, have demonstrated that a ‘hybrid’ 
approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development is also possible when 
utilizing TA for data analysis.  
Coding 
The deductive approach for coding and theme development was mainly used, however it 
was necessary to create some codes inductively – particularly when coding for what was not 
stated (omission). Therefore, the approach used for this study would classify as a ‘hybrid’ TA 
approach (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Finally, coding and data analysis were conducted 
following the general guidelines as developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). Their approach to 
thematic analysis is performed through the process of coding to look for themes, with the 
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“reporting of the content and meaning of patterns (themes) in the data” as the end goal (2006, p. 
86). There are six phases to this approach, which are listed as follows: 1) familiarization with 
data, 2) generating initial codes, 3) searching for themes/patterns (by analyzing codes), 4) 
reviewing themes, 5) defining and naming themes, and 6) producing the final report (2006, p. 
87).  
Data 
Conferences: “Bridging the Gap Series”  
The following is a description of the Outreach Program’s “Bridging the Gap Series” from 
the ICTY website: 
The conferences provided the Tribunal with an opportunity to present an account 
of its activities directly to audiences most affected by the crimes at the heart of the 
Tribunal's work. Local community leaders, victims, returnees, legal professionals, 
law enforcement personnel, journalists, scholars and other members of the public 
had the opportunity to hear first-hand and ask questions about the Tribunal’s 
extensive work.41 
 
The materials that were analyzed were the “Bridging the Gap Between the ICTY and 
Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina” summary reports. Each report contained, essentially, a 
summary of the conference proceedings. The following are the 5 locations and number of pages 
of each report: 1) Brčko: 75 pages, 2) Foča: 81 pages, 3) Konjic: 75 pages, 4) Srebrenica: 79 
pages, and 5) Prijedor: 83 pages. Each conference has a dedicated page on the ICTY website 
contained within the Outreach Program section. Also analyzed were the descriptions of the 
conferences that are posted on each location’s corresponding webpage. The following are the 
number of words contained on each page: Brčko (315), Foča (398), Konjic (354), Srebrenica 
(437), and Prijedor (593).  
                                                        
41 http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/bridging-the-gap-with-local-communities 
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Outreach Activities Summaries 
Outreach provided summaries of all of its activities from 1999-2017 (19 years in total). 
The following is the year and the number of activities as reported by the Outreach Program:  
2017 (13), 2016 (46), 2015 (54), 2014 (91), 2013 (83), 2012 (98), 2011 (90), 2010 (49), 2009 
(54), 2008 (57), 2007 (86), 2006 (43), 2005 (84), 2004 (51), 2003 (50), 2002 (62), 2001 (77), 
2000 (18), and 1999 (2); for a total of 1,109 entries and roughly 166,000 words. 
Outreach Newspaper and Journal Articles 
A total of 62 Outreach articles (over 75,000 total words) were published in two outlets (8 
article contributions to Justice in Transition and 54 to Balkan). From 2005 to 2007 Outreach 
contributed 8 articles to Justice in Transition, a “bi-monthly journal published by the Serbian 
War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office. The journal was distributed to members of the Serbian 
judiciary, government representatives, NGO’s, international organisations and the diplomatic 
community and supported by the OSCE, the Open Society Fund and the US Department of 
Justice.”42 From “late 2003 to early 2005, the Outreach Programme contributed a weekly 
commentary to Balkan, a Belgrade daily newspaper. The articles focused on Tribunal-related 
issues of particular relevance in Serbia and Montenegro, aiming to contribute to ongoing 
discussions and debates about the ICTY and broader initiatives concerning facing the past, 
justice and truth.”43  
Analysis and Discussion 
The results from the analysis indicate that the main themes of the ICTY frame of the 
Yugoslav conflicts fall into the two main categories of themes that have been the most prevalent 
                                                        
42 http://www.icty.org/en/outreach/outreach-articles-archive 
43 Ibid. 
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in the mainstream media and government’s frame of the Yugoslav conflicts: 1) describing Serbs 
mainly as perpetrators and uniquely evil/genocidal, and 2) ignoring (omission) or minimizing 
crimes committed by the in-groups/disavowing Serbian victims. Furthermore, two other themes – 
‘a war crime is a war crime no matter who commits it’ and ‘the Tribunal has individualized guilt in 
order to protect entire communities from being labelled as collectively responsible’ – also 
emerged and are included as part of the ‘fairness and impartiality’ category.  
Serbs as the Perpetrators  
 When describing crimes committed (or allegedly committed) by Serbs the Tribunal used 
emotionally charged terms and terms that might evoke images of the Holocaust, such as 
‘appalling,’ ‘horrendous,’ ‘horrifying,’ ‘ruthless,’ and ‘heinous.’ Crimes committed by non-Serbs 
against Serbs were generally described simply as ‘crimes’ or ‘war crimes’, without the use of 
emotive adjectives. However, the most dominant theme in this category began with the word 
‘campaign,’ such as campaign of terror/ethnic cleansing/persecutions. ‘Campaign’ was also used at 
the end of the phrase, such as the ‘ethnic cleansing campaign,’ the ‘shelling campaign,’ and the 
‘Serb campaign.’ 
The word ‘campaign’ can give an impression of a pre-determined and systemic policy of 
persecution against the ‘other,’ which evokes Nazism and implicitly accuses the Serbian nation (as 
a whole) of being complicit in the ‘campaign.’ Therefore, using the word ‘campaign’ to describe a 
specific case of persecution or ethnic cleansing de-individualizes the case, thus collectivizing guilt 
and even criminalizing the group’s legitimate objectives, such as seeking self-determination – the 
primary aim of all of the ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia (Szamuely, 2013). This theme, 
therefore, contradicts the ICTY’s claim that it has ensured that guilt remained individualized, 
which will be discussed further in the section on the ‘fairness and impartiality’ themes.  
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The article entitled, Facts About Foča, offers a prime example of the utilization of this 
theme. Various forms were used in this article, such as 1) “the Serb forces conducted a campaign 
of persecution,” 2) the trial against “[Bosnian Serbs] Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač, and 
Zoran Vuković established that one target of this campaign of terror…,” 3) “two cases dealt 
specifically with the campaign of widespread persecution…,” and 4) the “purpose of the Serb 
campaign in Foča was, among others, ‘to cleanse the Foča area of Muslims.’” As previously 
mentioned, describing these acts as a ‘campaign’ elicits the Nazi image and collectivizes guilt, 
however the fourth example is perhaps the most effective as the name of the ethnic group is 
grouped with the word ‘campaign’ (i.e. ‘the Serb campaign’). For instance, by simply changing a 
few words (the groups and the area involved) the statement can easily transform into something 
written about the Holocaust; such as ‘the Nazi campaign in Berlin was, among others, to cleanse 
the Berlin area of Jews.’ This is not in any way meant to minimize the severity of the crimes that 
occurred, but rather to highlight the discrepancies in the use of this term – that it was a dominant 
theme used only to describe crimes committed by Serbians – as well as to discuss the potential 
impact this theme could have on readers of the article.  
Ignoring/Minimizing In-Group Crimes 
 The theme or pattern of ignoring or minimizing crimes that were committed by non-Serbs 
against Serbs was the most prevailing theme that emerged from the analysis and it demonstrates a 
bias (by omission) by the Tribunal. A prime example of this theme is the omission of the massacre 
of 181 Serbian civilians in Mrkonjić Grad in Bosnia, which (as previously discussed) was also 
ignored by the mainstream media. Other examples of this theme include the omission of non-Serb 
war crimes that occurred in and around Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Bratunac in Bosnia; Gospić, 
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Vukovar, and Lika in Croatia; and Prizren, Staro Gracko, and Goraždevac in Kosovo.44 Ignoring 
war crimes committed by non-Serbs, correspondingly, disavows the victims, which contributes to 
the dehumanization of Serbians. 
In addition, certain terms or phrasing were also omitted when describing crimes 
committed against Serbs. Non-Serb war crimes were described in plain, technical terms and the 
term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was not used in cases involving Serb victims of this crime, whereas it 
was used unfailingly to describe this crime when committed by Serbs against non-Serbs. 
Therefore, ‘ethnic cleansing’ was used in lockstep with Galbraith’s view that only Serbs conduct 
ethnic cleansing (Herman & Peterson, 2010). For example, in the article, Indictments Against 
Generals Čermak and Markač, it states that Serbs “fled the area as their houses and property 
were destroyed.” This was a clear case of ethnic cleansing yet, instead of using the term ‘ethnic 
cleansing,’ Serbs are described simply as having ‘fled the area,’ which lacks any recognition that 
they were forced to flee. That the destruction of Serbian houses and property was intentional is 
omitted, which reduces the ethnic cleansing of Serbians from the Krajina region of Croatia to an 
unintended consequence (collateral damage) and, thereby, minimizes the crime. In addition, the 
ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Croatia occurred throughout the country and included hundreds of 
thousands of victims, yet these facts were also omitted, which minimizes the scope of the crime. 
This pattern of omission mirrors that of the mainstream media and government when it comes to 
Serbian victims and the use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ vis-à-vis Croatia.  
Another example of this omission occurred in the article ‘No Excuse for Killing and 
Torturing Civilians.’ This article is about the war crimes committed by Naser Orić, a Bosnian 
                                                        
44 For details of the war crimes committed against Serbs in these and other areas of former 
Yugoslavia see, for example, the works of Brock (2005), Johnstone (2002), Parenti (2000), and 
Szamuely (2013). 
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Muslim Commander in the Srebrenica area. What is omitted from the article is the extent of the 
killings committed by Orić and his men. Orić’s exploits are well-known as he openly and publicly 
boasted about his nefarious activities on many occasions, including the time he “entertained a 
Washington Post reporter by showing him a videotape of his soldiers decapitating Serbs” 
(Schindler, 2007, p. 229). Schindler (2007, p. 229) describes that Orić’s “tenure as Srebrenica’s 
commander was marked by horrifying atrocities against those he took a disliking to. Orić’s 
crimes against Serb civilians were among the worst perpetrated by anyone in the Bosnian civil 
war, including much wanton butchery against innocent victims.” Indisputable evidence has 
shown that Serbs, including women and children, “had been tortured and mutilated and others 
were burned alive when their houses were torched [by Orić and his men]” (Szamuely, 2013, p. 
278). Similarly, Johnstone (2002, p. 111) concludes that Orić had a propensity to attack Serbs on 
Serbian holidays, as well as to brag to Western reporters about his exploits.  
 The extent and scope of Orić’s (alleged) crimes were not discussed in the article, nor in 
the entire data set. What the article does mention, however, is that the indictment “alleges that 
one Serb was beaten to death, and six others were killed.” This is the extent to which the article 
discusses the killings that Orić was allegedly involved in. Instead, the article focuses on the 
destruction of property, including, of all things, television sets. It states that “Orić’s forces 
plundered cattle, furniture and television sets, and destroyed buildings and dwellings.”45 The 
article further states that, “as a result of these actions, thousands of Serbs fled the area.” Again, 
no use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing,’ even though this is a clear case of it. 
Finally, another dominant theme emerged as part of this category. This theme uses the 
technical name of the group when describing non-Serb crimes, while the ethnicity of the group is 
                                                        
45 Emphasis added. 
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used when describing Serb crimes. For example, non-Serb crimes are described as ‘HVO forces 
attacked…’, ‘KLA forces attacked,’ and ‘government forces attacked,’ instead of ‘Croatian forces 
attacked’, ‘Kosovo Albanian forces attacked,’ and ‘Bosnian Muslim forces attacked.’ Or names are 
used, such as ‘Orić’s forces attacked.’ However, when it comes to Serb crimes, they are 
described as ‘rebel Serbs attacked’, ‘Serb forces attacked’, and ‘Bosnian Serb forces attacked.’ 
Therefore, the Serbian ethnic group/nation is associated with crimes committed by members of 
its group, whereas the non-Serb ethnic groups are not associated, in whole or in part, with crimes 
committed by members of their group. As such, this theme collectivizes crimes committed by 
Serbs, while keeping crimes committed by non-Serbs individualized. 
Fairness and Impartiality Themes 
The theme ‘a war crime is a war crime no matter who commits it’ emerged as the central 
theme to the claim made by the ICTY that it “regards its fairness and impartiality to be of 
paramount importance” and that it “takes no side in the conflict” (ICTYa, nd). Another dominant 
theme, ‘the Tribunal has individualized guilt in order to protect entire communities from being 
labelled as collectively responsible,’ also emerged as part of the ‘fairness and impartiality’ 
category. These themes fall under the ‘fairness and impartiality category’ as they are vital to the 
ICTY strategy of trying to convince the public that it was fair and impartial, which, if accepted, 
would mean that its proceedings, case facts and outcomes, and the messages it disseminates 
should, subsequently, also be accepted. Therefore, these themes fit cohesively into, and are an 
integral part of, the Tribunal’s overarching frame of the Yugoslav conflicts. However, the results 
of the analysis show that, instead of supporting the ‘fairness and impartiality’ claims with 
substantiating evidence, the Tribunal mostly contradicted them. 
The article titled ‘Who Kills on Behalf of the Citizens of Serbia’ in no uncertain terms 
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explicitly implicates the Serbian people as co-conspirators of war crimes, and contradicts the 
theme ‘the Tribunal has individualized guilt.’ The use of the term ‘citizens’ suggests that the 
Serbian community, at large, is (at least partially) responsible for the alleged crimes because they 
were the ones who chose (voted for) their leaders. The Tribunal has made clear that its primary 
concern has been to prosecute the main political and military leaders of the former Yugoslavia 
for the most serious war crimes, so there is no mistaking that when the Tribunal uses the word 
‘killers’ in the article, it is referring to Serbia’s political and military leaders.  
Furthermore, the article states that “all citizens of Serbia are entitled to know who took it 
upon themselves to kill innocent civilians in their name,” which implicates, just as the title does, 
the citizens of Serbia in the alleged killings. By implicating the citizens of Serbia in the alleged 
war crimes, the Tribunal makes them collectively responsible for the crimes, which contradicts 
its claim that it has ensured that guilt has remained ‘individualized in order to protect groups 
from being labelled collectively responsible.’  
The evidence provided by the Tribunal to support the theme, ‘a war crime is a war crime 
no matter who commits it,’ is also contradictory. The Outreach Activities Summary, A Crime is 
Always a Crime – Regardless of Who the Perpetrators Are, offers a prime example of this 
contradiction. The summary states that “special attention was paid to cases which deal specifically 
with Croatia, namely the trials of Babić, Martić, Jokić, Strugar, Gotovina et al., Blaškić and 
Norac,” which were presented as supporting evidence that ‘a crime is a crime no matter who 
commits it,’ with the intended goal of helping the Croatian community come to terms with its role 
in the war. However, these cases hardly support this aim.  
Gotovina et al. (Gotovina, Čermak, and Markač) was arguably one of the most important 
trials held at the ICTY. For instance, a conviction was crucial to Serbs from Croatia who wanted 
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justice for their victims, however the Croatian government feared a guilty verdict would tarnish the 
country’s victim image and possibly even challenge Croatia’s narrative that it fought a strictly 
defensive war – known in Croatia as the ‘War of Independence’ or ‘Homeland War’– against 
‘Serbian aggressors.’ Essentially, if the accused were convicted it would recognize Serbs as 
victims and show that Croatians were also guilty of committing war crimes on a large scale, 
realities the Croatian government has recurrently had difficulty accepting (Basic, 2017).  
Initially, the accused were found guilty, which caused an uproar in Croatia by the political 
elite and media, who condemned the Tribunal and claimed it was ‘biased.’ However, the guilty 
verdict was extremely short-lived, as the three accused were acquitted of all charges by the 
Appeals Chamber, and, subsequently, given a hero’s welcome upon their return to Croatia 
(Dempsey, 2012). Dempsey (2012) asserts that the acquittal of the Croatian generals “is a 
depressing indictment for a court that was meant to end impunity for some of Europe’s worst war 
criminals.” She further postulates that the decision would likely 1) “undermine the ICTY’s 
credibility as an impartial body set up in 1993 to achieve justice for the victims,” 2) “make 
reconciliation between Serbia and Croatia even more difficult than it already is,” and 3) “send the 
wrong signal to military commanders and politicians who would contemplate ethnic cleansing.”  
Contrary to fostering reconciliation between Serbian and Croatian communities by helping 
Croatians come to terms with their role in the war and accept the crimes committed by their group, 
the decision allowed government officials and the media to disseminate a polarizing message 
repudiating any wrongdoing, which potentially helped further foment the rising tide of nationalism 
in Croatia.46 For instance, Gotovina, after meeting with the president, affirmed, “Our homeland 
                                                        
46 Although nationalism (as well as fascism) have plagued Croatia for some time (Brentin, 2016; 
Johnstone, 2002; Szamuely, 2013; Trifkovic, 2010), another wave of nationalism seems to be 
gaining momentum in Croatia in recent years. For further commentary on the current rise of 
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war is clean, it belongs to our history, it is a basis on which we build our future.”47 Furthermore, 
one of the most influential newspapers in Croatia, Jutarnji List, declared that the “verdict freed 
Croatia from any guilt for the war and organised war crimes,” which appeared in a piece with a 
title indicative of the dominant theme permeating Croatia: The War is Finally Over, Croatia is 
Innocent.48 The Gotovina et al. trial is undoubtedly antithetical to the statement ‘a crime is a crime 
no matter who commits it’, as well as to furthering reconciliation between the groups, which makes 
its use by Outreach difficult to reconcile. 
With regards to the two remaining accused Croats listed by the ICTY, Blaškić was 
convicted and sentenced to 9 years for crimes against Bosnian Muslims, while Norac was not even 
tried at the Tribunal. The ICTY deemed that his case did not warrant a trial in The Hague so it 
transferred his case to Croatia, where he was prosecuted in two different courts for separate crimes. 
Both courts found him guilty and he was sentenced to a total of 15 years in prison. Finally, Babić, 
Martić, Jokić, and Strugar are Serbs (from Croatia) who were found guilty of committing crimes 
against Croats and sentenced to 13, 35, 7, and 7.5 years in prison. The Tribunal, therefore, 
provided examples of mainly convicted Serbs (who were found guilty of committing crimes 
against Croats) and vindicated Croats (who were found innocent of having committed crimes 
against Serbs) to demonstrate its claim that ‘a war crime is always a war crime no matter who 
                                                        
nationalism in Croatia see the following: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/12/croatias-election-warning-
nationalism-balkans-eu-government-second-world-war-fascism?CMP=share_btn_tw, 
http://www.euinside.eu/en/comments/is-nationalism-growing-in-croatia, 
https://slate.com/culture/2018/07/croatia-2018-world-cup-the-conundrum-of-a-lovable-team-
cheered-on-with-fair-right-chants.html, 
https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2016/05/make-croatia-great-again-how-
fascism-emerged-eu-s-youngest-state   
47 See https://sg.news.yahoo.com/croatia-feels-vindicated-generals-acquittal-104857227.html 
48 Ibid. 
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commits it.’  
Thus, these presentations most likely did not assist the Croats in attendance to come to 
terms with their role in the Croatian conflict with Croatian-Serbs. On the contrary, the 
presentations most likely perpetuated the theme of Serbs as evil aggressors and, therefore, 
adversely affected the students’ perceptions of their (ethnic) group’s role in the conflict – a 
conclusion evident in the summary itself as it mentions that one of the Croatian students in 
attendance inquired as to why no charges were pressed (against Serbs) for committing genocide in 
Croatia. Furthermore, these presentations would most likely contribute to the continued disavowal 
of Serbian victims of the Croatian conflict in Croatia and beyond.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
There were a few limitations to this study. First, the Outreach Program supplemented its 
written work with seven documentaries, averaging about an hour in length. Due to the length of 
the documentaries (and the amount of them) it was not feasible to include them in the present 
study. A separate study would need to be conducted to thoroughly analyze them and to report the 
results, which would provide an important follow-up to the present study.  
Secondly, when conducting a qualitative content analytical study such as this one, the data 
may be interpreted differently by those with different disciplinary or theoretical approaches. 
However, the language utilized by the Tribunal was very basic and the articles, summaries, and 
reports were written with a clear intent – to convince the reader of the Tribunal’s version of events 
– therefore, this factor may not be as applicable to this particular study as it would to similar 
studies. Nonetheless, to counteract potential researcher bias, many examples (of the dominant 
themes) were taken directly from the data and provided within each category of the analysis and 
discussion section. Furthermore, the entire data set is accessible on the ICTY website, providing 
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transparency and allowing for further evaluation and scrutiny.  
In addition, how the themes might influence the reader could only be inferred in this study, 
therefore another possible future direction would be to test for effects of the themes on readers. 
Finally, future research should to be conducted to analyze the (potential) impact the Outreach 
program has had on the political environment in the region. 
Conclusion 
The results of this study have shown that the Tribunal’s frame of the Yugoslav conflicts 
mirrors the frame that was devised and disseminated by Western mainstream media and 
governments – in particular the media and government of the United States. Therefore, it 
supports previous studies that have demonstrated ethnic-bias by the ICTY, as well as confirms 
that the Tribunal’s self-declared achievements are “dubiously portrayed” (Potts & Kjær, 2016). 
Furthermore, this study provides an important qualitative analysis on how this international 
institute communicates political messages and ideas to the communities in the Balkans, as well 
as to the international community.  
There is no doubt that the ICTY has been, and continues to be, highly influential in the 
former Yugoslavia, especially when it comes to the policies of the governments in the region, as 
well as to the foreign policies of powerful states pursuing their own interests in the region; such 
as the United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Russia, and Turkey. Nonetheless, the 
most critical area where the ICTY has strived to have the largest impact is on reconciliation 
between the groups involved in the conflicts. Unfortunately, relations between some of these 
countries “are at the lowest level since the signing of Dayton [in 1995]” (Nikolic, 2015). This is 
not surprising considering that many communities in the region have negative perceptions of the 
ICTY. This study, therefore, raises an important question regarding the Tribunal’s persistent 
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quest to impact reconciliation in the region (now exclusively through its Outreach Program), 
which is ‘could the Tribunal be doing more harm than good?’ It has been roughly a quarter of a 
century since the majority of the conflicts ended in Yugoslavia, perhaps it is now time for the 
Tribunal to finally end its quest and allow the communities in the region to move on from a their 
turbulent pasts. 
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CHAPTER 4: Psychological Effects of Media Dehumanization on the Target Group 
During the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Western powers sided with the secessionist groups 
seeking to break apart Yugoslavia, which resulted in one-sided reporting of the crises. The 
mainstream media largely dumbed-down the events by framing them in simple and easy to 
understand terms, mainly describing the conflicts using the ‘good versus evil’ binary opposition 
that is frequently used in media frames (Boyd-Barrett, 2016; Hammond, 2000b). The dumbed-
down and one-sided (pro-government stance) reporting supports the findings of studies on framing 
and the media that suggest the media 1) tend to report and stay close to the government’s official 
version of events (Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Lawrence, 2010) while ignoring opinions on 
foreign policy that do not receive support among political elites (Powlick & Katz; 1998), and 2) 
consistently favor one side over another (Entman, 2004; Entman & Rojecki,  2000) – especially 
when it comes to U.S. foreign policy (Entman, 2004; 2007). Consequently, few perspectives of the 
crises in Yugoslavia were presented to the general public by the mainstream media and they 
essentially reduced a complex situation to an overly-simplistic and insufficient explanation of 
events.  
In order to gain support for the breakaway republics and ultimately to sway public 
opinion in favor of U.S. foreign policy, the mainstream media and government officials 
conducted a large-scale propaganda campaign against the Serbs (Hammond, 2000a; Hammond & 
Herman, 2000). Serbs were demonized and their victims disavowed. They were depicted as evil, 
genocidal killers with the intent of destroying all the other (ethnic) groups in order to create a 
‘Greater Serbia’ – a theory that has long been discredited (Brock, 2005; Hammond & Herman, 
2000; Johnstone, 2002; Laughland, 2007; Parenti, 2000; Szamuely, 2013). The demonization of 
Serbs has long exposed by (independent) journalists, scholars, and even U.N. officials. For 
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instance, Phillip Corwin (1999), the United Nations chief political officer during the Bosnian 
conflict, described Western journalists reporting in Sarajevo as “very, very biased in favor of the 
Bosnian government,” and that they deemed the Bosnian Serbs “the unofficially convicted 
demons in the Bosnian drama.” British writer Joan Phillips, one of the first to notice the 
discrepancies in the mainstream media’s reporting of wartime atrocities in Yugoslavia, noted 
that, 
People on all sides have lost everything; their families, homes, land, possessions, 
health and dignity. So why do we hear little or nothing about the suffering endured 
by the Serbs? … Western journalists go to Bosnia to get a story. But they have just 
one story in mind…[T]he Serbs are the bad guys and the Muslims are the victims. 
Their governments have all declared the Serbs to be the guilty party in Yugoslavia, 
and journalists, almost without exception, have swallowed this story without 
question. That’s why they see only what they want to see – Serbian atrocities 
everywhere and Serbian victims nowhere.49 
 
Scholar Michael Parenti (2000; p. 70) reveals that “when thousands of Serb civilians in 
eastern Herzegovina were expelled from their homes in February 1993, the Western media 
carried not a word about it. Every Serbian home between Metkovic and Konjic in the Neretva 
valley was burned to the ground.” He further states that “in January 1996 Croatian forces 
slaughtered 181 Serb civilian who lived in Mrkonic Grad, a town in northwest Bosnia near the 
Croatian border. The murderers left fascist graffiti over the entire town… the [victims’] graves 
were subsequently exhumed and all of the victims were identified by name. This story went 
almost completely unreported” (2000; p. 72).50 In a recent article published by Forbes, Senior 
                                                        
49 Taken from Parenti (2000; p. 69). 
50 See also “Serbs unearth 181 bodies in mass grave (1996)” at 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/serbs-unearth-181-bodies-in-mass-grave-
1303475.html 
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Fellow at the Cato Institute Doug Bandow (2017) gives a remarkably rare account of the anti-
Serb bias by the United States in a major Western media outlet, acknowledging that,  
Croatia, buttressed by U.S. aid, launched a large-scale military offensive against 
the Krajina Serbs, causing hundreds of thousands to flee. Years later I visited the 
region: the rural landscape was dotted with abandoned farms and ruined Orthodox 
churches, while the façades of urban buildings were pockmarked with bullet holes. 
However, Washington refused to acknowledge, let alone criticize, this episode of 
ruthless ethnic cleansing. The bias persists today.51 
 
Ignoring atrocities committed against Serbs was, and continues to be, common practice by 
Western governments and the mainstream media. Much of this was a result of the U.S. State 
Department’s position – which was in full support of the secessionists – as well as the actions of 
the secessionist groups. 
Slovenians were perhaps the first to recognize the importance of the media in order to 
gain the support of Western powers as they created a “well-equipped media center that would 
distribute vivid reports about nonexistent battles, exaggerated casualty figures, and alleged 
Yugoslav army (Serbian) atrocities” soon after declaring independence in 1991 (Parenti, 2000; p. 
82). The Croats and Muslims quickly followed suit by “conjuring up images of a dehumanized 
Communist Serbian threat to Europe” (Parenti, 2000; p. 82). Creating an aggressive and efficient 
propaganda apparatus is standard protocol for groups clamoring for international support, and the 
main aim of such an apparatus is to convince the world that you are the victims fighting against 
an oppressive and brutal regime. Finally, the U.S. government and mainstream media intensified 
the demonization of the Serbs – some believe it reached an unprecedented level (Herman, 2009) 
– in the lead-up to the U.S. led-NATO bombing campaign against Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia, 
                                                        
51 Emphasis added by this author.  
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and then again before, during, and after the NATO war of aggression against what remained of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  
With the advent of the internet, as well as having the most powerful media outlets in the 
world at its disposal, the U.S. was able to demonize the Serbs on a scale greater than the world 
had ever known – although it was helped in this endeavor by other Western powers such as Great 
Britain, Germany, and France. The reverberation of this demonization can still be felt today. As 
renowned scholar on the media (who also wrote prolifically on Yugoslavia), Edward Herman 
(2009) describes, “The successful demonization of the Serbs, making them largely responsible 
for the Yugoslav wars, and as unique and genocidal killers, was one of the great propaganda 
triumphs of our era. It was done so quickly, with such uniformity and uncritical zeal in the 
mainstream Western media, that disinformation had (and still has, after almost two decades) a 
field day.” Using tried and true techniques in their demonization of Serbs, and with a new 
weapon (the internet) at their disposal, Western media effectively and rapidly disseminated their 
propaganda around the world. 
Demonization: Process and Effects 
Generally, the demonization process consists of associating the enemy leader with a 
former, ruthless dictator (e.g., the “new Hitler”) and using highly emotive adjectives to describe 
him, such as “a mass murderer” or “genocidal” (Milojevich & Beattie, 2018). The identification 
and targeting of the enemy leadership is vitally important to the demonization process and 
“provides the focal point towards which the war effort can be targeted. Once the leader is 
identified, the character and perception of that individual can be cultivated and presented to the 
public to support the policy aims of government” (Willcox, 2005; p. 92). This usually takes two 
forms: “First, the war or crisis is specifically personalized with the enemy leader so that the 
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introduction of their name becomes synonymous with the conflict. Second, the individual, once 
directly associated with the conflict, is demonized, provoking negative connotations through the 
invoking of their name” (Willcox, 2005; p. 92). The demonization of the targeted leader “is in 
keeping with the narrative formula of casting the combatants in the roles of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. 
The extension of the leader figure's persona as the personification of evil, or simply as ‘the bad 
guy,’ is aided by the identification with established historical figures that are clearly recognizable 
as undesirable” (Willcox, 2005; pp. 102-106). 
 Adolf Hitler, for obvious reasons, is the most common historical figure utilized in this 
technique, which is often referred to as the 'Hitlerization' of the leader. This method “makes the 
demonization easier and offers a benchmark with which to compare personality characteristics. 
Reference to historical characters, especially Nazis, is a theme that runs throughout conflict 
coverage and is often intertwined with the other themes” (Willcox 2005; p. 106). As Johnstone 
(2002; p. 65) explains regarding the mainstream media reporting of the Yugoslav crises,  
The easiest way to describe a totally unfamiliar situation in a short time is by 
analogy to a familiar one, [and] nothing was more familiar to the Western public of 
the late twentieth century than Hitler and the Holocaust. Once the mass media 
began to treat the Yugoslav conflicts in these terms, likening the Serbs to ‘the new 
Nazis’, the dynamic became irresistible. Serbs as Nazis, with Milosevic as Hitler, 
was ‘the story’ that reporters were sent to look for. When in doubt, atrocities were 
attributed to the Serbs. Once launched, unproven accusations were repeated so often 
that they became obviously true, because familiar. 
 
Hume (2000; p. 77) traces the origins of this strategy to the early 1990’s, pointing out that “from 
the summer of 1992, the media’s thoroughgoing demonization of the Serbs helped to set in 
motion a dynamic of increasing Western intervention in the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
The Serbs = Nazis stories published and broadcast through the 1990’s were to play a significant 
part in paving the way for Nato’s ‘just war’ in the spring of 1999.” 
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Unfortunately, this targeted demonization by the mainstream media and various Western 
governments has negatively affected how the conflicts are understood in the Western world – 
which extends from the general public to academia. To further elaborate on the latter, a significant 
portion of academic scholarship on Yugoslavia has shown to appeal to conventional wisdom (a 
logical fallacy) about the conflicts, thus contributing to this problem of viewing the events 
through the binary, good versus evil, lens that portrays the Serbs as victimless aggressors. Using 
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda cases as examples, Aleksandar Jokic (2013; p. 1) demonstrates how 
“conventional wisdom, usually shaped by the media and politics, corrupt[s] fact based scholarship, 
particularly when that conventional wisdom or the standard narrative is simply presupposed as 
factually accurate by those engaged in what should be an exercise of scholarship and academic 
polemic.”  
In a recent interview that focused on the United States’ support of Israel, renowned scholar 
Noam Chomsky echoed Jokic’s analysis, stating that “the tendency of the intellectual community 
to go along like a herd in support of state (and private) power is just overwhelming. Intellectuals 
like to think of themselves as dissident, critical, courageous, standing up against power…it is 
absolutely untrue. If you look at the historical record that is a small fringe and they’re usually 
punished.”52 When it comes to the Balkans, loyalty to the official narrative is seemingly unrivaled. 
Professor David Gibbs describes this unfettered commitment to preserving and disseminating the 
official narrative as the ‘Balkan propaganda machine,’ which, he states,  
comprises academics, journalists, and bloggers who hold tenaciously to a simplified 
version of the Balkan wars as being caused almost entirely by Serbs; they view the 
later NATO interventions against the Serbs positively. For these activists, the Balkan 
conflict has become a great crusade, one that defies rational analysis. Any deviation 
                                                        
52 The interview can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUQ_0MubbcM.  
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from the prescribed narrative is considered an act of immorality, deserving of 
punishment.”53  
 
Although this phenomenon raises significant issues, the point here is not to indict (a subset of) 
academicians for appealing to conventional wisdom, it is simply to show that conventional wisdom 
about Yugoslavia has even permeated environments that are meant to be safe from these types of 
sweeping, negative stereotypes.54 Furthermore, by appealing to conventional wisdom about 
Yugoslavia, scholars contribute to the demonization process by disseminating the negative 
stereotypes that caricaturize the Serbs as soulless and immoral ‘genociders’ through their research 
and in their lectures. 
Ultimately, the main objective of demonizing a group, other than to gain public support for 
a particular foreign policy (usually a ‘humanitarian intervention’), is to dehumanize it, as it places 
the target group outside of the moral boundaries of society and makes crimes and atrocities 
committed against it seem acceptable, even just (Opotow, 1990).  
Dehumanization 
Dehumanization has been defined as a “psychological process of demonizing the enemy, 
making them seem less than human and hence not worthy of humane treatment” (Maiese, 2003). It 
is also an “extension of a less intense process of developing an ‘enemy image’ of the 
opponent…[which] is a negative stereotype through which the opposing group is viewed as evil, in 
contrast to one's own side, which is seen as good” (Maiese, 2003). Dehumanization generally leads 
                                                        
53 (http://original.antiwar.com/david-gibbs/2012/06/10/welcome-to-the-balkan-propaganda-
machine/) 
54 Anecdotally speaking, I was recently told by an undergraduate student – who is of Bosnian 
Muslim heritage and was taking a course on the Yugoslav conflicts at a prestigious American 
university – that his “professor is extremely anti-Serb” and that as long as he writes something 
that is anti-Serb for his final paper he will “for sure get an A.” I have had similar experiences in 
my academic career. 
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to a processes known as ‘moral exclusion’, by which targeted groups are placed “outside the 
boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply…[they] are perceived 
as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving”(Opotow, 1990; p. 1). Consequently, and as Optow 
(1990; p. 1) describes, “harming or exploiting them appears to be appropriate, acceptable, or just.”  
Serbs were dehumanized mainly through media demonization, which can lead to the public 
viewing the targeted group as ‘less than’. As Serbs were placed outside the moral boundaries of 
society, crimes and atrocities committed against them were viewed as just.55 Some journalists even 
resorted to openly calling for war-crimes to be committed against Serbs. FAIR (2000), the national 
media watch group, condemned Western mainstream media outlets for engaging in “crude race-
hatred and war-crime agitation” and singled out the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman and 
Fox’s Bill O’Reilly for particularly egregious offences. FAIR also protested the Committee to 
Protect Journalists’ (CPJ) exclusion of the 16 Serbian journalists killed by NATO – when it 
bombed Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) in April 1999 – from its annual list of journalists murdered 
because of their work. Even though Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) 
condemned the attack and AI called it a war-crime, 56 American mainstream media and 
government officials celebrated it.  
                                                        
55 A vast amount of scholarly literature on the Yugoslav conflicts typically depicts the destruction 
of Yugoslavia and the killing of Serbs as, for the most part, necessary and just. ‘Just War’ theorists 
were especially guilty of perpetuating this view. Furthermore, the literature on NATO’s three-
month illegal bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (generally referred to as the ‘Kosovo War’) 
that killed thousands of civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands was particularly heralded as 
necessary and just. See, for instance, Ignatieff (2001), Lambeth (2001), Orend (1999), Reiff 
(1996) and Roberts (1999). 
56 See https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/04/no-justicia-victimas-bombardeos-otan-
20090423/ and 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141022190610/http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-
01.htm  
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Chomsky (2015) lambasted the Western press and government officials for lauding the 
attack, and criticized (then special envoy to Yugoslavia) Richard Holbrooke for his remark that the 
attack on RTS was “an enormously important and, I think, positive development.” In his article, 
Chomsky (2015) compares the West’s reaction to the attack on RTS (relatively celebratory) with 
its (completely opposite) reaction of outrage and horror to the 2015 Paris attacks, demonstrating 
“the hypocrisy of the West’s outrage.” In addition, he concludes that “the more we can blame some 
crimes on enemies, the greater the outrage; the greater our [U.S.] responsibility for crimes -- and 
hence the more we can do to end them -- the less the concern, tending to oblivion or even denial.” 
In this concluding point, Chomsky describes one of the main effects of dehumanization. 
Recent empirical research has shown that dehumanization can have severely negative 
consequences; for example, those who view the outgroup as ‘less than’ are less likely to feel guilty 
about wrongs perpetrated by their group against the targeted group (Zebel, Zimmerman, Viki & 
Doosje, 2009) and are less likely to punish the perpetrators (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-
Sorolla, 2010).57 Apropos the effects of dehumanization on the target group, Bastian and Haslam 
(2010; p. 108) note that dehumanization is especially relevant to social ostracism, and that 
ostracized individuals “feel lacking in flexibility, emotionality, agency, and warmth, as if they see 
themselves as mechanical entities rather than fully human beings.” They further emphasize that 
responses to social ostracism include feelings of numbness, boredom, reduced empathy for others, 
lethargy, an absence of meaningful thought, a narrowly concrete focus on the immediate present, a 
reduced tendency towards action, and lack of self-assertion (see also Twenge, Catanese, & 
Baumeister, 2003; Williams, 2001) and that these responses are defense mechanisms against 
emotional distress and aversive self-awareness (see also Baumeister, 1990). 
                                                        
57 Taken from Vasiljevic and Viki (2008). 
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To date, the Bastian and Haslam (2010) studies are the only ones to investigate the 
experience of being dehumanized from the perspective of the target group. They found that people 
feel less human, and believe that they are viewed as less human, when they experience ostracism, 
and they also see those who ostracized them as less human. Therefore, their findings largely 
support the previously discussed studies that explored the dehumanizing consequences of social 
ostracism. However, the Bastian and Haslam (2010) studies were experimental, while the present 
study examines the effects of dehumanization from the perspective of the target group through a 
real-world experience of dehumanization, which is first study to do so. Furthermore, the present 
study explores the feelings and responses to this process over (an extended period of) time, and 
resulted in insights into how certain effects of dehumanization can evolve and/or dissipate, as well 
as how coping and/or defensive mechanisms may change, over time.  
Method and Data 
Overview 
Serbians living in the United States (Serbian-Americans as well as Serbian immigrants 
from Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Montenegro) were recruited to participate in the study. They 
were recruited through various Serbian networks (such as LinkedIn and Facebook groups, as well 
as Serbian Orthodox churches) and snowballing. Individuals were screened beforehand in order to 
make sure they met the correct criteria. A semi-structured and multimethod approach was utilized 
for data collection, with two waves of data collection. The first wave used a series of focus groups; 
three in total with 10-15 participants in each group. The initial two took place in Northern 
California (in the Bay Area) and the other group took place a few weeks later in the Los Angeles 
area. 35 individuals participated in the focus groups. A second wave of data collection began 
shortly after the last focus group meeting, with 20 participants taking part in one-on-one Skype 
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interviews. Overall, 55 individuals (30 males and 25 females) between the ages of 23 and 81, 
participated in this study.  
Participants were asked to respond to a range of questions about their personal experiences 
and feelings about how Serbs were/are portrayed in the media, as well as any negative and/or 
positive experiences they had in society that were related to their Serbian (or Serbian-American) 
identity. Discussions lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. All of the focus groups were moderated and 
the one-on-one interviews conducted by the first author. Furthermore, all of the focus groups and 
interviews were video and audio taped, the data transcribed, and participants given pseudonyms. 
Data Analysis Methodology 
Thematic analysis (TA) was used to analyze the data. TA allows the researcher to 
identify, analyze, and report patterns (or ‘themes’) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; p. 79), 
much like that of qualitative content analysis as developed by Mayring (2000). Both approaches 
allow for a qualitative analysis of data and share the same aim of analytically examining 
narrative materials (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013), however thematic analysis provides 
a purely qualitative, detailed, and nuanced account of data whereas content analysis uses a 
descriptive approach in both coding of the data and its interpretation of quantitative counts of the 
codes (Braun and Clarke 2006, Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013).  
In addition, there are two main types of thematic analyses, inductive or theoretical 
(deductive), which, depending on the one utilized, will dictate “how and why you code the data” 
(Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). Thus, the researcher “can either code for a quite specific research 
question (which maps onto the more theoretical approach) or the specific research question can 
evolve through the coding process (which maps onto the inductive approach)” (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; p. 84). However, Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006), have demonstrated that a ‘hybrid’ 
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approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development is also possible.  
Since this study was exploratory in nature (did not develop hypotheses) the inductive 
approach for coding and theme development was used. Coding and data analysis were conducted 
following the general guidelines as developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). Their approach to 
thematic analysis is performed through the process of coding to look for themes, with the 
“reporting of the content and meaning of patterns (themes) in the data” as the end goal (2006; p. 
86). There are six phases to this approach, which are listed as follows: 1) familiarization with 
data, 2) generating initial codes, 3) searching for themes/patterns (by analyzing codes), 4) 
reviewing themes, 5) defining and naming themes, and 6) producing the final report (2006; p. 
87). 
Analysis 
The results from the analysis indicate four main categories of themes from the data: 1) 
emotional responses, 2) behavioral responses, 3) ostracism, and 4) identity. The emotional 
responses of the participants were feelings of anger and/or distress. Although the term distress 
was not used by the participants, it is used here as it best encapsulates many of the feelings 
described by the participations – such as sorrow, sadness, upset, anxiety, and heartbreak. Anger 
was the most dominant theme followed by distress, although some described having feeling of 
anger and distress. The emotional responses generally dictated participants’ subsequent  
behavioral responses, which were ‘resistance’ (anger) and ‘isolation’ (distress). Within the 
resistance theme were the subthemes, ‘(self) engagement’ and ‘(group) mobilization,’ and within 
the isolation theme were the subthemes, ‘self-isolation’ and ‘group-isolation.’ The third category 
is ‘ostracism’ with the main themes in this category being ‘experiences of social ostracism’ and 
‘feeling perceived as “less than” (by those who committed the ostracism)’. These experiences 
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tended to reinforce participants’ emotional responses, which, subsequently, reinforced their 
behavioral responses. Essentially, the experiences of ostracism seemed to act as fuel for 
emotional and behavioral responses. Finally, the fourth category was ‘identity’, with the main 
themes being ‘I am Serbian’ and ‘I am Yugoslavian’. Within the latter theme was the subtheme 
‘calculation’ – briefly, this refers to when participants ‘calculate’ whether or not it is safe – from 
being ostracized or perceived as ‘less than’ – to tell someone they are Serbian. 
Emotional Responses 
The participants were asked about their perceptions of the way the media reported on the 
conflicts in Yugoslavia and how the groups involved were portrayed – the resounding perception 
was that the media negatively portrayed Serbs (not one participant expressed that they believed 
the media was fair) – as well as how they felt about it. The main themes from their responses 
were feelings of anger and/or distress. The most dominant theme was anger. The vast majority of 
participants claimed to have felt “very angry” at the way Serbs were/are portrayed by the media 
and that “they were/are not treated fairly by the media.”  
 
Mike: It was really tough to watch the news or read the paper. It was upsetting. The 
way we were being treated by the media hurt a lot. If I had to describe it in one 
word I would say ‘biased.’ They were just biased against us. They always made us 
out to be the bad guys and everyone else to be the good guys. They never showed 
our side of the story and they never showed our victims or any of the bad stuff that 
happened to us. You know, we were the only ones to be described as committing 
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ethnic cleansing or genocide. After the Croatian action to expel Serbs58 there was 
no talk of genocide. It was described as a ‘liberation.’ 
 
Catherine: I never got sad from it [the media reporting]. I’m loud…I’m a loud 
person naturally so I just got louder! It made me angry…well, actually, in one way 
it does make me sad. Only in the sense that I see how much it has [negatively] 
affected so many people. After World War II, Yugoslavia was completely 
destroyed and so many people died. Serbs… and Jews and Gypsies 
[Roma]…suffered [through a] genocide, but we got through it. We…..well, not just 
Serbs but all the people[s] in Yugoslavia, we very quickly rebuilt the entire country 
and our relations with each other. But this time it is different. It’s like the….I call 
it ‘media bombing,’ bombing by the media…it was just too much for many to take. 
In some ways it is worse than actual bombs. Psychologically it was very hard on 
Serbs, especially young people. I see it here but I especially see it there. It’s taking 
much longer to recover than back then [after WWII]. It’s especially hard now 
because the media is everywhere. Nowadays you hear news even in very remote, 
rural areas of Serbia. That wasn’t the case before. 
 
John: I thought the media was unfair and biased. They just blamed Serbs for 
                                                        
58 He is referring to the Croatian attack (Operation Storm) against Croatian-Serb (as well as 
Bosnian Serb) military positions and the targeting of the entire Serbian population of the Krajina 
region of Croatia. Herman and Peterson (2010; p. 82) state that “Operation Storm drove some 
250,000 ethnic Serbs out of the Krajina…. killing several thousand, including several hundred 
women and children.” They further add that this “ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs was the 
single largest event of its kind in the Balkan wars.” 
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everything. When something bad happened, it was always ‘the Serbs did it.’ They 
didn’t care about evidence. Just look at what happened at the [Markale] market in 
Sarajevo, when the bombs went off and killed and injured all those people, they 
[the media] immediately blamed the Serbs. And then when the report came out [by 
the U.N.] saying that the Serbs didn’t do it and the bombs were actually planted 
earlier by the [Bosnian] Muslims, the media didn’t say a thing. All of the wounds 
were below the waist so the explosions couldn’t have come from the air or from 
Serb positions. But none of that was ever brought up. They just ignored it. We were 
immediately blamed and shown to be like….some kind of crazy killers! That 
became the official story. Bosnian Serbs were bombed after that too [by NATO]! 
It didn’t even make sense for them [Bosnian Serbs] to do something like that. Why 
would they want to get the world mad at them and give the Americans and Germans 
an excuse to bomb them?! I mean, there was absolutely nothing to gain! You would 
think that the media would use common sense and figure that out. 
 
Linda: I thought it was really unfair the way the media reported on what was 
happening in Yugoslavia. All of it made me pretty sad, so I just tried to ignore it as 
much as I could. I just couldn’t deal with it. But it was hard to avoid. Sometimes it 
just popped up on my T.V. when I flipped through the channels. I would turn it off 
right away but then it was, sort of, already too late. Anyway, I still try not to watch 
or read anything about Yugoslavia because whenever I do it just upsets me.  
 
Rodney: Serbs were portrayed as killers and rapists, and they still are today! And 
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there was always this phrase, ‘Greater Serbia,’ that the media would use to paint us 
as megalomaniacs trying to take other peoples’ countries. Serbs were the 
‘aggressors’ conquering other peoples’ lands, or so they claimed. They never told 
you, on the other hand, that Bosnia was declared as an ‘Islamic Republic.’ They 
didn’t tell you that because it wouldn’t look so good for the Muslims’ image as 
‘tolerant’ and ‘Western.’ Bosnia was portrayed as this ‘multicultural utopia with 
Izetbegovic as the embodiment of it and the Serbs intent on destroying it.’ They 
didn’t tell you that he [Izetbegovic] wrote a book called the Islamic Declaration, 
which calls for Islamic fundamentalism. They [the Bosnian government] 
republished it just before the war and distributed it throughout Bosnia. Why would 
they do that if they weren’t trying to pursue an Islamic state? Does that seem 
tolerant!? Actually, it scared a lot of people… a lot of Serbs. But the media never 
mentioned anything about it. They only wanted to tell stories with Serbs as the bad 
guys. 
 
Behavioral Responses 
The participants were then asked how they reacted over time to the negative media 
portrayals. There were two dominant themes within the ‘behavioral responses’ category, 
‘resistance’ and ‘isolation.’ Within the resistance theme were the subthemes, ‘(self) engagement’ 
and ‘(group) mobilization,’ and within the isolation theme were the subthemes, ‘self-isolation’ 
and ‘group-isolation.’ The behavioral responses were generally dictated by participants’ 
emotional responses, anger corresponded with ‘resistance,’ while distress corresponded with 
‘isolation.’  
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Harry: I’ll tell you what, it [the demonization] made it easy for me to fight back! I went out 
of my way to look for opportunities to talk about the situation [what was happening in 
Yugoslavia], and I was able to do so at least four times. I had a debate at Stanford with a 
San Francisco newspaper writer who was very much pro-Croat/pro-Muslim…I spoke at 
DVC [Diablo Valley College] at the request of a professor, which I think went well, at least 
from my perspective. Also, I had to go down to Gilroy at a community college where one 
of our church member’s daughter was a student. Apparently, her professor was vilifying 
Serbs to the point where this young lady was very upset so she went to her mom and dad, 
in tears, and told them what happened. So they asked me if I would be willing to go there 
and give a talk, and I said ‘yes I would, as long as I could get access.’ And I did; the school 
gave me an opportunity to talk in this professor’s class and I think it went well, because 
the kids got a chance to hear another point of view. Another time I got an opportunity to 
go to Carmel and give a talk at a language school. Actually, it was more of a debate but it 
was another opportunity to talk on behalf of the Serbs. We didn’t get enough of these 
opportunities though… but, anyway, these are small, small audiences when you think in 
terms of who you are talking to. Anyway, I wasn’t the only one looking for these 
opportunities. There were other Serbs who were willing to go and talk at any available 
opportunity to give our point of view.  
 
Debra: It [the media reporting] was completely one-sided, just really unfair. After 
watching one news station after another constantly making us seem evil, night after 
night, day after day, I finally got fed up and one day I just went over and picked up 
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my T.V. and threw it outside. I couldn’t watch it anymore! It made me so upset! 
After that I didn’t go out for like two years…. maybe even longer. I basically would 
just come straight home after work, eat, then go to bed. I slept a lot during that time. 
I just didn’t have any energy. I didn’t want to go out. I don’t know, I guess you 
could say I was sort of depressed.  
 
Mary: Some of us would organize demonstrations in the area to give our 
perspective. We made signs and some people gave speeches. We wanted to let 
people know that we were victims too. And not just now but also before, during 
World War II…well, also World War I, but we wanted to focus on World War II 
because it was relevant to what was happening. All of the new countries that were 
forming out of Yugoslavia were Nazi states during World War II. They have the 
same borders as the Nazis made back then. All of those groups committed genocide 
against us during that war [WWII]. Just look at the Independent State of Croatia – 
the Ustasha – and what they did. Their official policy was to kill one-third, expel 
one-third, and convert [to Catholicism] one-third [of the Serbs in Croatia]. Just look 
at how the Croats [in the early 1990’s] were bringing back all their stuff from back 
then – their flag, money, newspapers, their border, and also the things they were 
saying. Our people were afraid, we didn’t want to be a part of that again.  
 
Ralf: I want to go to law school to study international law mainly because of my 
experiences dealing with all of this [demonization]. I want to be able to help my people. I 
also want to fight back against law professors that are anti-Serb, like this professor I had 
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when I was an undergrad. I took this class with this professor who just constantly attacked 
Serbs. Most of the time I never said anything but then this one lecture he started telling this 
outrageous lie about how Bosnian Serbs were first sent to Kosovo to kill Albanians and to 
start trouble there. Then he said they were sent back to Bosnia with all of the weapons they 
stole from the Albanians to kill Bosnian Muslims. I raised my hand and said, “When the 
hell did that happen?” I told him that what he was saying was ridiculous and I asked him 
where he got that information. He said, “It is a well-known fact, you didn’t know that?” I 
responded that it was complete bull**** and that he was just spreading propaganda. Then 
I said, “I am not going to let you talk about this bull**** because you don’t know what 
you are talking about.” As I said that three or four Russians who were in the class also 
stood up [and said], “We’re not listening to this crap.” A couple of Mexican guys stood up 
and we all left. There were about 7 or 8 of us. As we were leaving he dismissed the class! 
At the end of the semester when we did our evaluations, we all wrote what happened that 
day. The next semester I took a class called International Law and Global Justice and the 
professor announced that, “the International Law professor who taught International Law 
will not be teaching at this school anymore. He was removed because students were not 
okay with his way of teaching.” 
 
Ostracism 
The participants were then asked if they felt they were treated differently because they 
were Serbian; out in public or private with non-Serbs, such as at work or school or any type of 
social setting. Many described experiencing social ostracism as well as having feelings of being 
perceived as “less than” by those who committed the ostracism. These experiences tended to 
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reinforce participants’ emotional responses, which, subsequently, reinforced their behavioral 
responses. The social ostracism seemingly acted as fuel for their emotional and behavioral 
responses. 
 
Ralf: Earlier in the semester, before that incident occurred, I received an ‘F’ on my first 
essay. I would say I spent at least 60 hours perfecting this paper because I knew it had to 
be perfect, since it supported the Serbian point-of-view. I even got help on it from another 
professor at the university who I knew really well. I asked him to help me make sure that 
there was not one little thing that you could dissect [use to lower the grade] from it….he 
went through everything, from my grammar to my thesis, to the sources I 
used…everything. After that I went to talk to his T.A. which the T.A. said, “You know, if 
I were you I would just write something that would appeal [to the professor] and just get it 
over with because it’s a class.” So I wrote an essay, another essay, on Uganda or whatever 
the country was… I didn’t want to mention Serbia, just because I couldn’t….All I did was 
take out Bosnia and Serbia and replace those words with Uganda and I got an 89.9%. He 
didn’t want to give me that .1%.  
 
Beverly: It was already going on for a long time [situation in Yugoslavia] and I witnessed 
the beginning of the whole situation while I was living in Canada, and in the United States 
as I came in 1992, in the spring, it was very heated. And what Serbs here, local Serbs, were 
trying to do, we would rent a hall, like Ashkenazi in Berkeley, and we would invite 
American friends. We would make a big advertisement to try to explain the situation and 
what was also happening to Serbs. We also organized protests at Sproul Plaza at UC 
118 	
 
 
Berkeley. I have a picture of my son, who was only 7 years old at that time, holding a sign 
that said ‘tell us the truth about Bosnia.’ We had signs that said ‘bullets are also killing 
Serbian children.’ People walking down from the [football] game, passing by us, would 
yell, “Let them be killed!” At protests in front of city hall in San Francisco, we had some 
homeless, even homeless people, spit at us and yell, “You bastards! You killers!” You 
know, things like that….At work I also had a lot of pressure. People always asking me, 
“What is happening? Why are you [Serbs] doing this [i.e., murdering, raping, committing 
ethnic cleansing, etc.]. One time, I was introduced to a group of people by my boss and she 
was like, “This is our Beverly. She is wonderful. She [participant’s voice began to 
tremble]…she is Serbian, but she’s a good one.” 
 
Jane: We all went through things like that [social ostracism]. That was happening to 
everyone. Even today it is still happening. And with the new generation, with my kids. 
Some teachers, not all but probably, I would say, the ones who were old enough to be 
affected by it [media reporting]. They teach that Serbs were bad and my kids feel they are 
treated differently because they are Serbs. Sometimes they come home so upset, even 
crying. They say that they feel people look down on them because they are Serbs. 
 
George: Yes, I had families come to me to complain saying that they [the children] get put 
on the spot in school and the text, in the school subjects, especially history, they are so anti-
Serb. The children are so scared they try to avoid saying that they are Serbian. They try to 
hide it [their ethnic identity]. Even today, even today, this is happening in high schools. I 
could name you five kids who have come to me to tell me about these things happening at 
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their schools. They say that they are treated differently when they say they are Serb. Like 
something ‘special,’ or even like they are ‘dangerous.’  
 
Steven: I had a class of journal language at Harvard University and, at the end of the class, 
the professor gave a note to me and to another student from Serbia, the same note and it 
said something like, “Dear Steven and Trevor, for all of this life”… I’m not sure exactly 
what she said after this, but then she said, “but you taught me different, that I should not 
be biased against other people. Thank you for this lesson.” So she had a bias against us 
based on what she knew from the media but, because of the two of us, she changed her 
mind. I kept the note. I still have it somewhere.  
 
Larry: There’s a professor in my department at the engineering school who openly said that 
Serbs should be bombed, and not just once. He said it in a large meeting where all the 
faculty was there. Another thing, he wrote on an exam…and he knows that I am 
Serbian…he wrote for the first problem about a boat arriving in Croatia or whatever. 
Completely irrelevant for the subject and I knew that he’s trying to provoke me and I didn’t 
react. But after that, when I finished my exam and turned it in on the desk he said “Oh, are 
you Croatian?” Obviously he knows that I am Serbian. Everyone in the department knows 
this and I worked with other Serbians and my advisor, she is Serbian. But it was a 
provocation. Anyway, I don’t want to blame him because the media painted a bad picture 
about us and I’m not sure in the future we can correct that false representation of so many 
people. 
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Identity 
The participants were asked how they felt when they were introduced to new people, and 
how they responded when asked about their ethnic or national background. The main themes 
within this category were ‘I am Serbian’ and ‘I am Yugoslavian’. Within the latter theme was the 
subtheme ‘calculation’ – briefly, this refers to when participants ‘calculate’ whether or not it is 
safe – from being ostracized or perceived as ‘less than’ – to tell someone they are Serbian. The ‘I 
am Serbian’ theme is associated primarily with ‘anger’ as an emotional response as well as with 
the ‘engagement’ behavioral response, whereas the ‘I am Yugoslavian’ theme is primarily 
associated with ‘distress’ as an emotional response as well as with the ‘isolation’ behavioral 
response. 
 
Larry: I am from Bosnia and Herzegovina and at my university [graduate school/PhD 
program], people treated me differently depending on whether I said ‘I am Serbian’ or ‘I 
am Bosnian.’ I said Bosnian sometimes because I wanted to see their response. When I say 
‘I am Bosnian’ people definitely react differently than when I say ‘I am Serbian’….with 
much more sympathy, and I think… basically that’s what the media in the West achieved. 
So if you mention that you are Bosnian that means ‘something bad happened to you’ and 
you get all the sympathy and they’ll listen to you and all that stuff. When I say ‘I am 
Serbian’ they don’t say anything. They become quiet and don’t want to talk. I clearly make 
them uncomfortable when I say ‘I am Serbian….’, I am telling you, I play a psychological 
game with them to see if they like me or don’t like me depending on whether I say ‘I am 
Bosnian, I am Serbian.’ There is a huge bias, there is no question about it. 
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Andy: I lived in England before I moved here and I think it [social ostracism] was even 
worse over there. I used to do this ‘calculation’ before I decided where to say I am from. 
So in my mind I would go over like: where is this person (or where are they) from, around 
what age, are they liberal, do they seem nice?...I don’t know. You know, all these sorts of 
things would go around in my mind. Then I would decide to say if I am Serbian, or 
“Bosnian” (because my family is from Bosnia) or sometimes I would just say I am from 
“Eastern Europe.” But then sometimes they want to know exactly from where. I would 
prefer to avoid this but it’s impossible because of my accent. I sometimes still do it here 
when I think the person is old enough. I don’t think a lot of young people even know where 
Serbia is so I don’t worry with them.  
 
Dana: I just tell people I’m from Montenegro! Nobody even knows where that is…they 
think it is in South America! [she said this as she chuckled] But then it’s easy, you don’t 
have to worry about it. That’s what I tell everyone… my family…to say. That way no one 
bothers us. 
 
Stan: Yeah, sometimes I do that calculation thing. I do the same thing. I add up everything 
then I decide. I’ll just say that I was born in Yugoslavia, which is true anyway. Most people 
don’t ask further questions. 
 
Ralf: I always say I am Serbian! I am proud of who I am and where I am from! I will not 
let anyone take that away from me! If they don’t like it they can go you know where…I’m 
not going to hide who I am! 
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Harry: One time, I went on a business trip to Chicago and when I was checking into the 
hotel the girl said, “that’s an interesting last name, where is it from.” And I told her, “I’m 
a Serb…actually a Bosnian Serb.” This was back when Bosnian Serbs were always in the 
news. Her eyes lit up though, like she saw something really bad. I laughed and said, “it’s 
okay, it’s okay, don’t worry.” And she just smiled and went about her business, but that’s 
how it is. Anyway, I am proud of it [Serbian ethnicity] and everyone who knows me knows 
I am a proud Serb. But, not everyone is like that. I know some ladies at our church, older 
ladies, they told me that they wouldn’t dare tell people they are Serbs.59 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of this study support previous studies on dehumanization and social 
ostracism, as well as provided important new insights into other, and possibly more positive, 
effects. As shown in the emotional responses category, some participants described having 
feelings of distress, mainly feeling ‘upset’ at how Serbia and Serbs were portrayed by the 
mainstream media. They also described feeling low on energy, lethargic, and a lack of 
motivation for action. In terms of behavioral responses, they described responding with 
disengagement strategies, such as isolating themselves and disengaging from social and political 
activities. This was done through self-isolation and/or group-isolation; spending time lounging at 
                                                        
59 Someone from the group asked Harry if the ladies are American and he said, yes, that they 
were born in the United States. A brief debate ensued about whether American-born Serbs were 
more susceptible than Serbs (born in the former Yugoslavia) to denying their identity in front of 
non-Serbs. This element will be discussed further in the next section, however it should be noted 
that, at least based on this study, all Serbs (regardless of where they were born) were susceptible 
to denying their identity.  
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home (sleeping or watching television) or isolating themselves with family or other Serbs 
(usually at church or other ‘safe’ places). These participants described feelings and reactions 
strongly linked to dehumanization and social ostracism, which include feelings of numbness, 
lethargy, a narrowly concrete focus on the immediate present, a reduced tendency towards action, 
and lack of self-assertion (Bastian & Haslam 2010, Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003; 
Williams, 2001). As described by Bastian and Haslam (2010), these responses are defense 
mechanisms against emotional distress and aversive self-awareness (see also Baumeister, 1990).  
Many of them also tried to avoid letting Americans (non-Serbs) know about their Serbian 
ethnicity. They felt that they and their loved ones were treated differently based on their ethnicity. 
This finding supports studies that found that people feel less human, and believe that they are 
viewed as less human, when they experience ostracism (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Although many 
have been able to overcome these negative emotional and behavioral responses, they were largely 
pessimistic about the future of Serbia and Serbs that live there, as well as relations between Serbia 
and the United States. They also believe that the demonization of Serbs will never be reversed and 
that Serbs will only continue to be demonized. They feel that Serbs will always be looked at as 
‘less than’ by people in the U.S. and other Western countries. 
On the other hand, the results of this study have also shown that dehumanization can lead 
to more positive outcomes, such as becoming more politically engaged, at both the individual and 
group levels. The most dominant theme in terms of emotional responses, were feelings of anger 
about being demonized, which was seemingly used to fuel their opposition to the negative 
stereotypes and social ostracism they experienced. Many of them discussed how they participated 
in demonstrations led by local Serbian communities, and some even helped organize and lead these 
demonstrations. They rented out buildings and invited American friends and acquaintances to 
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attend, held demonstrations at city municipality buildings, protested at news stations, called 
members of Congress, wrote to their local newspapers, gave talks at universities and high schools, 
and some were founding members of the Serbian Unity Congress – a lobby group that tried to get 
influential politicians to hear their perspective on the crisis in the hopes of garnering some support 
within the U.S. government.  
Participants within this group seemed more optimistic that change could still occur and 
were hopeful that the United States may yet begin to support Serbian interests in the region. 
Individuals in this group strongly identified with their Serbian ethnicity and many described that 
they were “proud to be Serbian.” Many wanted to tell people ‘who they were’ or ‘where they were 
from’ as a form of resistance to the demonization. It should be noted that, in one of the focus 
groups, participants briefly debated about whether Serbs from the region (born and raised) felt 
more pride in their ethnicity and were not as susceptible to trying to hide their identity as those 
born and raised in the U.S. (i.e., Serbian-Americans), which many believed to be the case. Based 
on the results of this study, however, this does not seem to be the case. There was no distinction 
between Serbians (from the region) and Serbian-Americans when it came to hiding their identity or 
expressing pride for their identity. Overall, the dominant theme regarding identity, regardless of 
where they were born, was ‘being proud to be Serbian.’ Nonetheless, there were some participants 
who expressed pride in being Serbian yet also felt the need to hide their ethnicity, which seemed 
mainly to be the result of trying to avoid being ostracized. Essentially, they responded with a 
defense mechanism rather than any sense of shame.   
Nevertheless, many of the participants, even the most prideful, resistant, and politically 
active, discussed how damaging the demonization has been on the Serbian nation. Many of them 
provided examples of Serbian friends and family who have shown many of the negative emotional 
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and behavioral responses that are linked to dehumanization and social ostracism. This study 
showed that pride, resistance, and engagement were the most dominant responses, however since 
this study had a small sample size the findings cannot be generalized across the population. This 
was a limitation to conducting such a study. To further elaborate, many Serbians and Serbian-
Americans who felt distressed and responded with negative coping mechanisms (such as social and 
political disengagement) to the demonization, might be less likely to volunteer to participate in 
such a study compared to those who felt the need to resist and become politically engagement. For 
instance, many from the latter group mentioned that they were very happy to participate because 
they believed a study such as this one was important for the recovery process and could help Serbs 
who have really suffered. They also felt that by talking about the demonization ‘out in the open’ it 
was a way to resist it. Nevertheless, further research could be done that focuses on the ‘fight’ 
versus ‘flight’ responses. A quantitative study with a much larger sample size could more 
accurately assess the differences between these responses. Another possible direction would be to 
test how responses to dehumanization might change over time.  
 In sum, findings from the present study demonstrate the far-reaching effects of media 
demonization in the lives of individuals belonging to dehumanized groups. Specifically, the 
present study provides new insight into the effects of dehumanization by highlighting not only 
the negative emotional and behavioral responses, but also potentially more positive responses 
related to engagement and mobilization. As such, this study extends the literature on 
dehumanization and can be built upon by future researchers by further investigating ‘positive’ 
responses, as well as examining interventions that could help alleviate dehumanization’s 
negative effects. 
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CHAPTER 5: Summary and Conclusion 
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to examine the immediate effects and long-
term implications of Western foreign policies, particularly U.S. foreign policy, towards the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Consisting of four studies that analyzed 
crucial components of the Yugoslav case, this dissertation shows that these policies not only 
failed to alleviate the crisis but actually intensified it, ultimately resulting in the outbreak of a 
full-blown war and the destruction of a multiethnic and multireligious society. Today, most of 
the areas where fighting occurred are (mainly) ethnically homogenous – especially when 
compared to the demographics of the region prior to the war. The lack of diversity in the region 
is an unfortunate result of the widespread ethnic-cleansing that occurred. The only exceptions to 
this, however, are in Serbia and Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), which are the most diverse areas in the Balkans and where minority national 
groups flourish. As scholar Mladen Mrdalj (2019) notes, “the Serb entity in Bosnia now hosts 
vibrant communities of Bosniak Muslim returnees that vastly outnumber those of Serb returnees 
to Croat- and Bosniak-dominated territories.” The proven commitment to and nurturing of 
multiculturalism within Serbian lands unequivocally contradict the narrative created by the 
Western mainstream media, government elites, and The Hague Tribunal that Serbs are an 
intolerant and nationalistic nation.  
Besides examining the effects of U.S. foreign policy towards SFRY, this dissertation also 
focused on the roles of the ICTY and Western mainstream media in carrying out Western 
policies. The creation of the war crimes tribunal and the media demonization of Serbs were 
seemingly intended to justify, as well as to help sway public opinion in favor of, NATO’s 
military interventions in the region. Western governments, media, and the – Western created, 
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funded, and staffed – ICTY predominately described the conflicts using the ‘good versus evil’ 
binary opposition that is frequently used in media frames (Boyd-Barrett, 2016; Hammond, 
2000b). The Serbs were framed as the ‘evil demons’ with the intent to destroy anyone in their 
way towards pursuing a ‘Greater Serbia,’ while the Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo 
Albanians were framed as innocent victims seeking freedom and democracy.  
The ‘good versus evil’ frame is generally used to try to garner support for a 
‘humanitarian intervention,’ and it can be very effective as it “taps into deep-seated cultural 
narratives” (Milojevich & Beattie, 2017). By tapping into deep-seated cultural narratives, frames 
such as the ‘evil Serbs’ frame influence people to construe an issue or conflict in accordance 
with widely held beliefs – such as “my country always seeks to do good around the world” 
(Lakoff, 2011) – and have a “natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with a 
broader political culture. Resonances increase the appeal of a frame by making it appear natural 
and familiar” (Gamson, 1992, p. 142). This type of frame works particularly well in the United 
States, where the broader political culture has “embraced the global responsibility theme” 
(Gamson, 1992, p. 142) – or, to put another way, the ‘we are responsible for protecting the world 
from evil’ theme. In a recent interview,60 Dr. Gabor Maté discusses America’s distinct 
responsiveness to the ‘good versus evil’ narrative, stating that America “is very much addicted to 
the ‘good guy/bad guy’ scenario…so that reality is not complex and it’s not subtle and it’s not a 
build-up of multiple dynamics, internal and external. But basically there is evil and there is good, 
and evil is going to be caught out by good and destroyed by it.” 
 In reality, the situation in Yugoslavia was just as Dr. Maté describes real world 
phenomena; extremely complex with multiple internal and external dynamics. The most 
                                                        
60 The interview can be viewed in full at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uR07OtEhKPE 
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important elements that are often omitted from the Yugoslavia narrative are that all of the ethnic 
groups involved in the conflicts shared similar goals (self-determination) and concerns (security), 
and all were guilty of committing wartime atrocities. They were both perpetrators and victims of 
war crimes, without exception. Furthermore, and as discussed in Chapters 2-4, Serbs suffered as 
much as any other group in Yugoslavia, with victims in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro. Serbians were almost entirely ethnically cleansed from Croatia and Kosovo, as well 
as from Sarajevo and many other Muslim and Croat dominated areas of Bosnia. As discussed in 
previous chapters, war crimes committed against Serbs were ignored by the media and the ICTY, 
and for this reason they are not well known in Western countries. However, even when the 
subject of war crimes committed by non-Serbs are broached, whether in social media, 
classrooms, or at academic conferences, the dialogue is either abruptly shut down or arguments 
are made that minimize Serbs as victims while aggrandizing their role as perpetrators.  
The following lines of reasoning have seemingly permeated Western societies to justify 
crimes committed against Serbs, as well as to justify their dehumanization: ‘but the Serbs 
committed the most crimes’ and ‘but the Serbs started the war.’ Essentially, the argument is that 
‘the Serbs were guilty for starting the war and for committing the worst crimes so anything bad 
that happened to them was simply a consequence of their own actions.’ To put it another way, 
‘the Serbs did it to themselves so they got what they deserved!’ Jatras (2002), for instance, notes 
that, as a result of media demonization, this view has become pervasive within American society. 
She states, “As for suffering Serbs, including hungry Serbian children? ‘They got what they 
deserve,’ was, and continues to be, the overriding American mentality, so successful has been 
their demonization because of TV ‘specials’ and movies….” This attitude is not limited only to 
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Americans, though. As recently as October 2017, Herta Müller, the German-Romanian Nobel 
Prize winner, remarked that 
I still think the same [as I always have about Yugoslavia]. A lot has happened. A lot of 
evil was inflicted on Kosovo and Bosnia [by Serbs], all because of this horrendous 
nationalism. I was scared. I did not expect that from a country like Yugoslavia which, 
back in the day, was a haven. I did not expect for nationalism to explode in it. This 
country [Serbia] caused its own pain and suffering. Serbs inflicted evil upon 
themselves.61 
 
She made this statement while participating in a public forum in Serbia’s capital city of 
Belgrade, no less. Clearly, she subscribes to the conventional wisdom that Serbs are uniquely 
evil and it was Serbian nationalism that caused the war. Subsequently, she takes a logical leap to 
claim that Serbs have only themselves to blame for their pain and suffering. According to this 
logic, the Germans ‘got what they deserved’ when tens of thousands of German civilians were 
killed as a result of the bombing of Dresden by the United States and Britain at the end of WWII, 
and the Japanese had only themselves to blame for the widespread death, destruction, and 
suffering caused by the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the 
United States. Obviously, this argument is a logical fallacy. Any side involved in a conflict can 
commit war crimes, regardless of who may or may not be to blame for starting the conflict. 
Nevertheless, and as demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the claim that Serbian 
nationalism caused the war – which Müller makes – is inaccurate. 
As illuminated in Chapter 1, there were numerous factors that led to civil war enveloping 
Yugoslavia, however only one causal factor of the war was a necessary condition. Study 1 
analyzed the processes and effects of U.S. (as well as E.C.) foreign policy during the early stages 
of the Yugoslav crisis; focusing on one causal factor – the West’s strategy of coercion from 
                                                        
61 See https://www.dialoginternational.com/dialog_international/2017/11/herta-m%C3%BCller-
outrages-the-serbs-by-speaking-the-truth.html 
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1990-91. Using counterfactual theory of causation, as well as counterfactual analysis, with an 
emphasis on historical and logical consistency, and necessary and sufficient conditions, this 
study showed that the coercive strategy implemented by Western powers in the Balkans from 
1990-91 was the cause of the war. The other main causal factors for the outbreak of war were: 1) 
secessionist groups (i.e., the Croats, Slovenians, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanian) seeking to 
break apart the country through violence, 2) the Unilateral Declarations of Independence (UDIs) 
made by these same groups, and 3) the recognition of the UDIs by Western powers. Müller is 
seemingly a victim of the propaganda war against the Serbs as she, more or less, parroted the 
main talking points of the mainstream media’s frame of the Yugoslav conflicts. 
Unfortunately, the Tribunal contributed significantly towards creating the narrative of the 
‘evil Serbs’ that pervades society and is accepted by the likes of Müller and others. Müller is not 
the exception here (regarding her views on Yugoslavia), she is the rule, and she is not completely 
culpable for having these views. However, as an influential personality on the world stage, she 
becomes a complicit actor when she shares or expresses her anti-Serb views in public, which 
continues the cycle of disavowing Serbian victims, perpetuating the ‘evil Serbs’ stereotype, and 
dehumanizing Serbs. Next to the Western mainstream media, perhaps no other actor has done 
more to dehumanize Serbs than the ICTY. It seemingly did everything in its power to avoid 
recognizing Serbian victims, whether inside the courtroom or outside it. Study 2 (Chapter 2) 
shows that the disparities between the conviction rates and sentencing of Serb and non-Serb 
defendants are statistically significant – Serbs were 15 times more likely to be convicted than 
non-Serbs. Furthermore, defendants (regardless of their ethnicity) whose victims were Serbian 
were significantly more likely to be acquitted than defendants whose victims were non-Serbs. 
The results of this study overwhelmingly point to a blatant anti-Serb bias by the Tribunal.   
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Overall, the findings of this study support previous studies that have called the Tribunal’s 
impartiality into question. Perhaps most importantly, the results raise some serious concerns, 
especially when it comes to the impact the Tribunal has had, and continues to have, on 
peacebuilding and reconciliation in the region. As noted in previous chapters, it has been 
demonstrated that many communities in the Balkans have negative perceptions of the ICTY and 
that the workings of the Tribunal have aggravated tensions in the region. Instead of directly 
addressing the issues that led to the negative perceptions, however, the ICTY reacted with 
hostility towards these groups and minimized their concerns by essentially claiming that any 
issues they may have with the ICTY are simply a result of the propaganda created by the 
regional media and governments – as opposed to anything the Tribunal actually did (ICTYb, 
n.d.). The Tribunal, subsequently, created an ‘outreach program’ to disseminate positive 
messages about it to try to change its negative image in the region.  
The ICTY describes its Outreach program as essentially a beacon of light that has 
unequivocally helped give thousands of people a “chance to communicate directly with Tribunal 
representatives.” It also makes the claim that the information it provides is “accurate” – as 
opposed to the “hostile information’ provided by the regional media and politicians – and that 
having access to the ICTY’s accurate information “has served to dispel myths and prejudices 
about the Court” (ICTYb, n.d.). The “myths and prejudices” to which the court refers are mainly 
those that it has been repudiating since its inception – that it was biased and a tool used by 
Western powers (mainly the United States) to further their political interests in the region and 
beyond. The ICTY has never disclosed, however, any evidence to show that these ‘myths and 
prejudices’ (i.e., that it was biased) have actually been dispelled. Nevertheless, common sense 
would dictate that if the Tribunal genuinely was fair and impartial, then the messages it 
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disseminates through its Outreach program should also be fair and impartial. Essentially, the 
messages should be framed in a way that treats all of the groups, more or less, equally. This 
means that the perpetrators, victims, and crimes committed should be framed similarly, 
regardless of ethnicity. For instance, if the crime that is being described was ethnic cleansing, 
then the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ should be used consistently when describing that crime. 
Therefore, describing what Muslim victims or Croatian victims or Serbian victims or Albanian 
victims went through should be done in a relatively similar manner.  
Study 3 examined the messages disseminated by the ICTY through its Outreach program, 
and it, therefore, extends on the issue of bias. The results show that the Tribunal’s frame of the 
Yugoslav conflicts mirrors the frame that was devised and disseminated by Western mainstream 
media and governments – in particular the media and government of the United States. Similarly 
to the Western media frame, the ICTY’s frame depicts Serbs as uniquely evil and genocidal, 
while non-Serb groups are depicted largely as innocent victims. Therefore, it supports Study 2 of 
this dissertation as well as previous studies that have demonstrated an anti-Serb bias by the 
ICTY. Both Study 2 and Study 3 clearly show that the ICTY is not fair and impartial, and that 
there were mostly likely some ulterior motives involved in its workings. Furthermore, and 
besides seemingly having a negative impact on peacebuilding and reconciliation in the region, 
the workings of the Tribunal have significantly contributed to the negative perception of Serbs 
around the world. By disproportionately indicting and convicting Serbs, as well as depicting 
them as uniquely evil and genocidal, the ICTY has played a prominent role in the demonization 
of Serbs. As a result of this, as well as the policies and actions of Western governments and the 
mainstream media, individuals of Serbian ethnicity, regardless of their origin, have had to suffer 
the consequences of dehumanization.  
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Study 4 examined the effects of the ongoing media demonization/dehumanization against 
the Serbs that began at the onset of the crisis in Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. Recent empirical 
research has shown that dehumanization can have severely negative consequences. Serbians and 
Serbian-Americans were recruited to participate in a series of focus groups and one-on-one, 
semi-structured interviews via Skype. The results show effects that include feelings of numbness, 
lethargy, a reduced tendency towards action, and lack of self-assertion; responses that are defense 
mechanisms against emotional distress. These results support previous studies on dehumanization. 
However, the most dominant themes were motivations to take action and ‘fight back,’ mainly 
through political engagement and mobilization. The results can essentially be boiled down to 
responses of ‘fight or flight,’ with the former as the most dominant. This study, therefore, adds a 
novel insight into the effects of dehumanization.  
 In sum, this project offers new insights into Yugoslavia that have generally been 
marginalized or overlooked by much of the literature on Yugoslavia. The four studies of this 
dissertation focused on various issues pertaining to Yugoslavia, nevertheless these issues (as was 
demonstrated) are intrinsically linked. In addition, I would argue that perhaps the most important 
contribution of this dissertation is that it confronts conventional wisdom on Yugoslavia, which is 
generally shaped by media and government elites (Jokic, 2013). It will not be the first nor the last 
such body of work that will do so, however it is vital for the sake of truth, justice, healing, and 
reconciliation that scholars continue poking and prodding at conventional wisdom of various 
conflicts and other phenomena that highly impact the shaping of our values, beliefs, and 
attitudes. Ultimately, I hope that this dissertation, and other works like it, will continue to 
embolden others to pursue contentious topics that have been consumed by conventional wisdom 
and largely forgotten about. Perhaps the damage caused by conventional wisdom can be reversed 
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and societies, groups, individuals, and states that have suffered greatly can finally come to terms 
with their past and heal from the wounds that were inflicted upon them.  
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APPENDIX D: List of the Accused 
 
 
1. Aleksovski, Zlatko 34. Josipović, Drago 67. Nikolić, Momir 
2. Babić, Milan                       35. Kolundžija, Dragan 68. Obrenović, Dragan 
3. Bala, Haradin 36. Kordić, Dario 69. Ojdanić, Dragoljub 
4. Balaj, Idriz 37. Kos, Milojica 70. Orić, Naser 
5. Banović, Predrag 38. Kovač, Radomir 71. Pandurević, Vinko 
6. Beara, Ljubiša 39. Krajišnik, Momčilo 72. Papić, Dragan 
7. Blagojević, Vidoje 40. Krnojelac, Milorad 73. Pavković, Nebojša 
8. Blaškić, Tihomir 41. Krstić, Radislav 74. Perišić, Momčilo 
9. Borovčanin, Ljubomir 42. Kubura, Amir 75. Plavšić, Biljana 
10. Boškoski, Ljube 43. Kunarac, Dragoljub 76. Popović, Vujadin 
11. Brahimaj, Lahi 44. Kupreškić, Mirjan 77. Prcać, Dragoljub 
12. Bralo, Miroslav 45. Kupreškić, Vlatko 78. Radić, Miroslav 
13. Brđanin, Radoslav 46. Kupreškić, Zoran 79. Radić, Mlađo 
14. Čerkez, Mario 47. Kvočka, Miroslav 80. Rajić, Ivica 
15. Čermak, Ivan 48. Kandžo, Esad 81. Šainović, Nikola 
16. Češić, Ranko 49. Lazarević, Vladimir 82. Šantić, Vladimir 
17. Delalić, Zejnil 50. Limaj, Fatmir 83. Sikirica, Duško 
18. Delić, Hazim 51. Lukić, Milan 84. Simić, Blagoje 
19. Delić, Rasim 52. Lukić, Sredoje 85. Simić, Milan 
20. Deronjić, Miroslav 53. Lukić, Sreten 86. Šljivančanin, Veselin 
21. Đorđević, Vlastimir 54. Markač, Mladen 87. Stakić, Milomir 
22. Došen, Damir 55. Martić, Milan 88. Stanišić, Mićo 
23. Erdemović, Dražen 56. Martinović, Vinko 89. Strugar, Pavle 
24. Furundžija, Anto 57. Miletić, Radivoje 90. Tadić, Duško 
25. Galić, Stanislav 58. Milošević, Dragomir 91. Tadić, Miroslav 
26. Gotovina, Ante 59. Milutinović, Milan 92. Tarčulovski, Johan 
27. Gvero, Milan 60. Mrđa, Darko 93. Todorović, Stevan 
28. Hadžihasanović, Enver 61. Mrkšić, Mile 94. Tolimir, Zdravko 
29. Halilović, Sefer 62. Mucić, Zdravko 95. Vasiljević, Mitar 
30. Haradinaj, Ramush 63. Musliu, Isak 96. Vuković, Zoran 
31. Jelisić, Goran 64. Naletilić, Mladen 97. Zarić, Simo 
32. Jokić, Dragan    65. Nikolić, Dragan 98. Zelenović, Dragan 
33. Jokić, Miodrag 66. Nikolić, Drago 99. Žigić, Zora 
  100. Župjanin, Stojan 
 
 
  
 
 
